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tom 36
nr 2
Roman Ingarden devoted many of his philosophical works to the question of purely intentional objects. According to him, works of art are such objects. He investigated their ontological and epistemological aspects. Taking inspiration from his remarks on the cognition of purely intentional objects, and referring to Edmund Husserl's investigations, this paper sketches a general scheme of the cognition of such objects. The cognition of primarily intentional and secondarily intentional objects is described separately.
We show that the field of the real numbers is an intentional object in the sense specified by Roman Ingarden. An ontological characteristics of a classic example of an intentional object, i.e. a literary character, is developed. There are three principal elements of such an object: the author, the text and the entity in which the literary character forms the content. In the case of the reals the triad consists of Richard Dedekind, his work Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen, and the intentional object determined by this work.
The article attempts to investigate the essence of imagination by questioning the status of imagined objects. The author refers to Husserl’s concept of imagination as a form of consciousness that functions by presenting its object as imagined, i.e., as absent. Although Husserl formulated at least two theories of non-existent objects, his descriptions of imagination – states the author – are only partial, since he did not describe the noematical aspect of consciousness. In this context, Ingarden’s ontology provides useful tools for describing the imagined object as a purely intentional object. The author claims that Ingarden’s analysis of fiction can serve to supplement Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination. In this context, Blaustein seems to bind both perspectives – noetic and noematic – by indicating a transcendent content as a necessary element of any act of imagining. On this basis, the author defines the conditions of identity for imagined objects.
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