How is peacebuilding implemented most efficiently?

CHRISTIAN ØXNEVAD-GUNDERSEN

ABSTRACT
The security situation in the world is not stabilized and many operations related to creating a safe and secure environment did not achieve desired end state. The situation in Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya after years of military operations or short interventions proved not to be effective leading to further struggle and continuous chaos. There are a few instruments of power used including military one but those must be used in a synchronized way to use those capabilities fully. The Three-Pillar Framework (3PF) model that encompasses a great number of peacebuilding theories intending to provide a gateway for planners on how to approach peacebuilding is studied. The first pillar contains the conflict environment, the second contains conflict causes and the third contains the methods of conflict intervention.

KEY WORDS
Peacebuilding, operational planning, the Instruments of Power, NATO.

Introduction
It is easy to win a war. ‘Mission Accomplished’ was the text on the banner onboard the US aircraft carrier off the coast of Iraq in 2003 and NATO’s Secretary-General declared the mission accomplished in 2011 after Operation Unified Protector in Libya. However, we know that violence did not end in either Iraq or Libya. Military power is an effective instrument for winning wars, but how do we win, or build, peace?

Asking the general question, ‘How is peacebuilding implemented most efficiently?’ this paper will narrow it down to the scope of a NATO Joint Force Commander (JFC). NATO has repeatedly stated that military means can only achieve a limited set of objectives, such as winning the battle, and a comprehensive approach using all means available is required in order to fulfil the larger political aspirations of winning the peace. NATO, in its Comprehensive Planning Directive (COPD), describes the instruments of power as military, political, economic and civil. They are the tools that can influence the PMESII system domains (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information) that constitute the theatre of operations. NATO declares
that it only has control of the military, and partially, the political instruments through the North Atlantic Council (NAC) (SHAPE, 2013). This can imply that a military commander on a peacebuilding mission conducts operations without full access to all necessary means in pursuit of lasting peace.

Given this background, this paper argues that Information Operations (Info Ops) are an essential element for achieving peace by NATO JFC as Info Ops allows the use of all instruments of power. The Instruments of Power support a comprehensive approach and Info Ops are the JFC’s bridge between them.

NATO describes Info Ops as a military function that directs activities with the purpose to create effects on the cognitive will, understanding and capabilities of parties in support of the mission. Info Ops tools are military capabilities orchestrated within the framework of Info Ops. Information Activities are those actions that affect information or information systems and can be executed by any asset. Target audience can include populations, or individuals as leaders and decision-makers, and organizations. (NATO, 2015). For the purpose of this paper, information systems collect, apply and/or disseminate information, enabling actors to understand a situation and apply their will.

The major debate on Info Ops relates to hybrid warfare and perhaps to a lesser degree to peacebuilding. There are several definitions of peacebuilding that focus on actions that occur prior to a conflict breaking out. This paper, however, uses West’s definition quoted by Alger (2007, p. 543) as measures to ‘improve general security, establish a legitimate government, and rehabilitate the local economy and civil society’ since it fits well with NATO’s involvement in conflict after violence has already occurred. Sandole (2010, p. 56) presents his Three-Pillar Framework (3PF) model that encom-
passes a great number of peacebuilding theories intending to provide a gateway for planners on how to approach peacebuilding. The first pillar contains the conflict environment, the second contains conflict causes and the third contains methods of conflict intervention.

This paper is organised in four sections dedicated to each of the four Instruments of Power. In each section, I will first describe the relevant instrument and then provide examples of how Info Ops allow the JFC access to this instrument. In the end of each section, I will connect the relevance to peacebuilding. Finally, I will make recommendations regarding how JFC can use Info Ops as a frame for directing military effort in pursuit of peace in concert with the International Community. Understanding how JFC can use Info Ops to achieve peace is vital as Info Ops support the commander’s planning and direction of operations in the transitions between all phases of peacebuilding, enable a comprehensive approach through all instruments of power, and support cooperation with actors in those domains, addressing deep-rooted problems in pursuit of positive peace.

**Military Instrument of Power**

**Instrument of Power**

The military instrument of power is the use of both lethal and non-lethal force in order to impose will and make another entity act in a way that they would not otherwise act. It can deter, coerce, contain or defeat an opponent or, in a more constructive manner, secure or support stabilization and reconstruction (SHAPE, 2013).

