Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

HUMAN RIGHTS

100%

Mackiewicz W.

Edukacja Filozoficzna

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2006

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nr 41

57-72

EN

In the paper author tries to find the source of human nature, human dignity and human rights in contemporary civilisation. That nowadays scientific and technical civilisation seems to be, as never before and apart from the apparent cultural progress, non-human indeed.

2

HUMAN RIGHT AS A SECULAR TRANSCENDENCE

100%

Filutowska K.

Edukacja Filozoficzna

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2006

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nr 42

67-84

EN

The authoress discusses a problem of human rights in the context of Kantian's ethical formalism and Socrates' ethical intellectualism. She refers to Girard's interpretation of Hiob's story according to which this biblical hero is a victim of so called collective mimetism, connected with a totalitarian situation or society created by a soul of crowd. On the contrary to this totalitarian type of community human rights have their origins in the conscience of individual, in reason or a subject. According to her interpretation they mediate between external and internal sphere, between legal and moral sphere (Kant) and also between 'loi' and 'droit' (S.Weil). In this way they give a possibility to establish a really just law which - thanks to the mediation done in a conscience of individual - includes an element of transcendence and rationality, so it isn't a blind force which could destroy an individual. For the authoress Socrates is an adherent of such kind of reflexive attitude - and thanks to his moral autonomy - is also a patron of human rights discours at all.

3

Funkcjonowanie praw czlowieka na Litwie: czynniki i najważniejsi aktorzy

63%

Jasiuleviciene R.

Politeja : Pismo Wydziału Studiów Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego

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2011

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nr 2(16)

369-382

EN

The article deals with human rights process issues in Lithuania as the post- -communist country. Human rights, as the subfield of political science studies are not elaborated in Lithuania. This essay explores the two influential factors of human rights process and their impact on such actors of this process as government officials, society and NGO’s. Activity of this actors are contradictory, inconsistent and their interrelations are, sometimes, conflicting. Government official’s human rights policy are influenced more by institutional factor. Society evaluate human rights idea and policy from the cultural perspective. NGO’s have potential to conciliate influence of both factors, but their activity is not yet fully developed.

4

ISLAMIC VISION OF THE WORLD

63%

Krawczyk R.

Myśl Ekonomiczna i Prawna

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2008

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nr 1(20)

18-49

EN

The aim of the article is to draw attention to a frequent mistake made by western religious experts and civilization researches who are inclined to treat Islam in the same way as while analyzing any other religion, i. e. as a specific sphere of human life which is their sacrum of contacts with God. The author of the article proves that Islam is first of all a complete social system and its religious aspect plays an auxiliary role. The Islamic vision of the world is not a function of human relations with God's transcendence, as it happens in case of Christianity, but has a ummatic dimension, i. e. makes man's will limits dependent on the will of the whole Muslim community. An individual is not limited by the dimensions of a human being with their personal soul and individual ethics constitutes an immanent part of the whole society. So human freedom is obviously limited by the social interest and every human activity is assessed and punished from this point of view. The result of the ummatic vision of the world is a specific definition of human rights in Islam which was formally reflected in the so called Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (1991) being a former answer to the UN Declaration of Human Rights. The author's analysis is textual and refers to the most important statements made in the Cairo Declaration.

5

AMBIVALENTNOSŤ ĽUDSKÝCH PRÁV A NEURČITOSŤ ICH POJMU Z POHĽADU FILOZOFIE

63%

Palovičová Z.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2015

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tom 70

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nr 9

759 – 769

EN

The contribution deals with the concept of human rights from a philosophical perspective. It tries to answer the question whether a rationally and universally valid definition of human rights is possible at all. In its first part general characteristics of human rights is offered followed in its second part by the exploration of prevailing ways of justification of human rights in the contemporary philosophy. It is argued that the basis of human rights is defined variously and that due to different values giving the legitimacy to human rights we have various lists of the latter. It is this ambivalent basis of human rights that subverts their moral authority.

6

THE STRENGH AND FLAWS OF THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

63%

Banaszak B.

