Nowa wersja platformy, zawierająca wyłącznie zasoby pełnotekstowe, jest już dostępna.
Przejdź na https://bibliotekanauki.pl
Preferencje help
Widoczny [Schowaj] Abstrakt
Liczba wyników

Znaleziono wyników: 31

Liczba wyników na stronie
first rewind previous Strona / 2 next fast forward last
Wyniki wyszukiwania
Wyszukiwano:
w słowach kluczowych:  PERSON
help Sortuj według:

help Ogranicz wyniki do:
first rewind previous Strona / 2 next fast forward last
1
Content available remote Fenomenologiczne ciało astralne
100%
Filo-Sofija
|
2007
|
tom 7
|
nr 7
223-236
EN
What exactly is the substance of the Person – the substantial element of thinking about the Person? According to the possibilities of uncovering the Person by the emotional reduction, thinking about the Person is thinking about whom? It seems, that it is very difficult, maybe impossible, to get rid of the structural idealization of the substance, because even the pure comprehension of the person has its own, idealized structure. The empirical substance – anatomical body, and metaphysical spiritus movens – soul are the creators of typical dualism, where the Person is a connection of these two aspects from completely different worlds. But dualism is not enough, because in that meaning even soul has substantial structure, and dualistic project changes into materialism or spiritualism – depends what is taken as an idea of the Person. But phenomenology is still showing a different solution of this paradox. Relation between the empirical substance and mental sphere is not so simply, as it was presented by the dualistic vision. This relation is mediated by the intentionality. This substantial effort expressing emotions is realizing themselves in the Dialogue with the Others. Intentionality separates empirical substance – the anatomical body, which appears now as the symbol of the Person in Dialogue, and meta-level – the astral substance understood as the most sacred sphere of the Person, where access is possible only by the emotional reduction. That is the astral substance, possible to be presented as an idea of the Person – but this sentence is mistake, because astral substance is not possible to define. Thinking of the Person in Dialogue is thinking of the astral substance.
EN
A person and morality are inseparable because all human activity has its axiological aspect. Similarly, all human activity, both verbal and non-verbal is the way to communicate with other people or with the external world. It applies to direct person to person communication and also to mass media communication. Besides the above, each activity has its aim and means to attain the aim. The article analyses the question of what relations bind a person, morality and mass media, as indicated in the title. To what extent they are in line with Immanuel Kant's personal norm: 'may a human never be the means of your actions, but the aim' or with Karol Wojtyla's personal norm, which is a specific postulate of human affirmation for the sake of humans themselves: a person can never be the means to attain the aim, because this would violate the person's dignity. The idea of the personal norm and Wojtyla's personal anthropology with the perspective of 'a person and person's deed' allow us to present these relations in the article.
EN
In his 1913/1916 publication entitled 'Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values', Max Scheler develops the issue of person and value. In 'Ordo amoris' (1916) he presents the missing link in the relation between person and value, and in 'Ressentiment' (1912) he considers the relation in its inverted form. These three works constitute a whole that stresses the functional existence of values and its constitutive role for human identity in its individual and social dimensions. In 'Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity' (1989), Charles Taylor, going back to the sources of the self, undertakes Scheler's concept of the constitution of identity by values in its individual and social dimensions, giving them new life in the form of values as qualitative differences and their best account articulation. Taylor completes his analysis of values as qualitative differences with hermeneutical encouragement for seeking their sources in a quite theoretical way. Scheler sees the vehicle of values and moral growth in exemplars of the person, which is an another way of thinking about value - not in the terms of an 'eidos', but in the terms of real persons and their non-formal ethics. This paper considers the place of values in this non-formal method.
EN
In his attempt to analyze the problem of realism, Ingarden started from the Husserlian distinction between the world and 'pure consciousness'. Nevertheless, he rejected all the ontological - or rather metaphysical - features attributed to consciousness by Husserl, while at the same time he was convinced of the indubitability of our knowledge of the basic characteristics of it as a sort of being existent inside the human person. If he had resigned from this epistemological feature of a privileged access, he would have had to grant that we do not need to seek a proof of the existence of the world at all. Other ways in which Ingarden tried to elucidate the problem of being - in the first place the problem of human nature - led him to the sphere of free persons. Understanding our knowledge of this sphere demands an understanding of the human senses in a dynamic and holistic way and the acceptance of a personal model of the world as the basis of our knowledge. The 'primary data' of our experience are, in fact, human persons; they are the paradigm of independent being and full realism means accepting them as similar to us, as free creatures.
