Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

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THE DILEMMAS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE. CONCLUSIONS FOR POLAND (Dylematy dobrego rzadzenia (good governance). Wnioski dla Polski)

100%

Grosse T. G.

Studia Polityczne (Political Studies)

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2009

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nr 23

113-150

EN

The article aims to initiate a discussion regarding the development of a strategy of good governance within the Polish administration. In particular, it concerns the presentation of the most significant definitions of the concept and its practical operationalism within the work of international organisations and selected states. As definitions of the concept under discussion are repeatedly ambiguous, the article emphasises the experience of the EU, the World Bank and some of the EU member states. An analysis of international experience demonstrates the frequency with which the terms 'good governance' is linked not only with an administration's effective functioning, but also with the potential for seeing through determined political objectives, defined in the literature as 'state capacity'. The article deals solely with an analysis of these two terms and with the presentation of proposals for future work on the Polish administration.

2

SPECIFIC LEGAL AND SYSTEMIC FEATURES OF THE FUNCTION OF THE HEAD OF STATE'S POLITICAL ARBITRAGE (Prawnoustrojowa specyfikacja funkcji arbitrazu politycznego glowy panstwa)

100%

Szymanek J.

Studia Polityczne (Political Studies)

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2009

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nr 24

171-212

EN

The article aims at an analysis of the systemic position of the head of state, as set in the wide formula of the Parliamentary system, and of the function of the political arbitrate attributed to the head of state. It begins with a general observation that, in the case of a head of state in a parliamentary regime, the so called 'arbitrage function' is obligatory. In such a system of governance, the monarch or the president is not expected to be the leader of the executive, a factor ruling in the full meaning of the term. Quite to the contrary; in accordance with such principles of traditional Parliamentarism as 'the King can do no wrong', 'the King may not act on his own', and, lastly, 'the King reigns but he does not govern', in a Parliamentary system the head of state is moved aside, performs ceremonial functions, is a figurehead or, as the tale in the III French Republic held, is a person who cuts the ribbons at flower exhibitions. Apart from performing his representative and ceremonial entitlement, a president (a monarch) also exercises political arbitrage. The latter may take very different forms. It may be, e.g. a sport arbitrage, where the head of state is expected only to observe the rules of the game. It may be also a judicial arbitrage, where, apart from legality, the assessment of the arbiter may also be based on being right and fair. It may, finally, be arbitrage in the sense of making decisions, dangerously approaching the concept of arbitrariness, where the arbiter's actions mean a specific right to a 'free hand'; that is, the right to take decisions which are the best in the arbiter's opinion. Apart from this, the arbitrage of the head of state may take the form of value arbitrage, where the arbiter will protect those values significant to the state and its system. A so-called party arbitrage may be also indicated; this assumes that the head of state has an active role in maintaining the ruling coalitions, and, if necessary, in seeking the parliamentary majority providing a base for the government. However, whatever the type of arbitrage and whether it genuinely comes to the fore in practice or not, the arbitrage (a function of political arbitrage) is recognised as a necessary component of the structure of parliamentary governments.

3

POLITICAL CONSENT IN EASTERN EU COUNTRIES: A MACROECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

80%

Liotti G. , Canale R. R.

Ekonomický časopis (Journal of Economics)

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2018

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tom 66

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nr 8

821 – 837

EN

The aim of the paper is to investigate the link between trust in national political institutions and macroeconomic performance in the long run in Eastern EU countries. The objective is to answer the question whether the liberalization process and the subsequent exposure to globalized markets realized macroeconomic outcomes that are still cause of concern for these young democracies. The empirical technique is the panel dynamic ordinary least square (PDOLS) estimator, through which the effect of inflation inequality and debt on citizens’ trust in national governments and national parliaments is evaluated in term of long-run dynamics. Results show a negative impact of the indicators considered and highlight the role of macro-variables in the institutional consolidation process even in presence of path dependence dynamics of trust.

4

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF WORKER AND TRADE UNIONS INTERESTS (Polityczne reprezentacje interesów pracowniczych i zwiazkowych)

80%

Nalewajko E.

