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2011 | 14 | nr 201 | 106-113
Tytuł artykułu

Principal - Agent Relations in EU Budget Resource Collecting

Warianty tytułu
Relacje agent - pryncypał w procesie gromadzenia unijnych środków budżetowych
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
Unijne środki budżetowe gromadzone są w oparciu o zestaw reguł ustanowionych przez odpowiednie regulacje finansowe. Ze wspólnotowego punktu widzenia jest to względnie prosta procedura, a wysokość składek oparta jest na sprawozdaniach prezentujących zagregowane wpływy podatkowe. Mechanizm ten powoduje jednak dwupoziomową asymetrię informacyjną, gdzie ryzyko może być wyjaśnione przy pomocy teorii agencji. Mamy więc dwa rodzaje relacji pryncypał - agent: Komisja - kraje członkowskie, kraje członkowskie - podatnicy. W artykule zaprezentowano główne czynniki ryzyka związane z asymetrią informacji, szczególnie w stosunku do nowych krajów członkowskich. (abstrakt oryginalny)
EN
EU budget resources are collected in respect of rules set up by the financial regulation. From EU's point of view, it is a relatively simple procedure, contributions being based on Member States' reporting, which is obtained by aggregating data from taxpayers. This mechanism generates a two-level information asymmetry, risk being accounted for by means of agency theory. Thus, we have two different principal - agent relations: European Commission - Member States and Member States - taxpayers. We propose to present the main risks regarding information asymmetry, especially in the relation with New Member States, and evaluate the introduction of an authentic own revenue administered directly by EU institutions. (original abstract)
Słowa kluczowe
Rocznik
Tom
14
Numer
Strony
106-113
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
  • Bucharest University of Economic Studies in Romania
  • Bucharest University of Economic Studies in Romania
Bibliografia
  • Andersen S., Glencross A., Pre-Empting the Court: Member State Expectations, Political Oversight and the Nexus of Law and Politics in the EU, Paper Presented at the EUSA Biennial Conference Montreal, 2007.
  • Becker F., The Current Own Resource System of the EU Budget. Still a Working Model for the European Union?, bachelor thesis, 2007.
  • Begg I., Enderlein H., Le Cacheux J., Mrak M., Financing of the European Union Budget, Study for European Commission, Directorate General for Budget, 2008.
  • Begg I., Fiscal Federalism, Subsidiarity and the EU Budget Review, SIEPS Working Paper No. 1, 2009.
  • Braşoveanu I.V., Obreja-Braşoveanu L., Correlation between corruption and tax revenues in EU 27, "Economic Computation and Economic Cybernetics Studies and Research" 2009, Vol. 43(4).
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  • Delreux T., The EU as a Negotiator in Multilateral Chemicals Negotiations: Multiple Principals, Different Agents, IIEB Working Paper No. 26, 2007.
  • Gros D., How to Achieve a Better Budget for the European Union?, CEPS Working Document No. 289, 2008.
  • Gustavsson S., The living constitution of the EU, [in:] Efficient and Democratic Governance in the European Union, ed. B. Kohler-Koch, F. Larat, CONNEX Report Series No. 9, 2008.
  • Joerges C., Europeanization as Process: Thoughts on the Europeanization of Private Law, Center for International & Comparative Law Occasional Paper Vol. 1, 2009.
  • Le Cacheux J., European Budget the Poisonous Budget Rebate Debate, Notre Europe Etudes & Recherches No. 41, 2005.
  • Leen A., Eurotax and the fiscal sovereignty of the Member States, "The Columbia Journal of European Law Online" 2010, No. 18.
  • Matthijs H., The Budget of the European Union, IES Working Paper No. 4, 2010.
  • Pollack M.A., Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community, "International Organization" 1997, Vol. 51(1).
  • Quirke B., OLAF's role in the fight against fraud in the European Union: do too many cooks spoil the broth?, "Crime, Law and Social Change" 2009, Vol. 53(1).
  • Shapiro S., Agency theory, "Annual Review of Sociology" 2005, No. 31.
  • Vaubel R., Principal - agent problems in international organizations, "The Review of International Organizations" 2006, Vol. 1(2).
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171197771
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