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1

THE POLICY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT AIMED AT NEUTRALIZING THE GERMAN THREAT DURING 1935 – 1938 WITH A FOCUS ON THE SITUATION IN SLOVAKIA

100%

Olejník M.

Človek a spoločnosť. Internetový časopis pre pôvodné teoretické a výskumné štúdie z oblasti spoločenských vied

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2018

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tom 21

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nr 3

1 – 24

EN

The second half of 1930s was a period of dramatic political changes in Europe. The stability established by peace agreements concluded after World War I underwent gradual but continual erosion. The main reason for the transforming political landscape was the political developments in Germany which resulted in the collapse of the democratic parliamentary system. In the spring of 1933 The Nazi Party assumed power in Germany and over the span of a few years succeeded in remaking Germany into a totalitarian state. In the context of Hitler´s political aims, the growing economic and military power of Germany constituted a clear threat to Central European states. The Czechoslovak government concluded that it had to apply all possible means to reinforce the defense ability of the state, and consequently a policy of rapid fortification on the border with Germany was initiated. The Czechoslovaks hoped that the Western powers (namely France, who had a defense treaty with the CSR and had on numerous occasions professed a determination to come to Czechoslovak defense in case of German aggression) would fulfill its obligation. Chamberlain, in an attempt to find accommodation with Hitler, arranged a conference with the French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier, the Italian leader Mussolini and Hitler. Despite the fact that the fate of Czechoslovakia was about to be decided, no representative of the Czechoslovak Republic was invited. The signatories of the conference accepted Germany’s demands. This paper maps the steps taken by the Czechoslovak government to implement measures aimed at protecting the Republic against German aggression.

2

ROKOVANIA NACISTICKÉHO NEMECKA O DEPORTÁCIÁCH ŽIDOV V ROKU 1942 – PRÍKLAD SLOVENSKA, RUMUNSKA A MAĎARSKA

75%

Nižňanský E.

Historický časopis (Historical Journal)

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2010

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tom 58

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nr 3

471-495

EN

The study is an attempt to compare the discussions and resulting deportations of Jews in individual states. Nazi Germany asked more or less the same questions in these discussions, but the three states reacted differently to the possibility to deport their Jews, in spite of their home-grown policies of anti-Semitism. The rejection of deportation by Romania and Hungary did not result in the political elites of these countries at this time. Quiet collaboration of the individual countries, economic cooperation, especially in the armaments industry, and sending of military units to the Eastern Front, were much more important for Nazi Germany than the deportation of Jews.

3

NEMECKÝ PORADCA ERICH GEBERT A JEHO SNAHY O OVPLYVNENIE PRIEBEHU ARIZÁCIÍ NA SLOVENSKU

75%

Nižňanský E. , Psicová K.

Historický časopis (Historical Journal)

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2021

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tom 69

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nr 4

693 – 728

EN

In this study, we deal with the unknown efforts of the Nazi adviser to the Ministry of Economy Erich Gebert to influence the process of Aryanization in Slovakia. These efforts are also interesting because in 1940 a special office was created – the Central Economic Office, which was also to deal with the issue of Aryanization. A counsellor for the Jewish question – Dieter Wisliceny – also worked in Slovakia. Gebert‘s efforts in 1941–1943 to influence the Aryanization process were unsuccessful. These failures also show the possibilities of Slovak ministers, or administration to negotiate issues with Nazi Germany in some way and not to simply submit.

4

VSTUP SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY DO VOJNY PROTI ZSSR V DOKUMENTOCH NEMECKEJ PROVENIENCIE

75%

Baka I. , Tulkisová J.

Historický časopis (Historical Journal)

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2010

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tom 58

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nr 3

533-574

EN

In connection with analysis of the entry of the Slovak Republic (SR) into the war against the USSR as an ally of Nazi Germany, some documents from the German Foreign Office are already known. They enable us to trace German ideas about the role of the SR in the war, as well as the degree of willingness of the Slovak government to participate in the attack. However, military documents, especially reports of the German Military Mission in Slovakia and the German military attaché in Bratislava, are also important for analysis of the position of the Slovak army in the first days of the war. Information about the ideas of the Wehrmacht in connection with use of the Slovak army and the territory of the SR in the war can be found in them. They also enable us to trace the reactions of the Slovak side. The authors present a total of 18 German documents of political and military origin. The published texts shed light on the question of to what degree the military participation of Slovakia in the aggression was enforced and to what degree it was an expression of the initiative of the Slovak side. Analysis of the documents clearly shows that, from the German point of view, the entry of Slovakia into the war occurred without complications. The initiative of the Slovak side is stated in various declarations. This can be traced in the case of the prime minister V. Tuka in relation to the act of Slovakia entering the war, but also in the decision making about the character of the participation of the Slovak army in the campaign from the side of its leadership headed by the minister of national defence and first class general Ferdinand Catlos. Paradoxically, according to German military sources, the exaggerated Slovak activity in the area of deployment of Slovak units threatened the productivity of armaments companies working for the Reich.

