Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD AND COPING WITH INJUSTICE IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS

100%

Rovenská D. , Daduľáková L.

Človek a spoločnosť. Internetový časopis pre pôvodné teoretické a výskumné štúdie z oblasti spoločenských vied

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2018

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tom 21

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nr 3

39 – 49

EN

According to the just world hypothesis, people want to and have to believe they live in a just world so that they can go about their daily lives with a sense of trust, hope, and confidence in their future (Lerner,1980). Justice can be seen as a key issue in intimate relationships. People want to be treated justly and consider justice to be one of the most important attributes of a good intimate relationship. Social justice research has shown that people respond with negative attitudes and behaviors when they perceive unjust treatment or situations. However, belief in a just world is associated with a positive coping style (Dalbert & Filke, 2007). The aim of this contribution is to examine the level of the belief in a just world (personal and general), find out which strategy is most used when people cope with injustice in intimate relationships, and analyze the relation between the belief in a just world and particular coping strategies. The results showed no significant relationship between the belief in a just world and coping strategies. The authors ´s findings are inconsistent with the Montada and Lerner study (1998), in which the belief in a just world was associated with constructive coping strategies.

2

OUTLINE OF A SUB-STRUCTURAL MODEL OF BTA BELIEF

100%

Sedlár I.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2013

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tom 20

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nr suppl. 2

160 - 170

EN

The paper outlines an epistemic logic based on the proof theory of sub-structural logics. The logic is a formal model of belief that i) is based on true assumptions (BTA belief) and ii) does not suffer from the usual omniscience properties.

3

FALIBILIZMUS V KONCEPCII Ch. S. PEIRCEA

100%

Bajúzsová Z.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2007

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tom 62

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nr 4

304-309

EN

The paper tries to show, how fallibilism and necessity are related to each other in the philosophy of Ch. S. Peirce. Fallibilism as an epistemological doctrine is grounded in the idea, that there are no definitely valid propositions. Then, however, the approval of the existence of necessary conclusions in mathematics equals claiming that Peirce's philosophy embodies a contradiction. The authoress argumentation is, that the latter is illusionary: in fact there does exist such an interpretation of Peirce's philosophy, which enables fallibilism and necessity to coexist without any contradiction.

4

AGAINST THE BESIRE THEORY OF MORAL JUDGMENT

88%

Park S.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2013

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tom 20

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nr 1

5 - 17

EN

This paper critically examines two objections and raises a new objection against the besire theory of moral judgment. Firstly, Smith (1994) observes that a belief that p tends to expire whereas a desire that p tends to endure on the perception that not p. His observation does not refute the sophisticated version of the besire theory that to besire that p is to believe that p and to desire to act in accordance with the belief that p. Secondly, Zangwill (2008) claims that the strength of motivation may vary while the degree of belief remains constant. Besirists would reply that a besire admits of both degree and strength. Finally, the author argues that the belief that p endures while the desire to act on the belief that p expires with the introduction of a new bodily condition, and hence that the belief and the desire are distinct mental states.

5

HYPERINTENSIONALITY OF DEONTIC MODALS: AN ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY

88%

Glavaničová D.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2019

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tom 74

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nr 8

652 – 662

EN

A plenitude of motivations can and has been enlisted to speak for the hyper intensionality of epistemic modals. This fact is well-known and many logical frameworks have been introduced to capture the fine-grained nature of epistemic modals. Recently, hyper intensionality of deontic modals has been brought into the focus. Paradoxes of deontic logic and the failure of substitution of classical equivalents have been enlisted to motivate hyper intensionality in deontic logic. This paper formulates a new argument for hyper intensionality of deontic modals. The argument is based on an over-looked analogy between epistemic logic and deontic logic. This leads us to the question whether any hyper intensional framework apt for epistemic modals would be apt for deontic modals as well. The paper argues that many, but not all would be.

6

DO EMOTIONS HAVE DIRECTIONS OF FIT?

75%

Yang S.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2016

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tom 23

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nr 1

32 – 49

EN

The author ś aim in this paper is to provide a series of arguments against the conception of emotional truth. If we accept the idea that emotions are eligible for being truth-apt, then we are conceding to the view that emotions are capable of having epistemic warrant. Many contemporary writers regard this kind of warrant as the concept of appropriateness or fittingness that is taken to be analogous to truth in the emotional realm (e.g. D’Arms – Jacobson 2000a, Nussbaum 2001, de Sousa 2002, Morton 2002, Goldie 2004). Yet, if we allow an analogy between appropriateness and truth, it would seem to allow that emotions are capable of being true or false. However, the author argues against the concept of truth in the emotional realm, for there are some emotions that cannot be reduced to propositional attitudes which are eligible for being truth-apt, unlike beliefs, thoughts, and judgments. The author shall demonstrate these cases in terms of recalcitrant emotions. Especially, he argues that some emotions are not eligible for being truth-apt by utilizing the notion of ‘direction of fit’. He argues that emotions have neither directions of fit, since emotion is only embedded in belief or desire. Finally, the author concludes that appropriateness of emotions differs from truth or satisfaction by demonstrating that the norms of belief/desire differ from norms of emotion. Hence, he argues, it is a mistake to give an account of all these, namely, belief, desire and emotion in terms of rationality.

7

FAITH AND RETROSPECTION. 'A STORY OF HUMAN'S WAYS AND WAYS OF GOD' BY HELEN MOST (Glaube und Erinnerung. Eine Geschichte von Menschenwegen und von Gotteswegen von Helene Most (1883-1913))

75%

Wojtczak M.

Kwartalnik Neofilologiczny

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2010

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tom 57

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nr 4

379-385

EN

Most Helene (1883-1913), a German religious poet and Nun's confession was published in 1917 as a result of her death unfinished, was written by an anonymous author to an end. It is a text, paragon composed by 'two memories'. The certainty lives by the faith rooted in the retrospection. The proclaimed faith is divided here into two different retrospections. Provided faith is an overcoming of two none identities, the reflection of this phenomenon is analyzed in the text of Helene Most.

8

PERIODS AND FORMS OF SOCIALIZATION OF SCIENTIFIC INNOVATIONS

75%

Berkau U.

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

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2008

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nr 13(26)

99-109

EN

In this paper we consider inside-scientific and as well as outside-scientific periods of socializing scientific innovations, we analyze its following forms: knowledge, information, opinion, belief (as trust), program, etc. Socialization of natural sciences is discussed.

9

CAUSALITY, TRUTH AND REALITY

63%

Taliga M.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2010

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tom 17

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nr 4

488-507

EN

The paper tries to analyze critically what is usually taken for granted - the causal relation between empirical knowledge about external world and the world which is (supposedly) known. The aim is neither to propose a new definition of knowledge nor to restate an old one but rather to take a closer look at the claim that knowledge is a true belief caused in a proper way by facts, events, etc. of the external world. This claim is a core of the epistemological approach usually labelled as a 'causal theory of knowledge', but there are many causal theories distinct from each other. The paper therefore sketches the causal components of D. Davidson's epistemology and the roles they play in the process of cognizing, first. Then it exposes more details of Davidson's approach and pushes some of them further critically.