Przegląd Sejmowy

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2008

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nr 2(85)

9-24

EN

The Charter of Fundamental Rights, proclaimed on 7 December 2000, has the nature of an inter-institutional agreement and is not a legally binding document. The strength of the Charter lies in: - its comprehensive approach to the protection of the individual's rights; which extends to all categories of rights and to all persons sojourning within the EU territory, not only EU citizens; - standardization of concepts concerning fundamental rights; - establishing the mechanism for fundamental rights protection within the EU. The flaws of the Charter are as follows: 1. A new controversial typology of fundamental rights. The Charter does not refer to the categories of the individual's rights currently existing in both international law and domestic law of several states. Instead of previously applied typology, it establishes six categories of rights which correspond to its initial six chapters. In consequence, there is little evidence that new standards are introduced and that they have resulted in a relatively uniform meaning of the rights either in a widely understood European law (i.e. that of the European Union and that of the Council of Europe) and domestic law of the EU Member States. 2. The principles are not precisely defined. This new typology overlaps with the distinction between the fundamental rights and principles established by the Charter. The Charter lacks consistency and, contrary to the declaration contained in its title, it refers not only to fundamental rights, but also to principles. However, no distinct group of principles is separated in the Charter, and no such distinction can be derived from its content. 3. The Charter's possibility of stimulating the extension of competences of the EU institutions and organs. The ambiguity of relations between the system of protection provided by the Charter and the national systems of the EU Member States may have dual consequences. Either the EU institutions and organs are competent to decide in all the situations where there are any doubt arises about competence of national organs to deal with such matter, or in the case of any such doubt the ability to decide is granted to the national authorities. The former variant seems more likely to appear, which shall mean a de facto extension of EU competences. 4. The means for protection of rights guaranteed by the Charter are not specified in a sufficient detail.

7

Religionsunterricht und Menschenrechte – Didaktische Überlegungen zur Menschenrechtsbildung

63%

Schwendemann W. , Markl C.

Studia z Teorii Wychowania

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2012

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nr 1(4)

54-67

EN

Christian religious education revolves around the central idea of basic human rights. When learning to remember, for example the Holocaust or Shoah, one is reminded of the fact that it is essential to think about human rights since they are continuously abused. The atrocities committed by the Nazis were not merely an expression of their contempt for other human beings, but rather a complete disregard for and a total abolishment of basic human rights. The focal point of Christian religious education is to remember the crucifixion of Jesus Christ and by rights and dignity of every human being.

8

PROTECTION OF HUMAN DIGNITY UNDER UE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF COMPETENCE OF STATE AUTHORITIES

51%

Bosek L.

Przegląd Sejmowy

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2008

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nr 2(85)

61-91

EN

This article deals with the issue of protection of human dignity under EU law, in particular Article 1 and Chapter I of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The underlying idea of the obligation to protect human dignity manifests itself in the obligation to respect everyone, even those who lack conscience or are not capable to feel pain, or unable to defend their rights by themselves, the obligation which determines the limits of autonomy and includes the prohibition against infringement of subjectivity and individuality (inalienability of dignity). The level of protection of human dignity under EU law was referred, in the article, to the standard of protection of human dignity specified in Poland's Constitution. Protection of human dignity is an underlying principle of Poland's Constitution, which cannot be violated by direct delegation of competence to the European Union. From the Constitution there ensue the following obligations of the Polish public authorities within the scope competence delegated to the EU: - to negotiate the content of agreements which provide a basis for the delegation of competence in such a way, that they would correspond, to the fullest possible extent, to the constitutional model of protection of individual rights. Failure to follow this procedure will make the act of delegation unconstitutional; - to undertake (by Polish representatives) action within legislative and opinion-making bodies, with an aim to accomplish the constitutional model of protection individual rights and, in particular, to refrain from action which would infringe constitutional standards. Failure to do so would result in constitutional accountability or penal responsibility; - bring actions before the European Court of Justice for the purpose of annulment of secondary legislation or for securing their interpretation in line with primary legislation corresponding with the main foundations of the constitutional model of human rights protection. Failure to do so would result in constitutional accountability; - to interpret, apply and perform the obligations imposed by Community law in a way that would conform with the constitutional model of individual rights protection.

9

THE POLISH CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AFTER THE LISBON TREATY: THE LEGAL NATURE AND BINDING LIMITS (Polska Karta Praw Podstawowych po Traktacie lizbonskim. Charakter prawny i granice zwiazania)

51%

Muszynski M.

