The text is divided into two parts. In the first part, the author describes the eternalists' and presentists' positions as the two basic possible statements of the ontology of time (there exists only what is present - presentism - and there also actually exists both what is past and what is future). The eternalist position and the emphasis put on the actual existence of past and future events (expressed usually by the use of present tense or of some tenseless form of the verb) are thoroughly analysed in order to show that in fact, they end up making strings of symbols that are not correct statements. It is therefore necessary to step beyond these clumsy statements and try to understand more exactly the eternalist intuitions on a deeper, metaphysical level. That is the main concern of the second part of the text, in which the metaphysical implications of both positions are compared. At the end of the linguistical analysis in the first part, we got to a point where it may seem that presentism and eternalism are only different attempts to express that is in fact the same understanding of the nature of time, but in the metaphysical analysis that follows, it will turn out that they are not. Presentism and eternalism are shown to be two different ontological approaches of time in relation to space (time as a basically homogenous fourth dimension and time as something essentially different from space). The author then focuses on the consequences these two positions have especially on the concept of the present and of its flow through time. In the end, presentism and eternalism turn out to be completely different positions that - in parallel with the famous McTaggart's argument - claim a very strong reality of time on the one hand (presentism) or, on the other hand, its utter unreality (eternalism).
The aim of this paper is to examine the metaphysical position of eternalism, the view that past, present, and future are equally real and that the flow of time is an illusion. These claims are analyzed and what the paper tries to show is that the first thesis is hard to formulate in such a way that it can be used to distinguish eternalism from its opposite and that no plausible explanation is offered of how we create the 'illusion' of the flow of time.
At the beginning of modern logic, propositions were defined as unchangeable entities placed in a certain idealistic realm. These unchangeable propositions contain in themselves so-called indexical, i.e. the place, time and other circumstances of the utterance. This concept of the proposition, which is entitled eternalism, was and is still prevalent among analytic philosophers. Often even the term ‘proposition’ is identified with an idealistic entity located outside the real world. In my paper, I would like to focus on the concept of propositions of two logicians who deviated from the standard understanding of propositions, Arthur N. Prior and Pavel Tichý. They were both proponents of temporalism, i.e. the view that propositions could change their truth-value over time. The paper will discuss the reasons why they were proponents of temporalism and compare their views. It claims that in Prior’s case, his metaphysical views were the main reasons he was a proponent of temporalism. In contrast, when Tichý presented his arguments for temporalism, he focused primarily on natural language.