5
Content available remote Fenomenologiczne określenie Osoby
100%
Filo-Sofija
|
2006
|
tom 6
|
nr 6
91-100
EN
The main problem of this article is a try to find the meaning of an essence of the Person. Asking about the Person in colloquial meaning is asking about the cultural pattern of the Person at the same time. What can be helpful in leaving the cultural pattern of the Person without leaving an essence of problem known as a Person, but difficult to indicate without an example? Answer at this question, will be probably similar with finding an essence of the Person as a pure comprehension. Phenomenology, as a finding of certainty can be a method in that “personalistic adventure”, especially in version of the German phenomenologist – Max Scheler, who was trying to explain comprehension of the Person from the emotional point of view. Emotions, which can be understood as a phenomenon of the Person appearing in the practical function, and creating a culture with its examples of the Person, and finally giving its place in non personal surrounding world. Here appears solution. By using Scheler’s method describing the Person from the emotional side, it seems to be possible to separate the pure comprehension from the cultural pattern of the Person. That shows another reduction, next to well known reductions in Phenomenology. It could be something like an emotional reduction, which separates the Person from non personal structure of surrounding world and not gives a cultural pattern of the Person at the same time. The next move is building a dialogue as a relation between Persons, which defines them as a dialogical subjects.
EN
In the article the author inquires whether Robert Spaemann's naturalistic arguments for the claim that every human being is a person (in his book 'Persons: The Difference Between 'Someone' and 'Something' (Personen. Versuche ueber den Unterschied zwischen 'etwas' und 'jemand'); let us call it 'the personalistic thesis') are successful and whether it is possible to support Spaemann's ethical intuitions in the absence of the personalistic thesis. In particular, he discusses several ontological interpretations of the twin fission phenomenon. He concludes that although Spaemann's arguments are not valid, an alternative argumentation is possible on the basis of the moral importance of the (personal) identity relation and the moral importance of the 'person-making' teleology.
EN
Scheler refers man, on the one side, to the animal kingdom, and on the other, to God. 'Homo naturalis' includes the vital sphere and the psychic one. However, the essence of man inheres in his spirit which is the source of the volitionary and emotional acts. The spiritual centre of acts, the person, is no substance but only an arrangement of acts. The physiological and the psychical vital processes are only two sides of a single process of life. The dualistic view of man does not mean the soul and the body but the spirit and the life. In the early stage Scheler conceived God as a person, later on he mentioned only an absolute being without naming it a person. This being is supposed to be vested in an infinite spirit-reason and an irrational impetus. The 'ens a se' develops from a preoriginal principle due to a stronger and stronger permeation of the spirit and the impetus. And the place of this selfrealization of God is man. There are also presented the commentaries of some scholars and the critical comments of the authoress.
8
Content available remote PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTOLOGY (Filozofia i chrystologia)
88%
EN
Assuming that the so called ontological proof is conclusive (at least in some of its versions) the article tries to justify the thesis that the idea of incarnation belongs to the idea of God, what in consequence implies that His incarnation was necessary. Even though God freely created the world incarnation was necessary in order to reconcile His infinite perfection with finite and imperfect relation (this idea was already presented by some medieval theologians and philosophers). From God's point of view incarnation is an atemporal 'event', but for human beings it had to be something temporally determinate. The aim of incarnation was to give humans a moral paradigm which would show them how to overcome egoism (conatus) belonging to the essence of every personal being. In this way we can say that we not only a priori know that God as a prefect being exists but that we also know that it was necessary for Him to participate in His creation. The second part of the article aims to show that the Christian belief that Jesus was (is) God incarnate can be grounded in a reasoning similar to that presented by Rene Descartes as a justification for our 32 Stanislaw Judycki conviction that the so called external world really exists: God cannot lie - which via ontological proof follows from His perfection - and from this we may conclude that He would not allow that what is believed by Christians as His incarnation has turned out something illusory.
EN
The text deals with different aspects of Durkheim's theory of socialisation. It mainly focuses on Durkheim's understanding of a person and on his specific individualism, which is one of the central concepts of his theory of education. The text addresses Durkheim's idea that every society is in the first place a fountain of moral life, and that every morality embraces a religious aspect. 'Religious' in this context means a relation with the sacred, i.e. sacrosanct principles. When we consider Durkheim's claim that the fibre of moral relations is the essence of social bonds, and that every society is a moral community sui generis, a question arises before us: What should the actual (moral) education be like considering the fact that our so called post-modern society emphasizes moral pluralism as the principal moral ideal?
