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EN
The paper discusses the philosophy of colour in the poetic world of Tadeusz Rózewicz. While trying to tackle the eternal problem of the relation between word and image, the author arrives at epistemological questions which lead him to a theory of non-conceptual cognition. He also attempts to reconcile the philosophical views of Ludwig Wittgenstein (especially those expressed in 'Remarks on Colour', of which Różewicz was a keen reader) with the poetic text; he tracks Rózewicz's movements through the thicket of some of Wittgenstein's theses, and, analysing, among others, poems from 'Szara strefa', argues that the poet is critical of many aspects of Wittgenstein's doctrine. At the same time, he claims that the poet is trying to find his own way of thinking, one taking into account his cultural heritage, whose riches he happily exploits.
EN
The aim of the paper is to argue that the ontological setting of objects in Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' is a version of structural realism. According to our plan, one of the opening statements of the Tractatus - The world is the totality of facts, not of things - introduces structuralist perspective: structures are superior to their constituents. However, structuralists use the notion 'superior' in various senses, but this paper argues that the Tractatus places its objects within the framework of ontic structural realism in its moderate form. That form puts structures and individuals on the same ontological footing. Such thesis contradicts traditional object-ontology that dominates Tractarian literature.
3
Content available remote Cenzura a kulturní regulace
80%
|
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nr 4
503-531
EN
The revival of censorship studies over the last two decades is due not only to the implosion of the Soviet bloc and the ensuing release of official records from East European states for research purposes, but also to conceptual changes in our understanding of censorship. Proponents of the so-called 'new censorship' have advocated a view of censorship much broader than the traditional one by insisting that apart from institutionalized, interventionist ('regulatory') censorship, social interaction and communication is affected by 'constitutive', or 'structural' censorship: forms of discourse regulation which influence what can be said by whom, to whom, how, and in which context. However, widening the concept 'censorship' in this way carries the risk of equating censorship with any kind of social control, thus endangering its heuristic potential. The analysis of censorship should adopt Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance to distinguish between central and peripheral characteristics of censorship, in addition to using the communication model as a systematic basis for censorial practices and effects.
EN
The essay attempts to apply the concept of 'the anthropological imagination', as understood by Andrzej Mencwel in his book so titled, in reconstructing the dynamics of the Ludwig Wittgenstein's thought, especially the forming of his 'late' philosophy. This development that took the shape of 'rite de passage' was affected mainly by his 'anthropological initiation' that had its source in the experiences gathered by him after abandonment of academic activities in favor of the 'simple' life. It was this initiation that offered him insight into the cultural dimension of linguistic phenomena, revealing countless situations in which language is used and perceived quite differently than as a means for 'conveying thoughts'; that was why he recognized the necessity to introduce the anthropological perspective into philosophy. In consequence, Wittgenstein undertook an analysis of various 'language-games', which produced the premises for his critique of the concept of language as 'autonomous discourse'. In developing that kind of investigation, he made use of the anthropological imagination, understood principally as an instrument of intellectual cognition. This strategy, based on the sui generis 'logic of culture', made it possible for him to transcend the well-established cognitive standards and to elaborate the open research approach to the cultural diversification of the human world, especially of language. Viewed in this way, Wittgenstein's thought laid the ground for 'anthropology of the word', the contemporary research perspective aiming to investigate language as a cultural phenomenon.
5
Content available remote THEORY OF METAPHOR AND ASPECT SEEING
80%
EN
The present paper aims at elucidating the conceptual architecture of Marcus B. Hester’s theory of metaphor. This theory is fundamentally based on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s analysis of aspect perception (as appeared in the eleventh section of his Philosophical Investigations). On the one hand, Hester’s theory is worth noticing for the emphasis it gives to imagination (or quasi-perceptual experience) in the process of appreciating metaphorical statements; on the other hand, however, it does not properly interpret the chosen Wittgensteinian inspiration. Its main shortcoming, as I try to show, is that Hester does not pay adequate attention to Wittgenstein’s distinction between the experience of noticing an aspect (so called “aspect-dawning”) and continuous aspect perception. This flaw then results in such an account of metaphor that actually does not make room for aesthetic value of metaphorical statements. Such a result would be unacceptable for Hester himself, since poetic metaphor was in the centre of his attention, but the problematic assumptions responsible for it went unnoticed by him.
