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1
Content available remote The Embodied Nature of Autistic Learning: Implications for Physical Education
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EN
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and learning difficulties are difficult to separate in clinic manifestations and diagnoses. By taking learning as being-in-the-world, this article considers the embodied nature of autistic learning and urges its importance for understanding the phenomenological core of ASD. We begin by arguing that three mainstream contemporary ASD theories are inherently limited in offering an adequate account of autistic learning due to the disembodied ontology inscribed within them. Then, we provide an understanding of learning guided by the subjective dynamics of experience. Instead of having a disembodied and individualistic point of view, we suggest that autistic learning has an embodied nature. The “inappropriate” or “abnormal” affections and behaviors in the autistic experience of learning may actually be inherently meaningful for individuals with ASD. They strive to make sense of some basic disturbances and re-establish some form of coherence with the world, though this may only be possible in the form of delusions or autistic withdrawals. Finally, we explore the relationship between autistic learning and physical education and suggest in particular how spontaneous imitation can boost the development of children with ASD. We conclude that the application of implicit learning strategies in playful settings and the reduction of explicit strategies based upon intellectual reasoning rather than bodily reciprocity should be encouraged in the process of autistic learning.
EN
In this article, I will juxtapose Simmel’s theory with Martin Heidegger’s thought. I intend to gain, bythis, possibly fundamental (in the existential ontological, Heideggerian sense of the word) sight of his position.In Reading Simmel “by using Heidegger,” I will inquire about his interpretation of “being-in-the-world” andabout a place that the phenomenon of money occupies within the limits of being-in-the-world. As it may turn out,this method of analysis will enable us to look at Heidegger’s thought in a new way, revealing a certain kind ofanachronism or at least a one-sided view of human beings. The question is as follows: whose interpretation of theexistential-ontological structure of Dasein is more adequate, Simmel’s or Heidegger’s?
EN
The aim of this paper is to present Martin Heidegger’s view on intentionality. We start from initial observations on the phenomenon of intentionality (here we refer to four possible concepts of intentionality: mentalistic, linguistic, pragmatic, and naturalistic) and a few remarks on the fundamental ontology of Heidegger. Then we show what intentionality is not for Heidegger: fi rst, it is not an objectively existing relationship between two entities and, secondly, intentionality is not the subjectivity of the subject; and we specify what intentionality is: in Heidegger’s ontology, intentionality is closely related to the transcendence of being-in-the-world. Transcending – the constancy in crossing – Dasein enables it to refer to itself, other conscious beings, and, in general, all present entities. We have shown that none of the above concepts of intentionality (mentalistic, linguistic, pragmatic, and naturalistic) is not congruent with the interpretation of Heidegger, which concentrates on the following issue: how to go beyond the traditional understanding of intentionality and reach a more basic form of experience.
EN
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and learning difficulties are difficult to separate in clinic manifestations and diagnoses. By taking learning as being-in-the-world, this article considers the embodied nature of autistic learning and urges its importance for understanding the phenomenological core of ASD. We begin by arguing that three mainstream contemporary ASD theories are inherently limited in offering an adequate account of autistic learning due to the disembodied ontology inscribed within them. Then, we provide an understanding of learning guided by the subjective dynamics of experience. Instead of having a disembodied and individualistic point of view, we suggest that autistic learning has an embodied nature. The “inappropriate” or “abnormal” affections and behaviors in the autistic experience of learning may actually be inherently meaningful for individuals with ASD. They strive to make sense of some basic disturbances and re-establish some form of coherence with the world, though this may only be possible in the form of delusions or autistic withdrawals. Finally, we explore the relationship between autistic learning and physical education and suggest in particular how spontaneous imitation can boost the development of children with ASD. We conclude that the application of implicit learning strategies in playful settings and the reduction of explicit strategies based upon intellectual reasoning rather than bodily reciprocity should be encouraged in the process of autistic learning.
PL
Artykuł stanowić będzie próbę hermeneutycznej refleksji nad rozumieniem jako byciem-w-świecie, pojmowanym jako poszukiwanie tożsamości. Tożsamość ujęta będzie z jednej strony jako codzienne zadanie, a z drugiej – rodzaj nieusuwalnego napięcia pomiędzy dochodzeniem do siebie i uciekaniem od siebie. Kategoria sobości zinterpretowana zostanie w kontekście etyki autentyczności Charlesa Taylora, a zwłaszcza hermeneutyki Heideggera.
EN
This article is an attempt of hermeneutic reflection on understanding as being-in-theworld, which is recognized as looking for an identity. The identity, on the one hand, will be comprehended as an everyday task and, on the other hand, as a kind of irremovable tension between returning and escaping from oneself. The problem of the self will be interpreted in the context of Charles Taylor’s ethics of authenticity with particular emphasis placed on Martin Heidegger’s hermeneutics.
