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EN
The aim of this paper is to describe the mysterious and controvential virtue of megalopsychia which Aristotle discusses in book 4 of the Nicomachean Ethics. By examining its origin (which can be traced back to the ethos of the Homeric aristocracy) and the ethical context in which it could become significant, the author tries to present the underpinnings of this virtue as an alternative to the 'classical' view of virtue. Since the latter is based on the metaphysical assumptions which have lost their credibility in our days, he argues that it is the virtue of 'greatness of soul' - much closer to our views on both reality and human nature - that could help us restore the moral significance to the notion of virtue.
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EN
Moral condition of man, resulting from the character, the attitudes and the motivations of the individual determines its conduct. For this reason, it is possible to determine which features of the character of the people involved in the accounting are desirable and which not. These issues are of interest to virtue ethics. Ethics in accounting should be a comprehensive approach to the questions related to the accounting profession, and include within its scope not only the rules and principles, but also the values and virtues. This article aims to highlight the role of virtue ethics in accounting ethics and the definition of a catalog of virtues, which should show the person responsible for the accounting.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2019
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tom 74
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nr 3
181 – 193
EN
The article is primarily focused on the description, explanation and justification of the discernment and mutual intersections between intellectual and ethical virtues in the ethical theories of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. It also takes a look on the possibility of the defence of their concepts in today´s philosophic discourse, which has become influenced by the comeback of virtue ethics, which has occurred in the last decades of the twentieth century. We ask the question whether the look back on the history of virtue ethics can shed some new light in the search for the solutions for our contemporary epistemological and ethical problems.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2019
|
tom 74
|
nr 3
194 – 208
EN
The aim of this paper is to address the possibility of explaining the nature of moral cognition as being rooted in an agent’s involvement in a social practice. Seen along such lines, not only does the recognition of the extent of moral standards show up as based in the agent’s experience that has been gathered in the process of education and developing their capacities for acting autonomously, but it is also thanks to the engagement in the set of such social practices that the agent is able to define the moral aspect, which exceeds the practical aims of a certain area of life. Hence, I argue that in order to redefine the borders of shared morality, a practical experience is necessary to link the various practices that enable ethical reflection based on the moral resources that are obtained in this way.
EN
The article is an attempt to present the fundamental function that care and practical reason serve in Michael Slote’ s moral theory. Presenting them within a single theory is a daring attempt to combine the primary intuition of this ethical theory with the subjectively relevant theory of practical rationality, particularly in comparison with the popular version of the feminist ethics of care, to which Slote considered himself intellectually indebted. This virtue ethics has a sentimental or as Slote puts is "agent based" character and is relatively rare today.
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