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
|
tom 70
|
nr 5
367 – 377
EN
The paper sheds light on the idea of uploading persons. Trans-humanists defend the possibility of uploading persons. However, this might lead to substantial dualism of a person and its substrate. Dualism contradicts other trans-humanist philosophical presuppositions so, the trans-humanist theory as a whole could be contradictory. The problem of dualism can be eliminated by introducing the concept of emulation. Thus the concept of emulation could resolve the aforementioned contradiction in the trans-humanist theory. On the other hand, the drawback of the concept of emulation could be a threat to personal identity. Hence, the main task of transhumanism is not to tackle the problem of person but rather that of personal identity.
Konštantínove listy
|
2019
|
tom 12
|
nr 2
135 – 147
EN
This article presents the issue of the value platform of Byzantine philosophy. It begins with polemics about the possibility itself of opening a debate concerning such a theme. It focuses on delimitation and complications of the research of a value platform of Byzantine philosophy and – at the same time – it looks for chances of its detection. Attention is paid to the field of culture and semantics of the terminological apparatus. A great importance is given to the reflection on the philosophical expression of cosmos as well as on the meaning of terms like “synergic” and “ecumenic”. The final part of the article refers to the possible message of the platform of values of Byzantine philosophy for contemporary European value orientation and its direction.
12
Content available remote PRINCÍPY EXISTENCIÁLNEHO PERSONALIZMU V KONTEXTE BYZANTSKEJ ANTROPOLÓGIE
88%
EN
The study is based on the Berdyaev’s philosphy. The fundation of personalism is supremacy of person before its being. While being is a product of an abstract mind and is deprived of its existence, the person is associated with freedom. Therefore if there is freedom, it can not be determined by being. The spirit is not being but it is freedom. The spirit can not be tied to the order of being, but to a personal existence. Supremacy of person to its material needs has been defined by the founder of a philosofical movement, Berdyaev companion, Emmanuel Mounier. According to these principles it is necessary to redefine the person not on the base of individuality but on the base of existentialism. So far has dominated the definition of a person in substacial definition according to Boëthius. We propose here non substantial determination. Because the spirit, pneuma, is the fundament of the personal identification and self-indentification. We develop this based on the authentic legacy of the Byzantine anthropology. According to it the fundamental characteristic of personal existence is that a person enters into relationships. The nature and characteristics of the person are manifested only in the relationship. Individuality is not able to create relationships. A person is determined to develop such relationships in vertical and horizontal directions hence to divine and human being. The prototyp is the Trinitarian and divine- human concept of a person developed by Kappodocia church fathers. Based on this holistic understanding of a person we show a contrast to a noetic and anthropological reductionism within Latin (western) concept of defining a person whose result is a disoriented man. Suggested outcomes of this study may contribute to recovery of the holistic approach in uderstanding of the human person. Such new understanding of human being is as contradiction to deformed definition of human person according to natural, social or psychological determinism.
EN
The article is a survey of the development of phenomenology as a fundamental moral philosophy and as “a most universal and consequent empiricism based on primary presenting intuition” (Husserl) in some of the late analyses of Husserl and in the deliberations of Stephan Strasser, Ludwig Landgrebe, Karol Wojtyła, and Emanuel Levinas. In the last part of the text the author argues, in accordance with Robert Spaemann and Stephan Strasser, that such a philosophy is, in the first place, founded on a certain moral attitude of the philosopher and is a personal attempt of each philosophizing person to understand the world and his or her place and tasks in it. This demands the construction of a total view of the universe. Thus, philosophizing is an activity essentially different from scientific research; it is theoretically prior to science and its field of operation is more extensive than that of science, since every science presupposes a reduced field of operation.
EN
The paper presents an outline of the personalistic concept of marriage and sexuality proposed by the eminent 20th century thinker Karol Wojtyła. As a philosopher, he contributed to progress in the area of sexuality when he, in accordance with personalist principles, characterized marital sexuality as two people giving mutually in love (not excluding openness to procreation of life), wherein he challenged the earlier views of his predecessors who viewed marriage as an institution established above all for the procreation of children. In the paper, the essential lines of Wojtyła thinking about humans, sexuality, love and marriage are presented offering an alternative to the contemporary attitude towards depersonalised sexuality as an instrument for achieving pleasure. Wojtyła’s thoughts offer the possibility of once again experiencing astonishment over the beauty and depth of marital sexuality, the expression of which is selfgiving and unifying love.