Studia Polityczne (Political Studies)

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2009

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nr 23

173-204

EN

The article deals with the nature and conditions underlying mutual relations between Poland's trade unions and political parties. One of the ways in which trade unions operate is by bringing pressure to bear on the parties, with the objective of better satisfying the needs and requirements of their members. Meanwhile, in their fight to gain and retain power, the political parties require the capital represented by the trade unions' ability to mobilise and they need the unions' support. It is this which dictates the mutual dependence of assumedly autonomous institutional structures in a democratic state. Eventually, the nature of the mutual relations falls into a specific pattern, this being the result of separate development processes on the part of both sides. The unions might be constructed, for example, in accordance with a management model focused on a powerful internal organisational structure and leadership, as well as ongoing communication with the membership; they might also follow a political model, based on building relationships with leaders in the political milieu and external organisations. This second developmental track threatens the unions with weakness, curtailing their autonomy and politicisation. In this case, the trap of exchange relationships becoming petrified, or of their being blocked in the case of selected political partners, becomes utterly realistic.The single most influential trade union, NSZZ Solidarity, is placed at the focal centre. The organisation's relations with the current major players on the political scene, 'Platforma Obywatelska - PO' (Civic Platform) and 'Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc - PiS' (Law and Justice), are considered. The union's predominant political developmental track is shown, as is the resulting petrification of relations with the political parties. In its relationship with PiS, what predominates is an exchange of support, and symbolic resources which is based on collaboration and functions regardless of whether that party is in opposition or in power. In its relationship with PO, it is conflict, the blocking of exchange, blackmail and games with resources which are evident. In this situation, the effective representation of employee interests is difficult and it is not hard, in such a situation, to understand the oft-expressed dissatisfaction of union members. The keener the union leaders are to employ these moods in their battle for political influence, the more forcefully and the less conventionally the members articulate this dissatisfaction. As a result of the institutionalised trade union culture, such a situation will be difficult to repair.

5

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTE IN INDEPENDENT KYRGYZSTAN (Spór o konstytucje niepodleglego Kirgistanu)

80%

Gortat R.

Studia Polityczne (Political Studies)

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2009

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nr 23

75-112

EN

The article discusses the main threads of the public debate surrounding independent Kyrgyzstan's first constitution, which was passed on 5th May 1993. The introduction outlines the framework of the constitutional process; the strategies of the main players in the constitutional game are then reconstructed in the next section. The third section presents the issues which provoked the greatest controversy. Section four sets forth the circumstances under which the constitutional compromise was entered into, together with its main component parts. In section five, the reader finds clarification as to why the Basic Law of 1993 was reassessed before it ever came into force. The author analyses the dispute over the constitution through the prism of the game around the distribution of power and its resources within the specific realities of a Kyrgyzstan emerging from the Soviet system. The article takes as its thesis the notion that the form of the first constitution was the outcome of the divergent aspirations of the main political players and of situational conflicts over grounds other than the constitutional substance itself. It was under these circumstances that a Basic Act emerged which went quite some way toward equalising relations between the organs of state authority. As it transpired, the compromise which had been worked out was short-lived. The reason for the multiple revisions of the Basic Act by means of referenda was not so much the result of defects in the legislation as of the president's fight to maintain and strengthen his authority under conditions wrought by a deep crisis of transformation.

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THE MILITARISATION OF THE POLITICAL ELITE IN RUSSIA DURING THE PUTIN PRESIDENCY; AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION (Militaryzacja elity wladzy centralnej podczas prezydentury Wladimira Putina - interpretacja alternatywna)

80%

Cwiek-Karpowicz J.

Studia Polityczne (Political Studies)

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2009

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nr 23

151-172

EN

When Vladimir Putin handed over presidential authority in the spring of 2008, then, for the first time since the era of 'perestroika', there was no manifestation of a battle for power among Russia's elite. Numerous scholars, such as Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, explain this particular process as the militarisation of the elite, which occurred hand in hand with Vladimir Putin's presidency. The article aims at the partial denying of that thesis and at suggesting an alternative interpretation of the processes occurring at the top of Russian power structure. The author demonstrates that the dominance of people with a background in the security services of the elite central authorities, the most important circle of the elite, had already occurred during Boris Yeltsin's presidency, while the casting of the most critical positions under Putin's presidency was primarily decided by factors of loyalty on the part of the elite toward their head of state, rather than their powerful support mechanisms within the structures of the security services. By the same token, at the start of 2008, it was not in the least the 'force structures' which played this crucial role, but the ministers and the higher echelons of public administration.

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Politologiczne i socjologiczne teorie fragmentacji systemów partyjnych: od izolacji do interakcji

70%

Rafałowski W.

Studia Socjologiczne

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2013

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nr 3(210)

53–74

EN

Explaining the variety of party systems has traditionally been an object of political science interest. The number of parties in parliament and party system fragmentation are fundamental parameters describing party systems. In the 20th century there was a division in the field: political scientists were studying the institutional determinants of party system fragmentation, whereas sociologists were focusing on social cleavages. Both paradigms were isolated from each other and their representatives had neglected discoveries by scholars representing the alternative approach. Contemporary research takes into account both groups of factors and their interaction. In this paper, the history and accomplishments of both approaches are presented. It is described how this scholarly reflection progressed from qualitative case studies to quantitative research and from isolation to integration of paradigms. The possible routes of development of this subfield of social science are analyzed and goals are formulated which should be accomplished if a complex theory of party systems fragmentation is to effectively emerge.