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Content available Phronesis: racjonalność hermeneutyczna
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EN
The paper is an attempt to rethink the problem of rationality in the humanities in the context of hermeneutics. The author argues that this concept of rationality must be founded on the Aristotelian concept of practical reason (phronesis). Phronesis is a need for discernment of the self or rather to find itself in its own, tangible, specific situation. This understanding concerns Being-inthe-world and belongs to what in Martin Heidegger’s ontohermeneutics we can determine precisely as understanding in the hermeneutic sense.
EN
The article presents an analysis and an interpretation of the phenomenological-hermeneutic discourse based on Martin Heidegger’s idea and understanding of discourse (these are two separate notions). The choice of the topic is not arbitrary. The point is to show that Heidegger’s notion of discourse is also worth applying (and not only the popularised and almost conventionalised notion of Michel Foucault). The philosopher differentiates between four main structural moments of discourse in Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. These are: 1) the about-which talked over; 2) the said as such (discursive what); 3) communication; 4) manifestation. These issues are discussed in the paper in detail. The notion of discourse is not neutral but is always formulated on the basis of some discourse that is a certain way of understanding the world and the problem under analysis. That is why discourse will first be characterised as a way of thinking (the first part of the paper) and only then will Heidegger’s concept of discourse be approached (in the second part). Both issues seem important because: 1) the issue of the phenomenological-hermeneutic discourse seems relatively unknown (laymen’s approach is to radically differentiate between phenomenology and hermeneutics); 2) Heidegger’s concept of discourse deserves a broader audience.
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Artykuł stanowi próbę analizy i interpretacji dyskursu fenomenologiczno-hermeneutycznego w ujęciu Martina Heideggera oraz sposobu rozumienia dyskursu przez wspomnianego filozofa (to dwie niezależne kwestie). Wybór tematyki nie jest arbitralny. Przeciwnie, chodzi o to, aby pokazać, że Heideggerowskie ujęcie dyskursu zasługuje na uwagę (nie mniej niż spopularyzowane, by nie powiedzieć wręcz skonwencjonalizowane, ujęcie Michela Foucaulta). W Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs wyróżnia filozof cztery zasadnicze momenty strukturalne dyskursu. Są to kolejno: 1) to, o czym się mówi; 2) to, co powiedziane jako takie (dyskursywne co); 3) komunikacja; 4) wyjawianie/odkrytość. Kwestie te zostaną szczegółowo omówione w artykule. Pojęcie dyskursu nie jest neutralne, ale zawsze formułowane na gruncie jakiegoś dyskursu, a więc pewnego sposobu widzenia świata czy badanych problemów. Dlatego należy scharakteryzować wstępnie ów dyskurs jako sposób myślenia (część pierwsza szkicu), by dopiero następnie przyjrzeć się uważniej Heideggerowskiej koncepcji dyskursu (w części drugiej). Oba te zagadnienia wydają się bardzo ważne, bo: 1) problem dyskursu fenomenologiczno-hermeneutycznego wydaje się stosunkowo jeszcze mało znany (w potocznej świadomości zazwyczaj radykalnie oddziela się fenomenologię i hermeneutykę); 2) Heideggerowska koncepcja dyskursu również domaga się szerszego przedstawienia.
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Content available Kwestia języka w filozofii Martina Heideggera
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PL
Kwestia języka w filozofii Martina Heideggera pojawia się zarówno we wczesnym projekcie ontologii fundamentalnej, jak i w tak zwanym myśleniu po zwrocie. Problematyczność tego zagadnienia wyraża się choćby w mnogości stosowanych terminów. Bycie i czas to w wybranych fragmentach wyczerpujące studium „mowy” (Rede) jako swoistego ekstatycznego, a zatem otwartego i transcendującego bycia jestestwa, które buduje i potwierdza poprzez ów modus bycia przestrzeń wspólnotowości. Późny Heidegger podejmuje kwestię języka w kontekście metafory czwórni świata, wiążąc ją ściśle z tzw. myśleniem poetyckim – wywód ten daleko odbiega od analiz egzystencjalnych jestestwa. „Język” (Sprache) to – jak pisze Heidegger – domostwo ludzkiego bycia, w którym uprzywilejowane miejsce zajmują poeci, jedynie oni potrafią bowiem czytać znaki, jakie w otwartej przestrzeni między Niebem i Ziemią pozostawiają Śmiertelnym Bogowie. Topografię owej wieści (Sage) prezentuje Heidegger w wielu miejscach swej drogi do „innego myślenia”.
EN
Martin Heidegger uses different words to express the problematic issue of language and ex- plain what it is. In the fundamental ontolog y Heidegger focuses on speech. This existentiale ( Existenziale ) is the means of being-in-the-world that indicates the area of community and is a consequence of the initial disclosedness of Dasein . However, this is not the most important aspect of language issues in Heidegger’s philosophy. According to his Letter on humanism , lan- guage is the house of being and human beings dwell in its home. A human being is not Dasein and language is not speech. Moreover, language is not a tool for expression of thought. In late Heidegger’s philosophy, the question of language is related to poetical thinking and brings with ‘the fourfold’ metaphor.
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