PL
 |
EN
Nowa wersja platformy, zawierająca wyłącznie zasoby pełnotekstowe, jest już dostępna.
Przejdź na https://bibliotekanauki.pl
Preferencje help
Polish version English version Język
Widoczny [Schowaj] Abstrakt
Liczba wyników

Znaleziono wyników: 35

Liczba wyników na stronie
first rewind previous Strona / 2 next fast forward last
Wyniki wyszukiwania
Wyszukiwano:
w słowach kluczowych:  Merleau-Ponty
help Sortuj według:

help Ogranicz wyniki do:
first rewind previous Strona / 2 next fast forward last
1
Content available remote Jevení a okrasa: tělesnost a animalita u Merleau-Pontyho a Deleuze
100%
Rodrigo P.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2010
|
tom 58
|
nr 1
9-22
EN
The author in this study concerns himself with the question of animality especially as understood by Merleau-Ponty in his courses at the Collège de France. Merleau-Ponty’s starting point is a reading of Husserl’s manuscripts which, in a certain sense, define themselves in distinction to Heidegger’s position. In these manuscripts certain concepts appear in embryo which will later become decisive in Merleau-Ponty’s conception of animality – one example is inter-animality. In his lectures Merleau-Ponty enriches Husserl’s original outlook by his reading of Portmann, Konrad and Uexküll, so that his conception of animality is now informed by concepts such as Umwelt and building plan. In this way he gradually outlines a new and original conception of animality which is now not understood by a relation to the human world, but rather as an attempt to find the authentic animal mode of being, while still maintaining the characteristic emphasis of phenomenology on appearing. In the concluding part of the text, Merleau-Ponty’s conception of animality is compared with that of Gilles Deleuze, presented in his book What Is Philosophy? Both differences and resonances between the two perspectives are emphasised.
2
Content available Rola ciała w kształtowaniu świadomości – inspiracje filozoficzne i naukowe
85%
Nowacka-Dobosz S. , Femiak J. , Pędraszewska-Sołtys B.
Rozprawy Naukowe Akademii Wychowania Fizycznego we Wrocławiu
|
2015
|
tom 48
56-62
EN
Since time immemorial man has been trying to understand his origin and sense of being. He has been seeking to define himself and to find the right answer both through philosophical considerations and scientific inquiries and observations. If we ask what human consciousness is, how it happens that we possess it, how consciousness of our being and agency is formed in us, science will direct us towards neurobiological studies, whereas philosophy refers to its numerous representatives. One of the thinkers who, at the beginning of the 20th century, tried to answer the aforementioned questions, was Merleau-Ponty whose views are discussed in this paper.
3
Content available remote Mít tělo a být tělem : Analýza těla v Merleau-Pontyho „Fenomenologii vnímání“
80%
Čapek J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2011
|
tom 59
|
nr 7, Special No: Fenomenologie tělesnosti
99-114
EN
The present paper analyses the conception of the body, presented by Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception, from the perspective of the following question: does the analysis of the body as a body proper imply a certain form of dualism? Merleau-Ponty’s approach does not allow the formulation of the problem of dualism as a problem of relation between two substances (non-extensive one and extensive one). Experience of one’s own body, however, does imply a duality of pre-personal capabilities of the body and personal performances in which the individual in question uses “its own” body. The author proposes the distinction between the identifying and the possessive way of speaking about the body proper and attempts to apply this distinction on the duality in perceiving one’s body, as described by Merleau-Ponty. Therefore, the investigation of one’s own body does imply certain form of dualism.
4
Content available remote Sartre a Merleau-Ponty tváří v tvář totalitarismu
80%
Pechar J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2010
|
tom 58
|
nr 2
221-226
EN
An example of how difficult it was for some left-orientated French intellectuals to come to terms with information about the real situation in the Soviet Union is provided by the conflict between M. Merleau-Ponty and J.-P. Sartre in 1953, which led to Merleau-Ponty’s departure from the editorship of the review journal Temps modernes. Prior to this, in 1950, Sartre had lent his signature to an article in which Merleau-Ponty reacted to information coming out about the Soviet punitive and prison system by calling into question the very socialist character of the Soviet regime. After the outbreak of the Korean war, however, Sartre adopted an unequivally pro-Soviet and pro-communist standpoint and did not wish to see Temps modernes give space to the opinions of this opposing viewpoint. In this article we provide an analysis of the letters which the two philosophers exchanged on this matter
5
Content available remote Tělesnost a metafyzika : Dekonstrukce mezi dobrou a špatnou dialektikou
80%
Trnka J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2010
|
tom 58
|
nr 1
56-64
EN
The article investigates Merleau-Ponty’s late thought from the position of Derrida’s deconstruction, focusing on the possibility of thinking otherness in the framework of embodiment. We examine the thought movements in The Visible and the Invisible which open up such possibilities, as well as those which close them down. The basis for this investigation is a comparison of Derrida and Merleau-Ponty in relation to the thinking of Husserl, de Saussure, and Hegel. We demonstrate, above all, how Derrida’s deconstruction occupies a middle position between Merleau-Ponty and Hegel. In conclusion we outline an ambivalence which is to be found throughout Merleau-Ponty’s final work.