Przegląd Sejmowy

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2009

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nr 1(90)

55-78

EN

The Lisbon Treaty fundamentally changes the legal basis of the European Union. The areas of regulation subject to modification include the normative foundations of the protection of fundamental rights in the EU. The article attempts to answer the question concerning the legal nature and the limits of the revised Charter of Fundamental Rights which are binding on Poland. Despite an enthusiastic support of the Charter by part of legal scholars, the role of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the domestic legal order in rather ambiguous. In Lisbon, the authors of the Treaty have departed from formal way of proceeding. As a result - regardless of their political will - the adopted phrase of 'the same legal value as the Treaties' will not have any effect in Polish domestic law, where it functions as a non-binding act of the European Parliament, Council and Commission. Legal effect of an international act in the national legal system is hinged on the constitutional procedure of its adoption, and not on the political message. However, the rank of the Charter within the system of the EU law obviously rose. In fact, this will affect granting Treaty guarantees to its provisions. From this point of view, a new legal hybrid will appear, an act which, formally, is not a piece of primary law (as it is not ratified), but which has the status (enjoys the protection) prescribed for such acts. Some systemic consequences of this experiment, (e.g. the effect of the principle of primacy of EU law) may, however, have negative systemic consequences. The Charter will not be included, for procedural reasons, in the constitutional list of the sources of law and, therefore, there will be a collision between them and the norms of the national law. In this respect, a moderating role will be played by the Polish-UK Protocol which, according to Article. 49 b shall form an integral part of the Treaties. From the point of view of legal science, the meaning of the new Charter of Fundamental Rights is reduced, practically, to one aspect — inserting its content to the Lisbon Treaty opens a new phase in the evolution of the fundamental rights in the EU. To date, they were founded on the basis of the: European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and constitutional order of Member States. So far, the Charter has only reflected and expressed the fundamental rights specified within these two areas. The Lisbon Treaty grants it a status equal with them. .

10

THE CRUCIFIX IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSROOM IN EUROPEAN COURT RULINGS (Krzyz w szkole publicznej w orzecznictwie europejskim)

51%

Falski J.

Sprawy Narodowościowe

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2010

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nr 37

177-187

EN

Lautsi v. Italy was an important court case that was tried at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The subsequent ruling on 3rd November 2009 noted that the display of religious symbols (i.e., the crucifix in Italian public school classes) is contrary to Article 2 of the 1st Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights. This decision which went against Italy is in line with other judgments in similar cases, and seems to be promoting the European public school as a place of confessional neutrality where the goal is to cultivate secular values of a democratic society in pupils. The European Court of Human Rights thus clearly supports the idea and principles of secularism and the impartiality of the state. However, the ruling did not impose any obligation to undertake adequate legal solutions or verify the existing law, leaving each member state a level of freedom to make opinions and final decisions on their own. The Lautsi v. Italy judgment had an indirect influence on the entire public service sphere, of which the public school is just one link of a chain. Yet Italy filed an appeal and the case was referred to the Court's Grand Chamber. Its hearing is to be held on June 30, 2010. The legal ramifications of this ruling therefore remain an important debate in Europe.

11

LIMITATION CLAUSE AND THE INVIOLABILITY OF RIGHTS AND DIGNITY (Klauzula limitacyjna a nienaruszalnosc praw i godnosci)

51%

Piechowiak M.

Przegląd Sejmowy

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2009

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nr 2(91)

55-77

EN

The author examines the arguments for applicability of the limitation clause which specifies the requirements for limitation of constitutional freedoms and rights (Article 31 para. 3 of the Constitution) to the right to protection of life (Article 38). Even if there is almost a general acceptance of such applicability, this approach does not hold up to criticism based on the rule existing in the Polish legal order that treaty commitments concerning human rights have supremacy over national statutory regulations. Due to an international pattern which does not provide application of the limitation clause to the right to life protection, despite the recognition - at the level of a constitutional standard - of applicability of the clause of Article 31 para. 3 to Article 38, and to protection of life in general, this will be made impossible at any attempt to formulate a statutory standard. He also points out the defectiveness of the reasoning leading to acceptance of certain limitations of a particular value (e.g. life) on the basis of the ex definitione exemptions existing in the international standard to the assumption of applicability of the limitation clause when shaping statutory standards in the Polish legal system. The discussed issues are related to the question of interpretation of the inviolability of human rights. This term takes different meaning in the context of: 1) inviolability of all human rights understood in abstracto as normative structures of a general and abstract nature; 2) right protecting certain values with no exception; 3) rights to which an application of the limitation clause is forbidden; 4) rights not subject to derogation; 5) inviolability of understood in concreto, as that is (here and now) due to the subject of dignity; 6) inviolable essence of freedoms and rights. One should also clearly distinguish between (7) the descriptive and (8) the normative meaning of inviolability.

