Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Recenzja książki W.K. Gródka OFM "Jedno, wiele, nic u Zenona i Gorgiasza. Analiza terminów ἕν, πολλά, οὐδέν w kontekście teorii Parmenidesa:, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jana Pawła II, 2018

100%

Pacewicz A.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2021

|

tom 53

113-117

EN

Review of W.K. Gródek's book "Jedno, wiele, nic..."

PL

Recenzja książki W.K. Gródka "Jedno, wiele, nic..."

2

Melissos z Samos – doksografia i fragmenty

94%

Wesoły M. A.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2020

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tom 11

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nr 1

13-32

EN

There are several recent and noteworthy studies on the testimonies and fragments of Melissos of Samos: Laks-Most (2016), Brémond (2017). Furthermore, one can learn a great deal about Melissos from the lectures and discussions undertaken in the framework of “Eleatica 2012” (Mansfeld A. et al. 2016). When taken together, these studies enable us to fully appreciate Melissos’ original work in terms of its sources, its audacious arguments and its later criticisms. Melissos is here presented as a spokesman of the Eleatic school in an order that aims to do justice to the ancient testimonies that relate and refute his arguments as well as to the verbatim fragments (these are given here in the original). For the sake of clarity, however, various secondary testimonies have been omitted.

3

Aporie bramińskich systemów filozoficznych

84%

Kudelska M.

Diametros

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2013

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nr 36

98-121

PL

Artykuł ukazuje, jakie główne aporie pojawiają się w klasycznych bramińskich systemach filozoficznych, gdy starają się swoje założenia ontologiczne uzgodnić z podstawową tezą metafizyczną sformułowaną w Upaniszadach. Teza ta wyznacza określanie bytu absolutnego jako: sat ekam advitiyam – „istniejący jeden bez drugiego”. Sformułowanie to bardzo przypomina określenie bytu przez Parmenidesa. Późniejsze dzieje filozofii europejskiej uwidaczniają, jakie sprzeczności nasuwają się w kolejnych systemach, gdy chce się budować koherentny system ontologiczny, uwzględniając pojęcie Parmenidejskiego bytu. Tekst nie ma stricte porównawczego charakteru, w znacznej części analizuje wybrane systemy indyjskie. Ujawnia analogiczne procesy kształtowania się kluczowych dla danych tradycji idei metafizycznych. Wskazuje również na bardzo podobne trudności związane z przyjęciem ujęcia Parmenidejskiego bytu absolutnego w Europie, jak i tezy upaniszadowej w Indiach.

EN

The article presents the aporias that are found in classical Brahmin philosophical systems when their ontological assumptions are confronted with the fundamental metaphysical thesis formulated in the Upanishads. This thesis determines the way in which the absolute being is described: sat ekam advitiyam (existing one only, without a second). The wording considerably resembles Parmenides’ description of being. Later European history of philosophy shows various problems that appear in subsequent systems when we attempt to construct a coherent ontological system which includes the Parmenidean concept of being. The account presented is not strictly comparative, and it mostly analyses selected Indian systems. It shows analogous processes of the origination of key metaphysical ideas peculiar to given traditions. It also indicates significantly similar difficulties which are connected with assuming the Parmenidean understanding of absolute being in Europe, as well as the Upanishadic thesis in India.

4

Poznawalność bytu. Parmenides i św. Tomasz z Akwinu

84%

Pawlikowski T.

Rocznik Tomistyczny

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2013

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tom 2

31-54

EN

According to Parmenides, the only acceptable way of philosophy as true cognition is research of being. The philosophical tradition had taken this track. St. Thomas Aquinas had very little information about Parmenidean ontology, but shared his focus on being as the object of knowledge. However, they had a different understanding of being. Philosopher of Elea claimed that everything is one monistic being. Therefore, every act of cognition has the same object – being. There is only being. Non-being is nothing. It doesn’t exist, so it isn’t cognizable. Moreover, the knowledge of being and being itself are the same. As a consequence, Parmenides described entity in identification to the mind and recognized the essence of being as truth. Therefore, his ontology is called “a veridical conception of being”. According to Aquinas, being is pluralistic. There are many types of entities, minds and truths. The core of every being is act of existence. The truth is property of singular beings or judgements. Thomas metaphysics is existential. The truth, that is here identified with adequation of thing and intellect, and cognoscibility of beings, is interpreted as the consequence of existence. Being, truth and cognoscibility are different things. In comparison with Parmenides, Thomas seems to be more faithful to the “way of being”. He characterizes being as existing and avoids a specific paradox that is inability to define the truth in a classical way, assuming her identity with the entity.