6
Content available remote Topologický prostor jako model bytí v pozdních pracovních poznámkách Maurice Merleau-Pontyho
80%
Nitsche M.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2010
|
tom 58
|
nr 1
49-56
EN
This interpretational sketch focuses on a reading of several remarks about “topological space” as a “model of being” in Merleau-Ponty’s notes towards a projected work, the torso of which was published under the title The Visible and the Invisible. The reason for choosing topological space as a model of being is, on the present interpretation, because it constitutes an attempt to find a place for consciousness which does not bring with it the requirement of underpinning the world.
7
Content available remote Sen, tělo a duch : Topologie zkušenosti
80%
Koubová A.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2010
|
tom 58
|
nr 1
35-48
EN
“What is experience?” asks phenomenology, so as to uncover the essential structure of experiencing, and founding experience, from which true and philosophically defensible thinking may be derived. “What is dream?” asks Maurice Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible so that he may complicate the first question of phenomenology and sketch an absolutely non-trivial topology of the experiential field. A partial description of this topology will be the theoretical starting point of my reflection. From this point of departure I will embark on a phenomenological analysis of the concrete experience of dreaming and of falling asleep. On the basis of this analysis I will then follow the implications – backwards so to speak – to the consequences for the nature of Merleau-Ponty’s topology of experience. At the same time I would like to show how the phenomenon of dreaming and the imaginary has a central place in the description of the structure of experience, because without it we cannot give a description of the chiasm of the soul (consciousness) nor of the perceiving and the perceived body. I present dreaming as a phenomenon that unfolds at the blind spot of the waking self-concious consciousness and embodiment, and thus also as a specific basis (Stiftung) of Being, which is the concern of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology.
8
Theoretical Controversies-Terminological Biases: Consciousness Revisited
80%
Kondor Z.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
|
2015
|
tom 41
|
nr 1
143-160
EN
Although scientific practice sometimes encounters philosophical difficulties, it cannot shoulder the burden of resolving them. This can lead to controversies. An unavoidable difficulty is rooted in the linguistic attitude, i.e., in the fact that to a considerable extent we express our thoughts in words. I will attempt to illuminate some important characteristics of linguistic expression which lead to paradoxical situations, identifiable thanks to philosophy. In my argument, I will investigate how the notion of consciousness has altered over the course of philosophical investigation and how it relates to recent scientific practice. In conclusion, I will focus on a few recent so-called radical positions in philosophy with regard to a framework within which consciousness and more generally mental phenomena can be regarded in a new light, as well as on the barriers we face when trying to unify scientific results.
9
Content available remote Mezi tělem a reprezentací: sexualita ve „Fenomenologii vnímání“
80%
Fulka J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2010
|
tom 58
|
nr 1
23-34
EN
This study is a commentary on the chapter of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception that deals with the question of sexuality. In opposition to the traditional causal conception of sexual behaviour as a series of reflexes, Merleau-Ponty conceives sexuality as a specific type of intentionality and a relation between the individual and the world. Figuring in his complex argumentation is clinical casuistry, as well as references to Freudian and Binswangerian psychoanalysis. Special attention is given to Merleau-Ponty’s comment on Babinsky’s conception of hysteria which provides the impetus for a new treatment of the ambivalence of consciousness and embodiment. The aim of this text is, however, also to show that Merleau-Ponty’s analysis is in no way intended just as a particular analysis of one type of behaviour. Rather, sexuality becomes, in Merleau-Ponty’s work, a truly emblematic structure which exemplifies human existence itself in its significative and expressive dimension. As such, sexuality resonates with, for example, Merleau-Ponty’s conception of language, the radicalisation of which led him to his final analyses in The Visible and the Invisible.
