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2014 | 6 | nr 4 | 217-236
Tytuł artykułu

Tax Compliance and Public Goods Provision. An Agent-based Econophysics Approach

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We calculate the dynamics of tax evasion within a multi-agent econophysics model which is adopted from the theory of magnetism and previously has been shown to capture the main characteristics from agent-based based models which build on the standard Allingham and Sandmo approach. In particular, we implement a feedback of public goods provision on the decision-making of selfish agents which aim to pursue their self interest. Our results imply that such a feedback enhances the moral attitude of selfish agents thus reducing the percentage of tax evasion. Two parameters govern the behavior of selfish agents, (i) the rate of adaption to changes in public goods provision and (ii) the threshold of perception of public goods provision. Furtheron we analyze the tax evasion dynamics for different agent compositions and under the feedback of public goods provision. We conclude that policymakers may enhance tax compliance behavior via the threshold of perception by means of targeted public relations. (original abstract)
Opis fizyczny
  • University of Hamburg, Germany
  • BTU Cottbus - Senftenberg
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