5

Structure and Relevance of the Aristotelian Critic toward the Eleatics (Ph. I 2–3)

83%

Volpe E.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2016

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tom 7

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nr 1

149-166

EN

The first book of the Aristotelian Physics may be considered as a sort of general introduction to the whole work. In particular, chapters 2 and 3 result very interesting for the foundation of the science of nature according to Aristotle; indeed, in these two chapters, the Stagirite criticizes the position of the Eleates Parmenides and Melissus. These two philosophers are considered as those who claim that change does not exist because the existence of the not-being is impossible to suppose. For this reason, since the Eleates deny that motion and change really exist, the refutation of their thesis results essential for the logical and ontological foundation of the Aristotelian science of nature. This paper wants to make light on the argumentations that Aristotle uses against Parmenides and Melissus. Indeed, since the Stagirite makes often use of his philosophical categories (like substance; the categories, the continuum and so on), it seems that his critics sound a little bit anachronistic. In many passages of the text is seems that Aristotle “simply” replace the presupposition of the Eleatic philosophy (i.e. the being is and not-being does not) with the thesis of the evidence of moving and plurality, in general. The aim of this contribution is to reflect on the critics present in Ph. I 2–3 in order to underline the importance of the Eleatic philosophy for the Aristotelian science of nature.

IT

The first book of the Aristotelian Physics may be considered as a sort of general introduction to the whole work. In particular, chapters 2 and 3 result very interesting for the foundation of the science of nature according to Aristotle; indeed, in these two chapters, the Stagirite criticizes the position of the Eleates Parmenides and Melissus. These two philosophers are considered as those who claim that change does not exist because the existence of the not-being is impossible to suppose. For this reason, since the Eleates deny that motion and change really exist, the refutation of their thesis results essential for the logical and ontological foundation of the Aristotelian science of nature. This paper wants to make light on the argumentations that Aristotle uses against Parmenides and Melissus. Indeed, since the Stagirite makes often use of his philosophical categories (like substance; the categories, the continuum and so on), it seems that his critics sound a little bit anachronistic. In many passages of the text is seems that Aristotle “simply” replace the presupposition of the Eleatic philosophy (i.e. the being is and not-being does not) with the thesis of the evidence of moving and plurality, in general. The aim of this contribution is to reflect on the critics present in Ph. I 2–3 in order to underline the importance of the Eleatic philosophy for the Aristotelian science of nature.

6

Aristotle’s Solution for Parmenides’ Inconclusive Argument in Physics I.3

83%

Angioni L.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2021

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tom 12

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nr 1

41-67

EN

I discuss the argument which Aristotle ascribes to Parmenides at Physics 186a23–32. I examine (i) the reasons why Aristotle considers it to be eristic and inconclusive and (ii) the solution (lusis) that he proposes against it.

7

Monism in Aristotle’s Metaphysics I.3–5

83%

Johansen T. K.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2021

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tom 12

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nr 1

19-40

EN

Scholars have often seen Parmenides as entirely opposed to earlier materialistic philosophy. In this paper I argue that what is more striking in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book I is the degree of continuity that he sees between Parmenides and the material monists. I explore this coupling of Parmenides with the material monists to understand better what he takes to be distinctive and problematic with Parmenides’ monism.

8

From Parmenides’ To Mē Eon To Melissus’ To Mēden

83%

Galgano N. S.

Organon

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2019

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tom 51

5-22

EN

Parmenides warns against inquiring on the dead–end way of non–being (ouk esti): it is impossible to know and speak of what–is–not (to mē eon). At DK 28 B 8.6–9, he denies that not–being can be treated as real, and that it can be considered in any reliable reasoning. Melissus, in contrast, at DK 30 B 1 treats non– being as a possible state of affairs, as a possibility worth considering as a part of argumentation, though one from which generation remains impossible. This paper focuses on this radical shift regarding non–being between these two Eleatic thinkers, resulting in very different ways of seeing the world.