5

DISCUSSIONS OF NAZI GERMANY ON THE DEPORTATION OF JEWS IN 1942 – EXAMPLE OF SLOVAKIA, ROMANIA AND HUNGARY

75%

Nižňanský E.

Historický časopis (Historical Journal)

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2011

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tom 59

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nr suppl. issue

111 – 136

EN

The study is an attempt to compare the discussions and resulting deportations of Jews in individual states. Nazi Germany asked more or less the same questions in these discussions, but the three states reacted differently to the possibility to deport their Jews, in spite of their home-grown policies of anti-Semitism. The rejection of deportation by Romania and Hungary did not result in the political elites of these countries at this time. Quiet collaboration of the individual countries, economic cooperation, especially in the armaments industry, and sending of military units to the Eastern Front, were much more important for Nazi Germany than the deportation of Jews.

6

NĚMECKÁ OTÁZKA A ČESKOSLOVENSKO PO DRUHÉ SVĚTOVÉ VÁLCE

75%

Veselý Z.

Studia Politica Slovaca: časopis pre politické vedy, najnovšie politické dejiny a medzinárodné vzťahy

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2019

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tom 12

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nr 2

5 – 21

EN

The paper deals with the relation of Czechoslovakia to the German question after WW2. The author categorises the issues into three periods. Immediately after the end of the war (1945-1948) Czechoslovakia - the first victim of the agression of Nazi Germany - had made a considerable effort for achieveing a peace treaty on the basis of the Postsdam agreement of the great powers of the anti-Hitler coalition. The way of dealing with the question of postwar Germany and the relationship towards Czechoslovakia was to come up with the reality of the international relations after WW2 in the form of Cold War (1949-1989). The first outcome of this new situation was the split of Germany and the loss of the independence of the Czechoslovakia, which became a satelite of the Soviet Union. Also in relation to Czechoslovakia the German question was resolved after the end of Cold War (1990), when the Soviet Bloc fell apart and Germany was reunified. Reunified Germany as a democratic state became a partner for Czechoslovakia (or more precisely, its successing states the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic) and later on even an ally in the NATO and the EU.

7

PREDSTAVY, REALITA A MEDZINÁRODNÝ KONTEXT SOCIÁLNEHO ŠTÁTU V SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKE 1939 – 1945

63%

Hallon Ľ. , Schvarc M.

Historický časopis (Historical Journal)

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2014

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tom 62

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nr 4

645 – 678

EN

The conservative forces in the Slovak society of the first half of the 20th century sought models in Christian solidarity and the corporate state, which would replace parliamentarism of the Western type. The ideas could be put into practice after the seizure of power in autumn 1938 and especially when Slovakia became independent in March 1939. However, the ally of independent Slovakia, Nazi Germany rejected the corporate state. Therefore, the idea of Christian solidarity was replaced with the idea of Slovak national socialism and plans for a corporate social system for the Slovak working community according to the German model. The regime of the Slovak Republic in 1939 – 1945 attempted to put the new principles of the social state into economic and social practice. However, the implementation of the ideas of the time about a social state and the political system of Slovakia stopped half way.

8

Kraje skandynawskie wobec sprawy katyńskiej — zarys problematyki

63%

Jaworski P.

Sensus Historiae. Studia interdyscyplinarne

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2013

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nr 1(10)

165-176

EN

The message about Katyn graves announced by Germans in April 1943 became a beginning of the great political and propaganda battle. The struggle for convincing the public opinion to the own vision of the murder on Polish officers actually took in all countries which competent services reached of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Poles conscious of it which the most cared about the truth, were both for you being an expatriate then and remaining for you under the German occupation. Scandinavian countries were in a circle of states subjected to a publicity campaign of Berlin, for which it was a purpose as biggest publicizing the Katyn case. They belonged to them both occupied Denmark and Norway, as well as allied Finland. Special whereas Goebbels devoted the attention to neutral Sweden. The article is analyzing attitudes political changes and propaganda in Scandinavian countries towards the Katyn massacre.

9

VZNIK SLOVENSKEJ NÁRODNEJ BANKY A KONŠTITUOVANIE SLOVENSKEJ MENY VO SVETLE NEMECKÝCH DOKUMENTOV

63%

Schvarc M. , Schriffl D.

