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2014 | z. 71 | 163-180
Tytuł artykułu

Rating and Financing Subsidies for Global Systemically Important Banks

Autorzy
Treść / Zawartość
Warianty tytułu
Ocena i finansowe dotacje dla banków o znaczeniu globalnym
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
W artykule przedstawiono wyniki badań dotyczące kryzysu finansowego z lat 2007-2011. W trakcie kryzysu, rządy podejmowały działania, aby ratować swoje banki. Badania dotyczyły wartości sum, które przekazano bankom i postrzegania przez społeczeństwo tego procesu.(abstrakt oryginalny)
EN
The international financial? This paper provides an empirical way for the identification and valuation of implicit crisis of 2007 - global systemically important banks receives debt funding cost advantages of more than 2011 showed that when it comes to the crunch, governments bail out their banks. The implicit insurance against insolvency results in better ratings and lower funding costs for banks. But what is the value of the bailout expectation for banks as perceived by market participantsgovernmental rating and financing subsidies for banks by analysing the support imbedded in banks' credit ratings. The results show remarkable rating and funding subsidies: A small group of so-called 590 basis points. European banks have a funding cost advantage of 134 basis points (or 3.3 rating notches), whereas listed banks receive 67 basis points (or 1.7 notches) of support. (original abstract)
Rocznik
Numer
Strony
163-180
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
  • Technical University Bergakademie Freiberg, Germany
Bibliografia
  • 1. Bitz, Michael (2009): Banken als Einrichtungen zur Risikotransformation, in: Bessler, Wolfgang/Schmidt, Hartmut (Ed.), Börsen, Banken und Kapitalmärkte, Berlin, p. 349-380.
  • 2. Boes, Stefan/Winkelmann, Rainer (2006): Ordered Response Models, in: Hübler, Olaf/ Frohn, Jachim (Eds.), Modern Econometric Analysis, p. 167-181.
  • 3. European Commission (2012): Technical Fiche - Tax Contribution of the Financial Sector, Brussels.
  • 4. Financial Stability Board (2012): Update of group of global systemically important banks (G-SIB), 01.11.2011, Basel.
  • 5. Financial Stability Board (2013): Global systemically important banks - updated assessment methodology and the higher loss absorbency requirement, revised version July 2013, Basel.
  • 6. Fitch Ratings (2013): Definitions of Ratings and Other Forms of Opinion, New York/London.
  • 7. G20 (2008): Declaration (Washington) - Summit of Financial Market and the World Economy 15. November 2008, Washington, www.bundesregierung.de/Content/ DE/StatischeSeiten/Breg/G8G20/Anlagen/G20-erklaerung-washington-2008-en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2, [Oct 24th, 2013].
  • 8. G20 (2009): Declaration (London) - London Summit 2. April 2009, London, www.bundesregierung.de/Content /DE/StatischeSeiten/Breg/G8G20/Anlagen/G20-erklaerung-london-2009-de.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3 [Oct 24th, 2013].
  • 9. Gelman, Eric (1984): The Continental Bailout - Newsweek,from July 30th, 1984, p. 86.
  • 10. Göbel, Henning/Henkel, Knut/Lantzius-Beninga, Berthold (2012): Berechnung der Bankenabgabe, in: Die Witschaftsprüfung, 2012/01, p. 27-39.
  • 11. Goldstein, Morrís/Veron, Nicolas (2012): Too big to fail - The transatlantic debate, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Bruegel Working Paper 2001/03, Washington, D.C.
  • 12. Kellermann, Kersten (2010): Too Big To Fail - Ein gordischer Knoten für die Finanzmarktaufsicht?, Konjunkturforschungsstelle Liechtenstein Working Papers No. 6, Liechtenstein.
  • 13. McFadden, Daniel (1977): Quantitative Methods for Analysing Travel Behaviour of Individuals - Some Recent Developments, in: Henscher, David / Stopher, Peter (Eds.), Behavioural Travel Modelling, p. 279-318.
  • 14. Moosa, Imad A. (2010): The Myth of Too Big To Fail, Basingstoke.
  • 15. Morgan, Donald/Stiroh, Kevin (2005): Too Big to Fail after All These Years, FederalReserve Bank of New York Staff Report, No. 220, New York.
  • 16. Moss, David A. (2009): An Ounce of Prevention - The Power of Public Risk Management in Stabilizing the Financial System, Harvard Business School Working Paper 09-087, Harvard.
  • 17. Nier, Erlend/Baumann, Ursel (2006): Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking - Basel II: Accounting, Transparency and Bank Stability, in: Journal of Financial Intermediation, No. 15, p. 332-361.
  • 18. OECD (2013): List of OECD Member countries - Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, online: www.oecd.org/general/listofoecdmembercountries-ratificationoftheconventionontheoecd.htm [Oct 24th, 2013].
  • 19. O'Hara, Maureen/Shaw, Wayne (1990): Deposit Insurance and Wealth Effects: The Value of Being "Too Big to Fail", in: The Journal of Finance, 45, p. 1587-1600.
  • 20. Rime, Bertrand (2005): Do "Too Big to Fail" Expectations Boost Large Banks Issuer Ratings?, working paper, Swiss National Bank, Zurich/Bern.
  • 21. Schich, Sebastian/Lindh, Sofia (2012): Implicit Guarantees for Bank Debt - Where do we stand?, in: OECD Journal - Financial Market Trends, Vol. 2012, No. 1, p. 45-64.
  • 22. Schönfelder, Bruno (2012): Vom Spätsozialismus zur Privatrechtsordnung - Eine Untersuchung über die Interdependenz zwischen Recht und Wirtschaft am Beispiel von Gläubigerschutz und Kredit, Berlin.
  • 23. Soussa, Farouk (2000): Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard and Unfair Competition? Chapter 1 in Collective Volume, Financial Stability and Central Banks: Selected Issues for financial Safety Nets and Market Discipline, Bank of England, London.
  • 24. Stern, Gary H./Feldman, Ron J. (2004): Too big to fail - The hazards of bank bailouts, Washington, D.C.
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  • 26. Ueda, Kenichi/Weder di Mauro, Beatrice (2013): Quantifying structural subsidy values for systemically important financial institutions, in: Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 37, p. 3830-3842.
  • 27. United States Securities and Exchange Commission (2012): Annual Report on Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Washington.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171336939
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