9

První koncepce kulovité Země v antické kosmologii

83%

Kočandrle R.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2022

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tom 70

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nr 1

95-113

EN

Although it is not until we get to Aristotle that we can be absolutely certain of finding a spherical Earth in ancient cosmology, Diogenes Laertios considers it to have been first conceived by Pythagoras and Parmenides. In both cases, however, we in point of fact do not have at our disposal any additional, adequate sources. Nevertheless, the changes that took place in cosmologies between the 6th and 5th centuries BCE suggest that they are the result of a new cosmological concept. This was based on just precisely a spherical Earth being at the center of the spherical heaven – the universe. Moreover, so far as the concept of a spherical Earth was the product of metaphysical speculation, reports by the representatives of the Italian branch of philosophy would be adequate. Due to an insufficient preservation of the works of the early Pythagorean tradition and the significant influence of Parmenides on the thinkers that followed, it can be presumed that it was Parmenides who was the first to visualize a spherical shape for the Earth.

CS

Ačkoli se s kulovitou Zemí můžeme v antické kosmologii s naprostou jistotou setkat až u Aristotela, Diogenés Laertios ji přisuzuje jako prvním Pýthagorovi a Parmenidovi. V obou případech však de facto nemáme k dispozici další adekvátní podklady. Změny, k nimž došlo v kosmologiích mezi 6. a 5. stoletím před naším letopočtem, nicméně naznačují, že jsou důsledkem nového kosmologického pojetí. To se zakládalo právě na kulovité Zemi ve středu sférického nebe – univerza. Pokud byla koncepce kulovité Země navíc produktem metafyzické spekulace, zprávy zmiňující představitele italské větve filosofie budou adekvátní. Vzhledem k nedostatečnému zachování rané pýthagorejské tradice a významnému vlivu Parmenida na následující myslitele se lze domnívat, že právě Parmenidés nahlédl kulovitý tvar Země jako první.

10

On Gorgias’ Particular Demonstration

83%

Wesoły M.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2013

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tom 4

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nr 1

159-188

EN

The label idios apodeixis/logos «particular (personal, original) demonstration or argument» of Gorgias is known to us only from the third section of the little work attributed to Aristotle under the title De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia. Its authenticity seems to be unjustly questioned. We try to show that from the Aristotelian perspective we can properly understand the context of Gorgias’ own argument from his lost treatise On Not-Being or On Nature. Parmenides – using implicitly the polysemy of the verb ἔστιν/εἶναι – presented a certain ontological argument «being is, because being is being». Gorgias, however, makes a parody of this by offering a meontological argument: «not-being is because not-being is not-being». Consequently Gorgias then attempts to demonstrate, by means of refutation, that «it is not either to be or not be», i.e. «nothing is». We propose, thus, a reconstruction of Gorgias’ account of meonological and nihilistic argumentation. In this context we find in Plato’s Sophist and in Aristotle’s writings certain allusions to Gorgias’ idios apodeixis, which have not been sufficiently recognized and properly interpreted.

IT

The label idios apodeixis/logos «particular (personal, original) demonstration or argument» of Gorgias is known to us only from the third section of the little work attributed to Aristotle under the title De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia. Its authenticity seems to be unjustly questioned. We try to show that from the Aristotelian perspective we can properly understand the context of Gorgias’ own argument from his lost treatise On Not-Being or On Nature. Parmenides – using implicitly the polysemy of the verb ἔστιν/εἶναι – presented a certain ontological argument «being is, because being is being». Gorgias, however, makes a parody of this by offering a meontological argument: «not-being is because not-being is not-being». Consequently Gorgias then attempts to demonstrate, by means of refutation, that «it is not either to be or not be», i.e. «nothing is». We propose, thus, a reconstruction of Gorgias’ account of meonological and nihilistic argumentation. In this context we find in Plato’s Sophist and in Aristotle’s writings certain allusions to Gorgias’ idios apodeixis, which have not been sufficiently recognized and properly interpreted.

11

Melissus and the Problem of the Void: Apology and/or Misapprehension of the Parmenidean Monism?

83%

Volpe E.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2017

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tom 8

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nr 1

91-106

EN

With respect to Parmenides’ thought Melissus was regarded as a dissident thinker already in antiquity. His polemical introduction of the concept of void and the relative idea of infinite Being seemed particularly controversial. The aim of the present paper is to examine the origins of the Melissian understanding of void in order to trace its philosophical genesis to the criticism of the Atomist Leucippus. According to the philosopher from Abdera, the Eleatic fundamental principles had to conform to the obviousness of bodies’ motion, which is why the Eleatic not-Being had to be understood as void. Melissus took issue with this view and criticized the idea of the void’s reality by means of a methodical argument. In the course of doing so, the philosopher from Samos distorted the original Parmenidean ontology, which is why his theories were often criticized severely as theoretically weak.