Historický časopis (Historical Journal)

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2010

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tom 58

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nr 1

99-121

EN

In the period 1939-1945 German - the Slovak relations did not exist only on the political level, but also on a significant degree in the economic sphere. Apart from political domination of Slovakia, the Nazis were especially concerned with the control and the quickest possible incorporation of the Slovak economy into the German economic organism, which had to be reshaped into the so-called great economic space (Grossraumwirtschaft). A secret protocol about economic and financial cooperation concluded between representatives of the two states on 23 March 1939 in Berlin as a supplement to the 'Treaty of Protection' became a launch pad for securing the dominance of German capital in Slovakia. Article II of the protocol concerned the establishment of a central bank and constituting the Slovak currency. The sources considered here present precisely this problem. The documents do not concern only the atmosphere of the talks, the share of Germany in the establishment of the central bank or the fears of the Slovak participants for their own future. They also document the pragmatism and purposefulness of the Nazi economic policy towards the 'protected state'.

10

MILITARY INTERVENTION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN SLOVAKIA ON 9-11TH MARCH 1939

51%

Bystrický V.

Historický časopis (Historical Journal)

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2011

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tom 59

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nr suppl. issue

77 – 110

EN

The military intervention of the Prague central government in Slovakia during the days from 9 to 11th March, 1939 was intended to prevent the internal disintegration of Czechoslovakia. It would achieve this by replacing the autonomous government of J. Tiso and limiting the separatist tendencies of the radical members of Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party and the paramilitary Hlinka Guard. However, the military coup was not thoroughly prepared from the military, political or propaganda points of view. After the initial successes of the Czech gendarmes, who penetrated into Slovakia in the evening on March 9, the Hlinka Guard began to organize resistance and present the coup as an attempt to reverse the results of the Act on the Autonomy of the Slovak Region from November 2, 1938 and return to the centralist regime in Slovakia. In the struggle for public opinion, the Prague government could not convince the public about its intentions, and pressure from the People’s Party and Hlinka Guard forced it to hand over power to the political representatives of the Slovak region in the afternoon on March 11. During the evening President E. Hácha appointed K. Sidor as the new premier of the autonomous government. Sidor began to work on political consolidation. He enforced the release of imprisoned members of the Hlinka Guard and representatives of the People’s Party. He also forced the government in Prague to make various political concessions, which increased the legal powers of the autonomous government in Bratislava. The military intervention in Slovakia worsened relations between the Czechs and Slovaks. Adolf Hitler used the situation to achieve the internal breakup of the republic. Berlin unambiguously supported the demand for the creation of a Slovak state. The Parliament of the Slovak Region declared an independent state on March 14, 1939. This began the process of internal disintegration of Czechoslovakia, which led to the occupation of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia by Hungary and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by Nazi Germany on March 15.

11

VOJENSKÝ ZÁSAH ÚSTREDNEJ VLÁDY NA SLOVENSKU 9. – 11. MARCA 1939

51%

Bystrický V.

Historický časopis (Historical Journal)

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2010

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tom 58

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nr 3

439-469

EN

The military intervention of the Prague central government in Slovakia during the days from 9 to 11th March, 1939 was intended to prevent the internal disintegration of Czechoslovakia. It would achieve this by replacing the autonomous government of J. Tiso and limiting the separatist tendencies of the radical members of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party and the paramilitary Hlinka Guard. However, the military coup was not thoroughly prepared from the military, political or propaganda points of view. After the initial successes of the Czech gendarmes, who penetrated into Slovakia in the evening on March 9, the Hlinka Guard began to organize resistance and present the coup as an attempt to reverse the results of the Act on the Autonomy of the Slovak Region from November 2, 1938 and return to the centralist regime in Slovakia. In the struggle for public opinion, the Prague government could not convince the public about its intentions, and pressure from the People's Party and Hlinka Guard forced it to hand over power to the political representatives of the Slovak region in the afternoon on March 11. During the evening President E. Hacha appointed K. Sidor as the new premier of the autonomous government. Sidor began to work on political consolidation. He enforced the release of imprisoned members of the Hlinka Guard and representatives of the People's Party. He also forced the government in Prague to make various political concessions, which increased the legal powers of the autonomous government in Bratislava. The military intervention in Slovakia worsened relations between the Czechs and Slovaks. Adolf Hitler used the situation to achieve the internal break up of the republic. Berlin unambiguously supported the demand for the creation of a Slovak state. The Parliament of the Slovak Region declared an independent state on March 14, 1939. This began the process of internal disintegration of Czechoslovakia, which led to the occupation of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia by Hungary and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by Nazi Germany on March 15.