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2004 | 13 | 4(52) | 287-302
Tytuł artykułu

Freud and Kant: Two Conceptions of Subject and Self

Autorzy
Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
PL
Abstrakty
EN
The starting point of the article is the assumption that the psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud grows from a new conception of the subject and the self, different from the conception used by Kant. The author tries to make his point by analysing selected fragments of one of the first publications by Freud 'Entwurf einer Psychologie'. It is clear in that work that Freud already had at that time his own idea of the psychic apparatus, and that it consisted of three different systems: consciousness, pre-consciousness and unconsciousness. In this proposal the synthesising operation of consciousness, which is the home of the self, can be reduced to a specific 'defence activity' which protects the self from the loose process of shifting and condensing imagery (the original process) that occurs in the unconsciousness. This approach presupposes, first, new understanding, previously unknown to German idealism, of the subject that does not function as the ultimate foundation of all psychic processes but is engaged in interpreting the original process by rearranging its imagery in a loose and spontaneous manner. Secondly, the synthesising function of the self can no longer be explained as a process of reaffirming one's self-identity - which was presupposed in the Kantian concept of transcendental unity of apperception - but must be seen as a synthesising activity that occurs at the level of the original process by repeated efforts to select and repress its imagery
Słowa kluczowe
Rocznik
Tom
13
Numer
Strony
287-302
Opis fizyczny
Rodzaj publikacji
ARTICLE
Twórcy
autor
  • P. Dybel, Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN, ul. Nowy Swiat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Poland
Bibliografia
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
CEJSH db identifier
05PLAAAA0030730
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.fcd109b6-d684-3d7b-9647-03189af4cc04
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