12

The Role of the Old Interlocutors in Plato's Dialogue. A New Philosophical Meaning of Old Age

71%

Candiotto L.

Symbolae Philologorum Posnaniensium Graecae et Latinae

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2014

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tom 24

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nr 2

15-24

PL

This paper highlights the platonic conception of old age as very different from the traditional one. In order to demostrate it, the Parmenides and the Laws will be analyzed as key texts to understand the new philosophical meaning of old age that finds his main characterization in connection with young age. The topic of old age will be discussed along with youth training and the birth of the philosopher as a “result” of a proper philosophical education. At length, well-educated youths will be able to become philosophers who, in turn, will evolve into masters of others.

13

Aristotle, Eleaticism, and Zeno’s Grains of Millet

71%

Boeri M. D.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2021

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tom 12

|

nr 1

107-121

EN

This paper explores how Aristotle rejects some Eleatic tenets in general and some of Zeno’s views in particular that apparently threaten the Aristotelian “science of nature.” According to Zeno, it is impossible for a thing to traverse what is infinite or to come in contact with infinite things in a finite time. Aristotle takes the Zenonian view to be wrong by resorting to his distinction between potentiality and actuality and to his theory of mathematical proportions as applied to the motive power and the moved object (Ph. VII.5). He states that some minimal parts of certain magnitudes (i.e., continuous quantities) are perceived, but only in potentiality, not in actuality. This being so, Zeno’s view that a single grain of millet makes no sound on falling, but a thousand grains make a sound must be rejected. If Zeno’s paradoxes were true, there would be no motion, but if there is no motion, there is no nature, and hence, there cannot be a science of nature. What Aristotle noted in the millet seed paradox, I hold, is that it apparently casts doubt on his theory of mathematical proportions, i.e., the theory of proportions that holds between the moving power and the object moved, and the extent of the change and the time taken. This approach explains why Aristotle establishes an analogy between the millet seed paradox, on the one hand, and the argument of the stone being worn away by the drop of water (Ph. 253b15–16) and the hauled ship, on the other.

14

Franz Caucig’s "Phaedrus"

71%

Bove G. S. , Coskun I.

Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia

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2019

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tom 14

|

nr 4

7 - 21

EN

The article interprets Franz Caucig’s Socrates with a Disciple and Diotima?, one of several paintings commissioned for Palais Auersperg in Vienna, now housed at the Slovenian National Gallery. Socrates and a young man are in a pastoral setting beneath a plane tree near a river. They are addressed by a woman, and a chariot with maidens can be seen in the background. The scene is from Plato’s Phaedrus, since Socrates never leaves Athens, except for military service and in this scene from the Phaedrus. The woman addressing Socrates and Phaedrus in the painting cannot be Diotima because her chariot has two white horses, indicating a goddess. The most likely goddess would be the goddess in the poem of Parmenides of Elea, the source of the soul-chariot analogy in the Phaedrus. The setting of Caucig’s Socrates painting bears a remarkable similarity to his Amnytus painting, which features political references to Napoleon’s subjection of Gorizia, Caucig’s homeland. Caucig’s Phaedrus remarks upon Napoleon’s conquests, Hegel’s lectures on Parmenides, and David’s idealized painting of Napoleon crossing the Alps.

15

Parmenide: suoni, immagini, esperienza. A proposito di una nuova lettura.

71%

Fratticci W.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2015

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tom 6

|

nr 1

295-330

EN

This essay aims to analyse the Parmenides’ interpretation that Laura Gemelli Marciano offered in the Eleatica lectures. The scholar represents the Parmenidean Poem as a mystical experience where sounds, words and images communicate and produce a real approach to the divine reality at the same time. This intriguing reading, which closely follows that offered by Kingsley, understimates the problems and cognitive structures of rational thought in the poem. Thus Parmenides appears to be a shaman rather a philosopher.

IT

Laura Gemelli Marciano, Parmenide: suoni, immagini, esperienza, a cura di L. Rossetti e M. Pulpito, Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin, 2013, pp. 304.

