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2014 | nr 2 | 161-174
Tytuł artykułu

W poszukiwaniu modelu ustrojowego prokuratury (w świetle prac Komisji Rady Europy "Demokracja poprzez Prawo")

Autorzy
Treść / Zawartość
Warianty tytułu
Searching for a new model of the public prosecution regime (in light of the work of the European Commission for Democracy through Law )
Języki publikacji
PL
Abstrakty
Dwadzieścia pięć lat od rozpoczęcia procesu transformacji w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej pokazało, że jednym z najtrudniejszych problemów ustrojowych, z jakim przyszło się zmierzyć wszystkim tym państwom, jest kwestia usytuowania ustrojowego prokuratury. Świadczy o tym m.in. fakt, że w ciągu dwudziestu pięciu lat swojej działalności Komisja Rady Europy "Demokracja poprzez Prawo", tzw. Komisja Wenecka, przygotowała w tym zakresie kilkadziesiąt opinii prawnych oceniających rozwiązania dotyczące prokuratury wprowadzane w różnych państwach, a także opracowała swój własny raport, zwierający zasadnicze linie przewodnie dotyczące zasad organizacji prokuratury, będący w dużej mierze efektem tych doświadczeń.(fragment tekstu)
EN
Looking back at the twenty five years that have passed after the transformation processes started in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe we may say that each of these countries had to cope with the same major challenge in the course of the reform of the system of state organs: the place of the prosecution regime Consequently, each embarked on finding solutions which, by breaking away with the principle of the unity of power, would allow to arrive at the most effective model for situating the prosecution within the system of separation and balance of powers. As emphasised by the Venice Commission, there is no uniform model of the prosecution regime in the European system. Lawmakers may therefore choose from among different scenarios which all meet so-called European standards. Consequently, it may be claimed that none of the existing solutions, be it a model subordinating the prosecution to the parliament, or to the government, may be classified as contrary to democratic norms. No doubt, further, that in individual states efforts to find a proper place for the prosecution were determined by their legal traditions. Poland for that matter found itself in a relatively privileged position when compared with other states as it already had its own tradition. Thus, in an attempt to find the best possible option in the circumstances of 1989 with respect to the regime structure it was decided to rely on the solutions existing prior to the Constitution of 1952, and to rely on the solutions from before 1950 with respect to the prosecution. Following the amendments to the Constitution in 1989, the prosecution became subordinate to government. The logical consequence of this decision was a regulation that the function of the Attorney General (General Prosecutor) is performed by the Minister of Justice. Irrespective of the absence of precision in this expeditious formulation, the very idea of the concept of government-subordinated prosecution was justified and could not be considered contradictory to the democratic solution and the rule of law. There was no time, however, to draft and adopt a new act on the prosecution. Consequently, it was decided to regulate the prosecution by amending the existing law of 1985. Unfortunately, this other option of regulating the prosecution has continued till the present, with the result that the prosecution today is governed by the provisions of an act adopted five years before the process of transformation even began. The act underwent multiplied amendments, both before the adoption of the Constitution of 1997 as well as thereafter. One of the important changes was the amendment of 1996, liquidating the prosecution department at the Ministry of Justice and creating the National Public Prosecutor's Office and the office of the Public Prosecutor who became at the same time deputy General Prosecutor (Attorney General) - the Minister of Justice. Another substantial amendment to the act of 1985 was adopted in 2009 when the functions of the Prosecutor General and the Ministry of Justice had been separated. The National Public Prosecutor's Office was liquidated and replaced with the General Prosecutor's Office taking the role of the central organisational unit of the prosecution. This amendment allowed to secure a number of executive power competences in relation to the prosecution. Despite that, it seems that a step has been made towards singling out the prosecution from the executive power in order to, as may be assumed, turn it into an independent body. Certain doubts, however, arise regarding the validity of the place of the prosecution as a body independent of the government in light of the provisions of the Constitution of 1997: since the office of the General Prosecutor is no longer to be tied to the function of the Minister of Justice (i.e. a member of government), it seems that such change must be anchored in the Constitution. It also needs to be emphasised that regardless of the place the prosecution occupies in the state bodies regime, which of course is also of importance, what is really necessary is a catalogue of principles and guarantees that will not only ensure impartiality of the prosecutor in decisions making, but will also determine his liability. These guarantees are equally essential in the case of the government-subordinated prosecutor (to free him from political pressure) as well as in the case of independent prosecution (to eliminate pressures within the prosecution itself). It is rather obvious that twenty five years after the beginning of transformations and almost thirty years since the adoption of the still binding and applicable Act on Prosecution in the Polish People's Republic, a new act on the prosecution must be drafted in line with the European standards, which will also account at the same time, for the positive experiences of the past decades.(original abstract)
Rocznik
Numer
Strony
161-174
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
  • Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poland
Bibliografia
  • Gaberle A., O nowy kształt prokuratury w Polsce, Państwo i Prawo 2007, z. 8.
  • Herzog A., Niezależność prokuratury - mit czy nadzieja?, Prokuratura i Prawo 2009, nr 1.
  • Murzynowski A., Pozycja ustrojowa i zadania prokuratury - samodzielność czy powiązania z administracją, [w:] Studia Konstytucyjne, t. 5: Organy ochrony prawa. Regulacja w nowej konstytucji, red. L. Garlicki, Warszawa 1989.
  • Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu, Wyd. NSZZ "Solidarność" Region Warmińsko-Mazurski 1989.
  • Stankowski A., Propozycja unormowań prokuratury w Konstytucji RP, Prokuratura i Prawo 2009, nr 10.
  • Suchocka H., Kański L., Zmiany konstytucyjnej regulacji sądownictwa i prokuratury dokonane w roku 1989, Państwo i Prawo 1991, z. 1.
  • Waltoś S., Prokuratura - jej miejsce wśród organów władzy, struktura i funkcje, Państwo i Prawo 2002, z. 4.
  • Witkowski Z., Kilka uwag na temat prawno-ustrojowego usytuowania prokuratury w konstytucjach wybranych państw współczesnej Europy, [w:] W. Czerwiński (red.), Prokuratura (ustawa, regulamin i inne przepisy, stan na 1 stycznia 1997 r.), TNOiK, Toruń 1997.
  • Zięba-Załucka H., Instytucja prokuratury w Polsce, Warszawa 2003.
  • Zięba-Załucka H., Prawnoustrojowe problemy prokuratury RP, [w:] Trzecia władza, sądy i trybunały w Polsce, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Gdańsk 2008.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171389579
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