Nowa wersja platformy, zawierająca wyłącznie zasoby pełnotekstowe, jest już dostępna.
Przejdź na
Preferencje help
Widoczny [Schowaj] Abstrakt
Liczba wyników

Znaleziono wyników: 4

Liczba wyników na stronie
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last
Wyniki wyszukiwania
w słowach kluczowych:  CZECHOSLOVAK DIPLOMACY
help Sortuj według:

help Ogranicz wyniki do:
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last
Already before the interruption of diplomatic contacts between the Soviet Union and the Polish Exile Government in April 1943 foundations of a future Polish pro-Soviet government were laid. In May 1943, the Polish Tadeusz Kosciuszko Division was formed under the Soviet patronage, and also a Union of Polish Patriots was established in the Soviet Union to represent the pro-Soviet Poles, which in fact was a tool in the Communist hands. Logically, the Czechoslovak representatives in Moscow came more and more frequently into contact with representatives of the Polish Communists and pro-Soviet oriented Poles. In addition, it became soon clear that the Polish Exile Government was getting in increasing isolation and that a new partner of Czechoslovakia would be the Polish government created under the Soviet patronage. Polish Communists, however, had to reckon with a resistance of the Polish population, which was mostly reluctant to accept the Communist ideas. Therefore, they adopted a program aimed at creating a Poland embracing in its territory all the Polish population. That is also why the new Polish government wanted to get back the Tesin area with mostly Polish population, and refused to unequivocally recognize the prewar borders of Czechoslovakia in that area. This, however, was a condition required by the Czechoslovak government to establish diplomatic contacts with the Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw. Based on many domestic and foreign sources unknown up to now the contacts between the Czechoslovak exile government and the Polish National Liberation Committee are analyzed by the author and a number of new facts are shown in relation to the diplomatic background of the recognition of the Polish Provisional Government by Czechoslovakia. The roots of the territorial conflict that broke out between Poland and Czechoslovakia soon after the end of World War II are explained.
Content available remote Československá diplomacie a řecko-turecká válka 1920–1922
The attempt to implement the Sevres Peace Treaty, which ultimately led to a war between Greece and Turkey, had also its consequences for the remote Czechoslovak Republic. Czechoslovakia as a signatory to the Treaty was naturally interested in its implementation. Therefore, the resistance of the Turkish nationalists (known as Kemalists) was an undesired complication. As a result, Czechoslovakia showed sympathy with Greek's intervention in Minor Asia. However, the attitude to Greece soon changed, as did the political evolution in that country. Sympathy was replaced by reservation, dictated not only by the policy of the Great Powers, but also by the policy of Czechoslovakia's most important Balkan ally, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. At a later stage of the war, Czechoslovak diplomacy faced the Greek government's efforts of rapprochement with the Little Entente countries hoping to break its isolation and obtain support for its efforts. Of course, Czechoslovakia showed no interest in such rapprochement, as this would divert the Little Entente's focus from Central Europe, which was the main area of interest of the Czechoslovak government. By no means, however, the reserved attitude to Greece can be regarded as a sign of sympathy to the other belligerent party. Although Czechoslovakia's diplomacy allowed the Kemalists to purchase military material in Czechoslovak munition-works, and as the Greek military campaign more and more failed, Czechoslovakia consented to a revision of the Sevres Peace Treaty and politically opposed the Kemalists much more than the position of Greece.
(Slovak title: Ministr zahranicnich veci Vladimir Clementis, jeho urad a jeho diplomate (Prispevek k problemu formovani diplomacie komunistickeho Ceskoslovenska v letech 1948 - 1949)). The study is concerned with the activities of Vladimir Clementis (1901-1952) in directing the diplomacy of Czechoslovakia, especially in the role of minister of foreign affairs in the period 1948-1950. Clementis, leftist intellectual and 'undogmatic' communist as a head of Prague diplomacy, after the communist coup of February 1948, still attempted to achieve some degree of autonomy in the foreign policy of people's democratic Czechoslovakia. However, the growing Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West reduced the space for such a policy almost to zero. The views of Moscow became the deciding factor for the diplomatic activity of Czechoslovakia. The majority of specific steps, including the appointment of personnel to the Prague diplomatic apparatus, were not decided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but by the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In February 1949, Clementis was forced to introduce a radical reorganization of his office according to the model of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which gave the Prague foreign ministry roughly the organizational structure. In relation to the overall development of world politics, Clementis had to give up most of his more independent positions. However, pressure from the 'Stalinists' led by V. Siroky, led him being deprived of his post in March 1950 and replaced by Siroky himself. Clementis was fallen victim to the fabricated political trial in 1952.
(Title in Slovak - 'Informovanost cesko-slovenskej diplomacie o kontaktoch slovenskych autonomistickych politikov s nacistami v obdobi pomnichovskej republiky'). The study is concerned with the problem of Czechoslovak diplomacy information about Slovak - German relations in the period of so-called Second Republic. The authoress analyses its sources of information, which included the official statements of the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), reports from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Berlin, reports of the Czechoslovak intelligence service to the Foreign Ministry in Prague and the domestic and foreign press. She comes to the conclusion that Czechoslovak diplomacy underestimated the role of Slovak separatism in Nazi policy and had only very superficial knowledge of the contacts of Slovak political figures with the Nazis.
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript jest wyłączony w Twojej przeglądarce internetowej. Włącz go, a następnie odśwież stronę, aby móc w pełni z niej korzystać.