16

Opposition and Truth: Parmenides’ Enigmatic Way

71%

Tarca L. V.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2013

|

tom 4

|

nr 1

105-124

EN

In Parmenides’ B 8 37–41, we find a question that raises a difficult problem: how can Parmenides handle the opposition between “being and not” (i.e. being and not being) in the same way as the oppositions which characterize the mortals’ opinions? This question is especially relevant for answering the following theoretical question: how do we to treat the fundamental philosophical question of oppositions at large? To answer these question we need to reinterpret some major points of Parmenides’ thought: the second part of his poem, but also the identification of πέλειν and εἶναι in B 6 8, as well as other passages of the poem. But, above all, the question makes us introduce some distinctions within the concept of negation and, consequently, between difference and negation. This allows us to distinguish the affirmation of the truth of being from the negation of the negation of being (i.e. the negation of nonbeing). This distinction has a major philosophical relevance, as can be seen by referring it to such thinkers as Plato, Hegel and Heidegger.

IT

In Parmenides’ B 8 37–41, we find a question that raises a difficult problem: how can Parmenides handle the opposition between “being and not” (i.e. being and not being) in the same way as the oppositions which characterize the mortals’ opinions? This question is especially relevant for answering the following theoretical question: how do we to treat the fundamental philosophical question of oppositions at large? To answer these question we need to reinterpret some major points of Parmenides’ thought: the second part of his poem, but also the identification of πέλειν and εἶναι in B 6 8, as well as other passages of the poem. But, above all, the question makes us introduce some distinctions within the concept of negation and, consequently, between difference and negation. This allows us to distinguish the affirmation of the truth of being from the negation of the negation of being (i.e. the negation of nonbeing). This distinction has a major philosophical relevance, as can be seen by referring it to such thinkers as Plato, Hegel and Heidegger.

17

Parmenides’ Poem: Riddle from B 5

71%

Bogaczyk-Vormayr M.

Ethics in Progress

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2016

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tom 7

|

nr 2

95-103

EN

The paper constitutes a short analysis of the poem of Parmenides from Elea “On Nature”. The author posits that this text is the original aim of ontology. In the author’s opinion, the most important thesis of the poem is to be found in the fragment B 5, in which she recognizes the ancient motive of the self-knowledge (“the inner Way of Truth”). The primary purpose of the analysis is to interpret the mythological language and to reconsider terminology, e.g. Way of Day and Way of Night, Dike and Moira, thymos, plankton noon. Furthermore, the thinking of Parmenides is briefly interpreted in comparison with Heraclitus, Anaximander, and Archytas.

18

Melissus, Time and Eternity

71%

Pulpito M.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2017

|

tom 8

|

nr 1

107-124

EN

The traditional interpretation of Eleatism has it (1) that Melissus was a disciple of Parmenides (albeit with some divergences) and (2) that Parmenides believed in the timeless eternity of Being. It seems, on the contrary, (3) that Melissus acknowledged the reality of time by conceiving eternity as infinite time. Failing to justify this particular divergence from Parmenides’ approach, certain authors held that it was necessary to reinterpret the Melissan eternity as a form of infinite timelessness. This paper attempts to demonstrate that this reading is groundless and that if the traditional interpretation is questioned then one should reconsider the assumptions (1) and (2) but not (3).

19

Trilemmas: Gorgias’ PTMO Between Zeno and Melissus

71%

Rossetti L.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2017

|

tom 8

|

nr 1

155-172

EN

The present paper makes the following points. (1) The summary given in Sextus Emp. Math. VII is of much greater value than usually acknowledged, since it preserves several key elements of Gorgias’ communicational strategy. (2) A sketchy trilemma is available in the opening sentence of Philolaos (DK 44B2) as well as in a passage of Plato’s Parmenides. This is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the very first known trilemma was devised by Gorgias and not by Sextus himself or Aenesidemus. (3) Not unlike Zeno, Gorgias enjoyed to be neither serious nor joking, but remained somewhat halfway. This point is seldom acknowledged, though it is crucial in order to understand that he pretends to claim (e.g. that p), but his claims do not amount to any points of doctrine. (4) That he remains halfway should not prevent us from appreciating some of his ideas, but, at the same time, we should not expect full intellectual adhesion to what he tells us. Besides, something similar occurs in most of Plato’s dialogues. (5). Gorgias owes a lot to Melissus.

20

Poemat Parmenidesa. Fragmenty B 9-17, B 19

71%

Mrówka K.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

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2012

|

nr 50

118-139

PL

This is a new translation of the Fragments of Parmenides of Elea, the fifth century B.C. thinker. The text includes: a Greek poem with the fragments B 9-17, B 19, a critical apparatus which takes into consideration some new editions and a new English translation.