10
Content available remote Vzájomné presahovanie telesnosti sveta a telesnosti tela ako otvorenosť pre vnímanie
80%
Hroncová P.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2011
|
tom 59
|
nr 7, Special No: Fenomenologie tělesnosti
129-142
EN
The author concentrates on the motive of the flesh of the world and flesh of the body in Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophy, devoting her attention to the relation between them and on the specific features of the relation which come to the fore precisely in perception One of its principal specific features is the reversible nature of this relation. The author considers the flesh as a constitutive structure of the possible encounter of man with the world and as a principal openness towards the possibility of perceiving. The paper attempts to pinpoint the similarity as well as the difference between the flesh of the body and flesh of the world. The respective natures of those two forms of flesh and the nature of their relation form the basis for explaining the principal presuppositions of the reality of perception, which culminate in the notion of overlapping. The overlapping reveal the dynamic structure of perception and is understood as a realization of the basic openness created by the flesh.
11
Content available remote Jak tělu rozumět tělem. Příspěvek fenomenologie k překonání limitů mecha nistického paradigmatu ve fyzioterapii
71%
Kříž P. , Halák J.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
|
2022
|
tom 44
|
nr 1
3-35
EN
This article aims to explain how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of embodiment contributes to the theory and practice of physiotherapy. The mechanistic conception of the body, to which physiotherapy usually refers, assumes a universal model of its functioning and interprets its relationship to the environment causally. In fact, however, it does not allow a satisfactory explanation of the effi ciency of the therapeutic methods used in practice. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of motor intentionality points to the fact that the body “understands” the practical meaning of a situation. Bodily understanding is then manifested in particular by the ability to adequately diff erentiate, adapt or vary motor and postural responses to environmental challenges. This change in the conception of embodiment also has important implications for understanding the therapist-patient relationship and the intervention itself. Physiotherapists should draw more on the fact that they are themselves a body and, on this basis, guide the patient’s bodily intentionality towards a more developed understanding of the practical meaning of situations.
CS
Cílem článku je vysvětlit přínos Merleau-Pontyho fenomenologického pojetí tělesnosti pro teorii i praxi současné fyzioterapie. Mechanistické pojetí těla, na něž se fyzioterapie zpravidla odvolává, předpokládá univerzální model fungování těla a jeho vztah k prostředí vykládá kauzálně. Ve skutečnosti však neumožňuje uspokojivě vysvětlit principy účinků v praxi používaných terapeutických metod. Naproti tomu Merleau-Pontyho koncepce motorické intencionality poukazuje na fakt, že tělo „chápe“ praktický význam určité situace. Tělesné porozumění se pak projevuje zejména schopností adekvátně diferencovat, adaptovat či variovat motorické a posturální odpovědi na výzvy prostředí. Tato změna pojetí tělesnosti má zásadní důsledky i pro pochopení vztahu fyzioterapeuta s pacientem i samotnou terapeutickou intervenci. Fyzioterapeut by měl více vycházet z toho, že je sám tělem, a na základě toho vést tělesnou intencionalitu pacienta k rozvinutějšímu porozumění praktickému významu situací.
12
Content available remote Typika taktilního světa
70%
Petříčková T.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2011
|
tom 59
|
nr 7, Special No: Fenomenologie tělesnosti
115-127
EN
The present study concentrates on the problem of tactile experience, drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s investigations in Phenomenology of Perception. We follow the most important sources of inspiration of Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of tactile phenomena (David Katz, Erwin Straus) and point out especially the differences between them in order to reach a deeper understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of touch a to create a basis for our own development of the given problem. This development consists in showing the correspondence between the constitution of tactile phenomena and the corporeal "synergic unity", and also in reflecting upon touch as a borderline bodily experience.
13
Content available remote Tělo a morální fenomenologie : Mezi Merleau-Pontym a Levinasem
70%
Urban P.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2011
|
tom 59
|
nr 7, Special No: Fenomenologie tělesnosti
203-218
EN
The “corporeal turn” which has taken place in 20th century thought, is closely related with the discovery of corporeality as a key motive of philosophical ethics. The aim of the present paper is to present and compare two phenomenological contributions to „bodily ethics“ – the first one consists in an ethical interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, while the second one is explicitly contained in the thought of E. Levinas. The starting point of our analysis is the conception of intersubjectivity which differs radically in the thought of the two philosophers. While Merleau-Ponty stresses especially the primordial inter-corporeal resonance and empathy between myself and the other, Levinas’ view is based on the idea of an irreducible alterity of the other, which makes him to consider the relation between myself and the other as essentially asymmetrical. We attempt to show that the relation between Levinas’ and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of intersubjectivity is far more complex than it seems and that in order to develop the moral phenomenology of corporeality in a productive way, it is necessary to overcome certain one-sidedness both in Levinas and Merleau-Ponty. This overcoming is unthinkable without taking over the most productive motives of both philosophers’ views of intersubjectivity and corporeality.