EN
This paper raises the issue of the notion of rule-following in the late philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and its possible implications in the field of law. First part is focused on Wittgenstein's 'theory' of what does it mean to obey the rule, it sketches the manner he approaches this issue in Philosophical Investigations and it summes up the outcome - i.e. rule-following does not lie in the interpretation, but it is basicly the matter of the practice (customs, institutions). Second part deals with objections to application of Wittgenstein on the theory of law and it aspires to use Wittgenstein's rule-following as the new eyes (new point of view) on the problems of adherence to legal rules. It also offers a few practical examples of legal rule-following and it hopefully provokes the questions about nature and reasons of the process of obeying legal rules. Last section of the second part is dedicated to the discussion of the authorities in given field - mainly Prof. Morawetz and Prof. Patterson. However, the paper ends with conviction that even if Wittgenstein's 'theory' is not en bloc applicable on the legal theory, still, it is not fully unusable and it has some explanatory value.
7
Content available remote Grammatica fidei: Katecheze „po Wittgensteinovi“
70%
Studia theologica
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2005
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tom 7
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nr 3
79-92
EN
The author suggests an application of Wittgenstein's (1889-1951) theory of language games in catechesis. Catechesis should be more embracing of rules of Christian thinking and action than learning of propositions. Following Wittgenstein's thoughts, D. Z. Phillips (b. 1934) presents such rules in the perspective of philosophy of religion and G. A. Lindbeck (b. 1923) in the field of dogma. Lindbeck demonstrates that this approach is in coincidence with ancient Church catechesis, which was more an introduction to Christian life than a theoretical lecture. Religious education can be compared with the learning of a foreign language. The goal of such education is a skilled speaker (Christian) who is able to distinguish what is possible in a particular language (in Christianity). He/she does not simply repeat sentences or behaviors but he/she is able to create new ones. Lindbeck argues especially against a liberal catechesis. The author of this paper nevertheless rejects the opinion that Lindbeck accepts Wittgensteinian fideism that is contradictory to Christianity.
EN
The paper deals with Ludwig Wittgenstein's approach to the 'rule following activities'. Wittgenstein made many profound remarks, especially on the nature of the rules determining our communication in an everyday language. Some of these remarks are in the center of a current philosophical controversy known as 'rule following considerations'. Among many contributors the most important one is probably Saul Kripke. The aim of this paper is to refute Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's approach to these activities, which Kripke developes in his book 'Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language'. According to Kripke, the central argument of 'Philosophische Untersuchungen' - the private language argument - leads us to so-called sceptical conclusion. From this conclusion it follows that in the everyday language there is no clear meaning of the term 'following a rule'. The paper is an attempt to reconsider this approach and to demonstrate that this sceptical interpretation of the private language argument is misleading.
EN
This article strives to provide an original conceptual framework that should open a way to clarification of general philosophical debates on rules and norms. It makes a clear distinction between rules (and norms) understood as social facts grounded on specific relationships between social subjects and rules (norms) understood as linguistic entities. Norms are taken as specific social rules and divided into three different types: social constitutive norms, particular constitutive norms, and institutional norms. Attention is also devoted to relation between normality and normativity, to the role of permissions and to specific features of technological ‘rules’. In the last part of the article the outlined conceptual apparatus is employed for analysis of two passages from Wittgenstein’s Investigations.