EN
The paper comments and elaborates on five pages of P. F. Strawson's 'Individuals' (1959, 230-234), together with his 'Entity and Identity' and 'Universals'. The focus is on Strawson's understanding of individual non-particulars as types or universals, and on his contention that the most obvious non-particular entities ('well-entrenched non-particulars') are the broadly conceived artefacts including the works of art. The narrow focus is on the implications of Strawson's suggestion that 'an appropriate model for non-particulars of these kinds is that of a model particular - kind of prototype, or ideal example, itself particular, which serves as a rule or standard for the production of others' (1959, 233). The paper analyzes the relation between Strawson's position and the issue of artefacts and their (largely missing) ontology. It also asks about some less obvious affinities between the problem of the non-particulars (and their entrenchment) and Strawson's concept of a person.
EN
This analysis of the concept of conscience proposed by the outstanding contemporary German thinker Robert Spaemann focuses on several selected aspects: first, a look at this complex phenomenon from two sides, namely its negative aspect (what conscience is not) and positive (what conscience appears to be), then a juxtaposition with other contemporary theories, and finally an analysis in terms of its origin. This shows that Spaemann understands conscience in the classical spirit of Thomas Aquinas. It is not the source of moral law, nor does it appear to be an authority deciding what is morally good or bad, but rather it constitutes a binding moral judgement which takes the form of a call or an appeal. It is emphasised that conscience, seen in the perspective of its origins, is defined by Robert Spaemann, similarly to Viktor Frankl, as an innate ability, a tool for knowing good from bad. No researcher dealing with the philosophy of this eminent thinker has ever pointed out this similarity. The article emphasises and discusses the most original dimension of Spaemann's theory, i.e. presenting it as the most distinctive personal sign. The final considerations attempt to show why, in what sense, and under what conditions the question of conscience is connected with the question of mystery. This analytical aspect has not been directly addressed by Spaemann in his considerations, therefore the article attempts to complement his theory in this respect. Also, the author explains the originality of the German thinker's approach, and offers a concrete indication of where Spaemann's thinking coincides with that of Thomas Aquinas.
EN
Article raises a very important problem of person in a documentary. The document touches the film because no fictional characters, movie characters, but specific individuals. The article is presented views on the relationship of documentary director-hero genre and ethical dimension. Before 1989, a man marked the citizen - state representative, who should not much differ from the rest of society. Political changes in Poland have changed the way of looking at man and how filming his fate. There are many films including historical theses, which from the perspective of a single show past or current situation in Poland.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
|
tom 70
|
nr 6
458 – 464
EN
In his political fight for freedom Patočka sacrificed his life. His action was in full accord with his teaching. The key concept of his philosophy of history was the upswing over the level of mere sustenance of life. In the ancient Greece, this upswing gave simultaneously birth to politics and philosophy. This was the starting point of history. Patočka’s concept “solidarity of the shaken” is interpreted as the solidarity of those who have lost their belief in the possibility of an absolute meaning of this world, those, who know, what is the meaning of history, namely facing up a slide into meaninglessness of the mere sustenance. If history is the history of upswings, i.e. the repeated fight against sliding into non-historicity, if it is an endeavour rooted in freedom, then the problem of history cannot be resolved once and for all; we have to make repeatedly our efforts to solve it.
19
Content available remote Koncepcja śmierci mózgowej w świetle analiz: czy da się ją obronić?