**Information Operations**

The objective of Info Ops is to create an effect on the cognitive will, understanding and capabilities of the target audience. The NAC approves targets, which can include individuals, groups and organisations. The audience can encompass entire societies ranging from combatants to civilian parties of the conflict. Several military tools and methods of operations can fulfil the intention of Info Ops. Tools, or capabilities, that can be integrated through Info Ops can include public affairs, electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations, civil military cooperation (CIMIC), key leadership engagement (KLE), soldier-level engagement, deception, presence/posture/profile (PPP), psychological operations (PSYOPS) and the physical destruction of targets (NATO, 2015).

NATO has employed Info Ops in several missions. For example, as a response to the atrocities that occurred in the Balkans in the late 1990s. NATO initially responded by employing air power as per Operation Allied Force in Serbia and Kosovo (Melien, 2012, p. 320). Some targets were Air Defence/Radar installations that enabled situational awareness to adversary decision makers. They were affected by kinetic strikes or non-kinetic EW attack, denying the adversary an information system capability that enabled its understanding of the situation. Another evidence for Info Ops tool in NATO’s effort to hinder the humanitarian crisis in the Balkans were the use of PSYOPS with the intention of depriving armed actors of their will to continue atrocities (Richards, 1997-2017).

**The Relevance for Peacebuilding**

How does the military instrument of power and tools of Info Ops support peacebuilding? Sandole (2010, p. 70) describes one of the phases of intervention as ‘Conflict Management’, where one reacts to the violence in place and seeks to contain it. ‘Conflict Management’ was the case of UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Former Yugoslavia. With this understanding, we
can place Info Ops tools of kinetic strike and PSYOPS in Pillar 3, conflict intervention and its subset ‘Conflict Management’, of the 3PF model. When we address Pillar 1, Conflict Elements, in 3PF and examine the environment of Balkans in the 1990s, we can identify the conflict as an Aggressive Manifest Conflict Process (AMCP) (Sandole, 2010, p. 58) where parties resort to violence in pursuit of incompatible goals where Kosovo Albanians pursued independence and Serbs firmly opposed them. Info Ops use PSYOPS to exploit structural or intra-group conflicts in warring parties seeking to break cohesion and ultimately the actors’ will to execute violence (Sandole, 2010, p. 59).

As we see, the military instrument of power and Info Ops have a connection to the conflict elements and intervention pillars in the 3PF model, but it can be argued that these specific examples of Info Ops tools have limited effect on Pillar 2, addressing the causes of the conflict. A kinetic strike on a warring faction’s information system denying situational awareness and PSYOPS breaking cohesion and will, only suppresses the violence. That could be a deliberate objective in order to allow a next phase or other peacebuilding tools to function, but Military Power cannot win the peace alone. Galtung in Call (2008, p. 176) describes negative peace as only the absence of violence lacking the elements needed to promote peace. As an example, the military can remove an actor’s capability to use violence, but not the will to use it (i.e. removing the gun will not necessarily affect the mindset of a thief and change his motivation for committing crimes). One can argue that the Info Ops tools described here are limited to the accomplishment of negative peace and containment of violence. Therefore, in order to achieve positive peace, where a society has the capability to overcome differences through means other than violence, there is a need to address deep-rooted problems in order to prevent violence from resurfacing (Sandole, 2010, p. 10). We need to expand beyond the tools examined here, as a comprehensive approach is required. This leads us to the next instrument of power, political power.

**Political Instrument of Power**

**Instrument of Power**

The political instrument of power revolves around the diplomatic arena cooperating with various actors that have power, or authority, to provide direction within a relevant system. The intent is to achieve a favourable position supporting the end state, combining military and diplomatic power. (SHAPE, 2013)