EN
This article engages critically with the theory of expression proposed by Mitchell Green in his Self-Expression (2007). In this book, Green argues that expressions are signals designed to convey information about mental states. By putting pressure on one of the examples Green uses in his book, I will challenge this thesis. Then I will deepen this challenge by developing a contrast between two philosophical perspectives on expression, which I name the ‘instrumental’ and the ‘descriptive’. I take Green’s theory of expression to be an exemple of the instrumental perspective. Expression, in the instrumental perspective, is a means for transmitting information about mental states from organism to organism. I articulate the descriptive perspective with the help of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Ludwig Wittgenstein. On the descriptive view, expression is (at least a part of) an answer to the question what it is so much as to have mental states and a living body. I suggest at the end of the article that if we remain within the instrumental perspective, we will not be able to use expression to satisfactorily answer this question.
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tom 95
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nr 6
534 – 548
EN
The paper deals with a study about rules and private language in Wittgenstein written by Saul Kripke and its influence on argumentation leading to scepticism about possibility of rule-following. Kripkenstein’s sceptical paradox and its solution as to Kripke are formulated in the first part of the paper. Kripkenstein is confronted with Wittgenstein in the second part of the paper. Author’s critical remarks as to Kripkenstein may be summed up in the following way: First of all, the aim of Wittgenstein’s remarks on rules was to describe the agreement, not disagreement, as to the use of language (rules). Hence Kripkenstein ignored the aim of remarks. Secondly, „to follow the rule blindly” in Wittgenstein, he points to the end of justification and to the reflexivity of the reaction, not to the arbitrariness of the reaction as Kripkenstein invokes. Thirdly, Kripkenstein fell pray to a craving for generality and he was searching for the fact of meaning as a mental state. However, Wittgenstein warned us of it. The second part involves also the critic of Kripke provided by G. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker. Argumentation of legal scholars that is influenced by Kripke (or even the misunderstanding of Kripke) comprises the third part of the paper. J. Boyle and A. Marmor are shown as the typical examples. The first one, J. Boyle, even misinterprets Kripke as he claims that the Wittgensteinian view on language is relativistic. This part also includes the contra argumentation against sceptical reading of Wittgenstein. Hence, the paper confutes scepticism in modality of rule-following scepticism identified by Kripke.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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tom 76
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nr 7
531 – 541
EN
In 1919, when his Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus), was finished but still unpublished, Wittgenstein sent the manuscript to Frege, and, as a consequence of that, they exchanged several fairly polemic letters in 1919 – 1920. Only Frege’s letters were preserved. The letters are highly compressed in content, and offer an interesting insight in how, mostly critically, one of the authors of whom Wittgenstein held highest esteem, thought about the content, style, and organisation of the manuscript. At the same time, we can get some impression from Frege’s letters how Wittgenstein reacted to his initial letter addressing the Tractatus, and how the subsequent exchange went. In this paper, I offer several observations concerning their exchange, and I compare it to the parallel exchange on the same matter between Wittgenstein and Russell.
EN
The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, the author attempts to present Wittgenstein's later philosophy as coherent with neuroscientific investigations of human linguistic abilities; secondly he sketches a picture of the current neuroscience in order to find the coherent solution to the problem of 'hard' basis of the grammar. The central role in his presentation of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language is played by the concept of the 'form of life'. He describes two most common interpretations of this concept. At the first glance it seems to refer to the common but culture-related and conventional set of practices which serve as a ground for linguistic behaviour inside a community. However, the totally contingent base of the language cannot explain many obviuos human abilities with the capability to learn the mother tongue in the first place. Neither this is Wittgenstein's point, for certain occurances of the concept of 'form of life' refer to something much more stable and cross-cultural than just a convention regarding practices. The author bounds this meaning of the concept to another key notion of a 'primitive reaction'. The question concerning biological basis of human cognitive abilities in language formation and understanding is then addressed in order to explain some of the characteristics of the remarks presented by Wittgenstein. He addresses the problem of the nativity of general and particular language rules, trying to find common and undisputable ground for further discussion regarding syntactic and semantic features of language communication. The inconclusive results of modern research lead to the cautious notion of compatibility of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and the cognitive theories of cross-culturally interchangeable grammar basis. In the summary he presents the view of language as imperfect tool of communication hoping to develop more precise and adequate model of cognitive grammar consistent with the philosophy of the second Wittgenstein.
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