14
Neither Heresy Nor Renewal: Phenomenology as Permanent Self-Correction and Self-Improvement
70%
Przyłębski A.
Dialogue and Universalism
|
2015
|
nr 3
51-61
EN
The article considers the problem of the redefinition of the concept of phenomenol-ogy after Heidegger’s critique of the idea of presuppositionlessness, Ricoeur’s criticism of the beginning of the transcendental ego, and Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of Husserl’s perceptual apprehension.
15
Content available remote Pojem živelnosti u Merleau – Pontyho a Bachelarda
70%
Vydra A.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2011
|
tom 59
|
nr 7, Special No: Fenomenologie tělesnosti
143-155
EN
In a small note in the Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty states that he conceives of being and the imaginary as elements rather than objects or entities. Moreover, he adds that those elements are to be understood in Bachelard’s sense. It is precisely the elemental nature which represents one of the characteristics of the flesh (la chair) in Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished last work. If the living body is supposed to open an ontology and to solve certain ontological problems, we need to be careful while analysing its elemental character: the notion of „element“ is not to be taken for granted. Therefore, the author begins by examining Bachelard’s conception of elements, his attitude towards the history of sciences and towards the rupture between modern and contemporary science (for example in relation to non-substanciality and processuality on the micro-level of matter). In the second part of the paper, we return to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the living body, which is, according to him, different from the substancialized body in cartesian philosophy, and we develop the topic of the elemental – a notion derived from that of element – and of inter-elemental relations. After that, we point out several consequences which the reflexion on the elemental nature of the world may imply in relation to non-cartesian medicine. The fundamental axis of the text concerns also the poetic and metaphorical language and its use in the texts of both philosophers.
16
Toward an affective pedagogy of human rights education
60%
Hung R.
Journal of Pedagogy
|
2014
|
tom 5
|
nr 1
48-64
EN
This paper explores the notion of Affective Pedagogy of Human Rights Education (APHRE) on a theoretical level and suggests a concept of curricular framework. APHRE highlights the significance of affectivity and body in the process of learning, factors usually neglected in the mainstream intellectualistic approach to learning, especially in areas under the Confucian tradition. The paper’s first section explores the thinking of three philosophers - Rorty, Merleau-Ponty, and Beardsley - who serve as sources for APHRE. The second section explains how their concepts contribute to APHRE’s development. In the third section, a practical curricular framework is presented. Finally, the paper discusses implementing the framework and concludes by recognizing APHRE as a pedagogic approach for crossing borders among nationalities, cultures, and languages
17
The embodied classroom - A phenomenological discussion of the body and the room
60%
Alerby E. , Hagström E. , Westman S.
Journal of Pedagogy
|
2014
|
tom 5
|
nr 1
11-23
EN
A (Western) school is, among other things, a building with its own spatial formations and boundaries. In educational settings, the place for learning, as well as the human body in the place, is significant. In this paper, we explore the theory of the lived body as it was formulated by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and argue why we think this theory can be used fruitfully in educational research, and specifically in a study of learning places such as classrooms. We also discuss what a classroom is and can be drawing upon the work of Otto Friedrich Bollnow. As humans, we access the world through our bodies and the knowledge we develop is always embodied. The body and the world are two aspects of a reversibility, which Merleau-Ponty terms flesh. He also stresses that the body inhabits the world, and our corporeality can therefore be tied to the room-we are affected by and affect the room in a mutual interplay. In this paper, we develop this further and argue that teachers and students inhabit the classroom. Corporeality is therefore closely connected to spatiality and is understood as a prerequisite for being involved in relationships. We argue for the importance of exploring the notion of embodiment in educational settings with a special focus on the embodied classroom using the phenomenology of the life-world
18
Content available remote Co znamená být člověkem? : Ke knize Étienne Bimbeneta „L’Animal que je ne suis plus“
60%
Fulka J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2012
|
tom 60
|
nr 5
753-767
EN
The book by Étienne Bimbenet L’animal que je ne suis plus is an ambitious attempt to define humanity in relation to animality, a project that considers itself a part of the tradition of the “phenomenology of life”. The author displays a manifold debt to the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, but at the same time he adds to Merleau-Ponty’s thought, especially by tackling new findings in the area of psychology and linguistics. The basis of this account of the relation between man and animal is a philosophical interpretation of the phenomenon of “shared space”, i.e. the ability of the human individual to perceive another human being as an intentional being—an ability that is, according some linguists, an indispensable condition for the acquisition of language. From this viewpoint Bimbenet then inprets the relation of man to the world which, he argues, is in sharp contrast to the relation which an animal maintains with the world. This review not only summarises the conclusions that Bimbenet’s book comes to, but also puts the work into the broader context of the phenomenology of life, and of certain linguistic theories.