75%
EN
Since 1968 it has been recognized in the medical practice that irreversible coma connected with apnea can serve as a criterion of human death. This approach was first introduced in the so called Harvard Protocol. As a result of the work of this commission, the brain-based criteria of human death were quickly legally introduced in America and in most countries in the world. The only symptom on which death can be pronounced is, according to this new definition, the absence of spontaneous brain function. However, the acceptance of the new definition of death did not eliminate the old one completely. In many states both old and new definitions of death are legally valid. Practically, in these countries the alternative definition of death functions alongside the old one and diagnosis of death can be based both on the cardiac/respiratory and brain symptoms. One of the few exceptions proved to be Japan. The law in this country does not provide a uniform answer to the question of what human death is. Instead, it allows people to choose between traditional death and brain death. The law states that if a person wants to be an organ donor after brain death has occurred, he or she must record that intention on a donor card or label beforehand. Those who object to brain death and transplantation do not need donor cards. They are considered to be alive until the heart stops beating. In this way the Japanese law respects the opinion of 20-40% of the society who do not believe in the brain death. The opinion of the same percentage of people in Western societies who oppose BD is ignored by their legal systems. Initially the concept of BD did not cause a lot of controversy but this situation changed in the nineties of the last century. Since then many authors have criticized the validity of the brain-based criteria of death. They maintain that it is impossible to declare the absence of all the functions of the whole brain on the basis of the clinical tests supposed to detect it. There may be present some level of consciousness in brain death (BD) patients and therefore, they may feel pain. It is significant that 27% of the members of the teams which perform the excision of the heart for transplantation think that they are killing a living person and that in many countries during this operation a normal general anesthesia is required because of the vivid reaction of the body of the patient. The opponents of the brain death theory stress that the accurate examination of the so-called brain dead persons shows the persistence of the functions of significant parts of their brains. There are EEG waves recorded in 20-40% of BD patients. Event related potentials (ERP) show the reaction to verbal and non-verbal stimuli and the hormone production by the brain tissue can be detected in many BD people. The proper treatment could not only significantly prolong lives of the BD patients, but around 60% of possible donors with the lowest result of 3 in Glasgow Coma Scale could be restored to normal life if their brain edema is properly treated. This treatment should be based on the therapeutic hypothermia connected with the application of the thyroid hormones, whose level is usually too low in the patients with the brain injury. There is a growing lack of consensus regarding the issue of brain death, especially among physicians. Some regard brain death as a biological one, some as the death of the person but not of the human body, and the rest, as a definition accepted by the society, which doesn’t require other legitimacy than the freely chosen criteria. The brain death concept is also criticized from the philosophical point of view. The strength of the brain death theory was based on the premise that the brain is the integrating center of the body. According to this argument, the death of the brain means that the organism ceases to exist for it is no longer a functioning whole. To this argument the opponents of the brain death concept say that this question is not a question a priori but an empirical one and that the empirical data validate the opposite opinion, which says that the bodies of brain dead patients are alive. Some widely known cases show that even the real death of the entire brain means the death of the body and, therefore, may not signify the death of a human person. The integration of the body is the function of the organism as a whole and not of a single organ, even if this organ is the brain. This point of view can be confirmed by the opinion of St. Thomas Aquinas who says that the soul is primarily and per se connected with the body as a whole as the proportionate perfectible and only secondarily with the parts of the body, according to their ordination to the whole. So, the death of any single organ does not preclude the union of the soul with the rest of the body as a living whole. Moreover, the terms such as “consciousness” and “person” should not be identified. The term such as “human living nonpersons”, proposed by some bioethicists and referring to the people without consciousness has not been accepted in the official documents concerning BD. Bodies of the BD people are alive, therefore, it is not right to use the term “brain death” to describe the state of these patients, but rather the term “brain failure” should be used. As the result, according to some authors, the dead donor rule should be abolished. The Catholic Church stresses the sacredness of the human life from the beginning to the end. Therefore She requires that there be no doubts that the donor in BD is really dead. Because of the lack of consensus among physicians, philosophers and theologians, the popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI decided to continue the scientific research and discussion concerning BD between the representatives of various disciplines.
EN
Strawson developed his descriptive metaphysics in close relation to Kant's metaphysics of experience which can be understood as a particular version of descriptive metaphysics. At the same time, Strawson rejected the foundations of Kant's version of descriptive metaphysics which, according to him, is a sort of psychology. His argument against Kant's conception of subject, or of the 'I', can be found in his conception of a person. However, a closer investigation of this Strawson's conception can reveal that it is not enough comprehensive compared with that of Kant. Speaking with Kant, Strawson understood the part of being 'I' which can be known via self-knowledge but he failed to appreciate the second part of being 'I', namely self-consciousness. A comparison of Strawson's conception with Kant's conception of being 'I' reveals its systematic shortcomings that rather support, against Strawson's purpose, Kant's version of descriptive metaphysics as a theory of subjectivity.
first rewind previous Strona / 2 next fast forward last
JavaScript jest wyłączony w Twojej przeglądarce internetowej. Włącz go, a następnie odśwież stronę, aby móc w pełni z niej korzystać.