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2009 | nr 62 | 229
Tytuł artykułu

Regulacja monopolu naturalnego w teorii i praktyce

Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
PL
Abstrakty
Scharakteryzowano monopol naturalny w ujęciu tradycyjnym oraz współczesnym. Omówiono tradycyjną koncepcję regulacji monopolu naturalnego: jej źródła inspiracji, sposób uzasadniania regulacyjnej funkcji państwa oraz dyskusje nad regułą wyznaczania cen w warunkach monopolu tradycyjnego. Poddano krytycznej analizie ekonomiczne modele regulacji (Stiglera, Peltzmana oraz Beckera) i możliwości ich zastosowania do wyjaśnienia regulacji rynków o właściwościach monopolu regularnego. Zanalizowano także koncepcje nowej regulacji rynków o właściwościach monopolu naturalnego, które pozwalają na pełniejsze wyjaśnienie państwowej regulacji rynków.
EN
The natural monopoly was characterized in the traditional and contemporary meaning. The traditional conception of the natural monopoly regulation was discussed: the inspiration sources, the way of justifying the states' regulating function and the discussions on the price fixing rule in conditions of the traditional monopoly. Economical models of the regulation (Stigler's, Peltzman's and Becker's) were subjected to the critical analysis, as well as the possibilities of their usage in explaining markets regulations with the properties of the regulating monopoly. Also, conceptions of the new markets' regulation for markets with the natural monopoly which allow better explanation of the state regulation of markets. (AT)
Twórcy
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