CS
Kniha Etienna Bimbeneta „L‘animal que je ne suis plus“ je ambiciózním pokusem o vymezení lidství ve vztahu k animalitě, přičemž tento projekt se vepisuje do tradice tzv. fenomenologie života. Autor v mnohém navazuje na filosofii Maurice Merleau-Pontyho, ale zároveň jeho myšlení doplňuje zejména tím, že se konfrontuje s novými poznatky v oblasti psychologie a lingvistiky. Základem jeho výkladu vztahu člověka a zvířete je filosofická interpretace fenoménu tzv. sdílené pozornosti, tj. schopnosti lidského jedince vnímat jinou lidskou bytost jako bytost intencionální, schopnosti, která je podle některých lingvistů nepostradatelnou podmínkou osvojení si řeči. Z tohoto východiska potom Bimbenet interpretuje vztah člověka ke světu, který se podle něho výrazně liší od vztahu, který se světem udržuje zvíře. Předkládaná recenzní studie jednak shrnuje závěry, k nimž Bimbenetova kniha dospívá, a jednak jeho dílo zařazuje do širšího kontextu fenomenologie života a některých lingvistických teorií.
19
Content available remote Viditelnost jako původní danost : k ústřednímu významovému okruhu Merleau-Pontyho filosofie
60%
Halák J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2012
|
tom 60
|
nr 5
667-684
EN
In his writings at the end of the fifties, Merleau-Ponty introduced a new semantic and expressional circuit with the concept of “visibility”, a variation on the concept of “flesh” (chair). The aim of this article is to show that a consistent interpretation of this circuit necessarily leads us to a consideration of the concept of visibility as a systematically privileged viewpoint for the interpretation of all Merleau-Ponty’s more particular discussions. The concept of visibility, or flesh, summarises Merleau-Ponty’s thesis that the proper cohesion of the “horizon” or “field” is prior to that which is objectively and individually thinkable within it. Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s pivotal idea is set down not just from the phenomenological viewpoint, or in particular instances, but rather quite generally and in an ontological sense. The article offers an analysis of the lexis related to the concept of visibility, characterises Merleau-Ponty’s conception of phenomenon from its perspective and summarises its ontological consequences, using the example of two central themes i.e. the relation between subject and object and the relation between the empirical and ideal.
CS
Na konci padesátých let Merleau-Ponty ve svých textech zavádí nový formulační a významový okruh související s pojmem „viditelnosti“, variantou pojmu „tělesnost“ (chair). Cílem této stati je ukázat, že důsledná interpretace zmíněného okruhu nutně vede k tomu, že musíme pojem viditelnosti považovat za systematicky privilegované východisko pro interpretaci všech dílčích Merleau-Pontyho výkladů. Pojem viditelnosti resp. tělesnosti totiž shrnuje Merleau-Pontyho tezi o prioritě souvislosti „horizontu“ či „pole“ ve vztahu k tomu, co je předmětně a individuálně myslitelné uvnitř něj, a to nikoli již pouze z fenomenologického hlediska a u konkrétních témat, nýbrž obecně a v ontologickém smyslu. Článek nabízí rozbor lexika viditelnosti, z takto naznačené perspektivy viditelnosti charakterizuje Merleau-Pontyho pojetí fenoménu a shrnuje jeho ontologické důsledky na příkladu dvou ústředních témat, jimiž je vztah mezi subjektem a objektem a mezi empirickým a ideálním.
20
Content available Silence of an Author and Silence of a Madman
60%
Nowak B.
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
|
2018
|
tom 2
|
nr 2(4)
38–52
EN
The purpose of this paper is to analyze silence as a specific experience that is formed on the border between that what is psychotic and that what is creative. Trying to deepen the reflection on the area of silence in our experience I will recall two conceptions: Merleau-Ponty’s and Lacan’s. Both of these authors attempted to go beyond the dichotomy of the subjective and the objective perspective in pursuit of a new definition of the subject. Both of them analyzed cases of mental illness and creativity. Merleau-Ponty focused on the bodily aspects of experience, whereas Lacan focused upon the lingual. However, though the phenomenological and the psychoanalytic approach are not entirely reconcilable, in many points they may turn out to be complementary, especially when brought into particular contexts with Martin Heidegger, a figure each considered their main inspiration.
first rewind previous Strona / 2 next fast forward last
JavaScript jest wyłączony w Twojej przeglądarce internetowej. Włącz go, a następnie odśwież stronę, aby móc w pełni z niej korzystać.