12

PROTECTION OF GENERAL PERSONALITY RIGHTS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC (Ochrana vseobecnych osobnostnich prav v Ceske republice)

51%

Matejka J.

Právny obzor. Teoretický časopis pre otázky štátu a práva (Juridical Review. Theoretical journal for the questions of state and law)

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2008

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tom 91

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nr 2

119-131

EN

In his article the author deals with the protection of general personality rights in the Czech Republic that concerns exclusively the rights of natural persons. This protection results from so-called General Clause set out in the Civil Code and is continuously extended. It may be assumed that it is often implemented simultaneously with other ways of the protection of personality - by the provisions of both the private law (e.g. Labour Code) and the public law (e.g. Criminal Law, Offences Act, etc.). The author further analyses the scope and the content of the rights to the protection of personality that comprise human life and health, civic honour and human dignity, privacy, name, manifestations of personal character and other ideal possessions not explicitly specified by the Civil Code. The individual components of the protection of personality also find the support in other national laws and measures (e.g.personal freedom (of speech, movement etc.), right to education, right to information, right to a personal secret, etc.), but also in the international documents (e.g. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations General Assembly, etc.).

13

Stowarzyszenie Amnesty International jako ruch społeczny praw człowieka

51%

Kmieciak B.

Studia Socjologiczne

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2013

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nr 1(208)

153-171

EN

Author discusses the phenomenon of Amnesty International as a global social movement. This issue will be presented on the example of the Polish branch of Amnesty International Association. For this purpose, official data will be presented, taken from reports and studies published by the Association. Studies, which directly relate to the activities undertaken by Amnesty, will be also referred to (e.g. reports and outlines from school lessons on the subject of human rights). The aim of this work is not only to describe the activities of the Association but also to show the phenomenon of a social movement Amnesty International. In addition, author attempts to answer the question, whether the formula of Amnesty International movement makes its actions effective and thus contribute to protection of human rights? For this purpose, the analysis of Amnesty International’s actions will be accompanied by a presentation of social movements’ theories.

14

KRITIKA POJMU ĽUDSKEJ DÔSTOJNOSTI V KONCEPCII SUZY KILLMISTEROVEJ

51%

Turčan M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2022

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tom 77

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nr 1

36 – 47

EN

The paper deals with Suzy Killmister’s approach to the concept of human dignity. The author analyses her view and argues that the concept offered by her is relativistic to the degree in which the idea of universal human rights is susceptible to collapse, even though she seems to wish to uphold it. The author points to several problems in Killmister’s theory and concludes that, besides its inspiring nature, there is not a safe enough ground for its endorsement.

15

MORÁLNO-NORMATÍVNE ZDÔVODNENIE ĽUDSKÝCH PRÁV

51%

Foltin M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2021

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tom 76

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nr 1

46 – 58

EN

This paper presents and analyses the moral-normative sources of human rights. In this article, we analyse the philosophical sources of human rights that relate to the question of why human beings should be holders of human rights, regardless of whether specific legal claims can be derived from them at the legal level. The paper addresses three main normative sources of human rights: (a) secular claims of human dignity; (b) claims based on human needs and human nature; and (c) transcendental claims. The article points out the limitations of these philosophical resources and suggests why it may be suitable to accept human rights based on a pluralistic notion of human nature.

16

War against pirates? The EE-operation Atalanta in the perspective of humanitarian and human rights law

51%

Geistlinger M. , Scharnagl S.

Międzynarodowe Prawo Humanitarne

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2012

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tom 3

163-172

EN

Nowadays, maritime piracy constitutes serious danger to one of the most important world communication vias, leading through the waters off the coast of Somalia. The importance of this sea road for the economy and international security implied engagement of maritime forces of the EU and NATO Member States. Actions undertaken against Somalian pirates resulted in emergence of a variety of challenges in respect to observance of human rights and humanitarian law.

17

PRÁVO NA ODPOR JAKO ÚSTAVNĚ ZARUČENÉ PRÁVO A JEHO SPECIFIKA

51%

Bartoň M.

Právny obzor. Teoretický časopis pre otázky štátu a práva (Juridical Review. Theoretical journal for the questions of state and law)

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2019

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tom 102

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nr 4

303 – 321

EN

The article deals with the right of resistance, especially with the question of the sense (or purpose) of its constitutional anchoring. The right of resistance as a constitutional subjective right cannot be claimed as a legal claim against state, neither in the form of a negative obligation of public authorities to respect such right, nor in the form of a positive obligation to fulfil and protect it. The right to resist has a natural law basis and already appears in early human rights documents. Its purpose is to justify resistance against state power in the case of violation of “social contract”. The question, whether the right to resist was legitimately used is more political or factual question, rather than legal. Constitutional anchoring of the right of resistance has therefore political and moral function and also very strong preventive role, mainly after the experience with totalitarian regimes.

18

Integralność praw człowieka

51%

Mazurek F. J.

Roczniki Nauk Społecznych

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2009

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tom 1(37)

7-31

EN

The leading motif in the Church’s teaching is the inborn and supernatural dignity of each human being that is the only and supreme moral norm. It is from this norm that human rights and other principles follow. The first and fundamental way of the Church is recognizing each human being’s dignity, and reminding: Respect the dignity and freedom of every human person! During the meetings of the OSCE the Holy See mainly promoted the right to freedom of conscience and of opinions in connection with all human rights. It postulated recognition of human rights as a principle of the international law. Overcoming the dispute concerning the contents of the concept of human rights was possible, among others, at the Vienna Conference. There it was said that all human rights follow from the dignity of the human person and from the human being’s inherent value; it was also stated that the human person is the main subject of human rights and fundamental freedoms, so he should be their main addressee and actively participate in the realization of the rights. In the document accepted at the Copenhagen Conference the human person was recognized as the supreme value that is the foundation of the inborn and inalienable human rights. Moreover, the contents of the concept of the right of man to freedom of conscience, to religious freedom and to freedom of opinions is contained in Art. 18 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and developed in the same articles of the International Convention for Personal and Liberation Rights. The human rights may be protected in democracy and in a law-governed state. John Paul II stressed that real democracy is possible in a law-governed state on the basis of the correct concept of the human person. The essence of democracy is respecting all the human rights.

19

NEGATIVE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND SECULAR THOUGHT IN THE LIGHT OF THE CASE OF LAUISI V. ITALY (Negatywna wolnosc religijna i przekonania sekularystyczne w swietle sprawy Lautsi przeciwko Wlochom)

51%

Piechowiak M.

Przegląd Sejmowy

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2011

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nr 5(106)

37-68

EN

The article provides an analysis of the European Court of Human Rights judgments in the case of (http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/resources/hudoc/lautsi_and_others_v__italy.pdf) Lautsi v. Italy (application no. 30814/06), also known as the Italian crucifix case. The applicant claimed that displaying crucifixes in the Italian State-school classrooms attended by her children was contrary to the principle of secularism, by which she wished to bring up her children, and therefore infringed her right to ensure their education and teaching in conformity with her religious and philosophical convictions, and also breached her freedom of conviction and religion, as protected by Article 9 of the Convention. In its judgment of November 3, 2009, the seven-judge Chamber declared that there had been a violation of Article 2 (right to education) of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights taken together with Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) of the Convention. The judgment was given unanimously and none of the judges appended a separate opinion. The Italian Government asked for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber by virtue of Article 43 of the Convention. In the judgment of the Grand Chamber, delivered on March 18, 2011, the Court held, by fifteen votes to two (and with separate opinions of six judges), that there had been no violation of Protocol No. 1 and no violation of the Convention itself. The analysis in the article is focused on selected principal factors determining the Court's decision. It shows that the proposal for the Court to recognize secular convictions as those protected by Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 or Article 9 of the Convention has no sufficient basis in the Convention itself and in earlier Court's case-law and, even, may be considered as promotion of religious intolerance, threatening the freedom to publicly manifest a religion or belief, as guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention.

20

Postulat czwartej generacji praw człowieka w politycznym systemie międzynarodowej ochrony – próba filozoficznego uzasadnienia z perspektywy personalizmu etycznego

51%

Ciszek M.

Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae

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2010

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tom 8

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nr 1

105-116

EN

In my article I presented conception of the fourth generation worked out by Catholic ethics. Mentioned conception according to Catholic ethics should be the law’s standard in international system of protection of human rights. I tried to explained a sense of this conception from the philosophy perspective linking to the basic law’s acts.