**Information Operations**

So, how can a JFC contribute in the political instrument of power? Info Ops is the JFC’s link to Strategic Communication (StratCom), which in turn encompasses Public Diplomacy and thereby connects the JFC to the political instrument of power. Political guidance and direction of the narrative are synchronized from the strategic to the tactical level through StratCom with the intention of ensuring cohesiveness in the narrative displayed (ACT-SHAPE, 2015). The JFC can contribute to this Instrument of Power with actions on the battlefield and hence support the efforts of top-level diplomatic talks. As an example, Special Forces were the early NATO ground troops to enter Kosovo. They gained access to decision-makers that were difficult to reach and conducted KLE, with aim of influencing their cognitive will and understanding, working towards peace deals between warring factions (Melien, 2012, pp. 319-320). Written and spoken words deliver a message.
At the same time, so does our body language. According to the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence (CoE), an organisation carries its own body language (Tutins, 2016). In this case, the JFC can support efforts in the diplomatic arena with the manoeuvre and actions of their forces, adjusting force Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP). You can send a message of threat with amphibious vessels, threatening an invasion and thereby coercing a warring faction or you can send a strong message of reassurance to the weaker faction when deploying ground units.

**Figure 2. Lederach’s Leadership Pyramid based on Sandole, 2010, p. 45**

The Relevance for Peacebuilding

Having seen how these two tools of Info Ops provide the JFC access to the political instrument of power, how does it fit in the scope of peacebuilding? As observed in the previous section, military power is limited in its ability to address the causes of violence in Pillar 2. A general understanding is that guns do not start wars, but miscommunication does. Supporting this perception, Alger (2007, p. 535) sites UN general assembly highlighting the importance of communication between entities in addressing deep-rooted causes of violence. With this background communication can be understood paramount in trying to achieve a ‘Culture of Peace’ that is able
to ‘reject violence and prevent conflicts’. Given this background, the Info Ops tools of KLE and PPP give the JFC the possibility to address 3PF Pillar 2 and the causes of the conflict. Delivering messages influencing parties’ will and understanding, and supporting the achievement of parties’ mutual understanding through KLE and PPP addressing each actor.

Lederach’s Leadership Pyramid as presented by Sandole (2010) provides a picture for how to engage the different layers of society in a conflict working towards peacebuilding. The model maps out Top-, Mid-, and Grass Root-Level Leadership, which must be cohesively engaged in building peace. Top Level Leadership is described as official, governmental actors with the aim of achieving an overarching peace deal between the major conflicting players (Sandole, 2010, pp. 44-47). This engagement would naturally belong to the political instrument of power above the JFC level. Middle Range Leadership, however, is characterised as a layer that has connections to both Top and Grass Root-levels of society and is not as restrained by politics as the Top-Level (Sandole, 2010, p. 47). This leaves it as an important layer of society that can have a positive effect if addressed cohesively with the Top-Level. The NAC approves Info Ops target audiences, which can involve all actors in the theatre, not only the warring factions (NATO, 2015). This implies that JFCs can engage broadly in the Lederarch Leadership Pyramid while addressing conflict elements and causes in Sandole’s 3PF model supporting the political instrument of power.

The nature of the Information Activity of KLE and PPP in this paper is non-kinetic. Therefore, it can operate in several phases of peacebuilding described in Pillar 3 of intervention, moving from ‘Coercive Peace-making’ all the way to ‘Conflict Resolution’ (Sandole, 2010, pp. 70-71)

**Economic Instrument of Power**

**Instrument of Power**

According to COPD, we can understand the economical instrument of power as those actions that promote, or hinder the effectiveness of the financial system involving the parties in the conflict (SHAPE, 2013).

**Information Operations**

How can the JFC be involved, or contribute, within the Economical Instrument of Power? During NATO’s Operation Unified Protector in 2011, military units enforced a weapons embargo on Libya stemming from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1970 and 1973. The embargo effectively controlled the flow of commodities off the coast of Libya. Another example is from Operation Joint Endeavour in 1995 under UNSC Resolution 757 (1992) and 1022 (1995) where maritime assets enforced economic sanctions, supporting efforts of states that halted their trade, on then Yugoslavia through an embargo. The sanctions were supposed to be lifted when certain parts of the peace agreement were upheld (UNSC 1022). The use of military assets to enforce embargos is part of presence, posture and profile (PPP) and targets the will and understanding of Top-Level Decision-makers (i.e. the will to meet criteria for a peace agreement). As such, these activities are in the scope of Info Ops.

As we saw in the first section, the JFC can use Info Ops as a tool to deprive a decision-maker of C2 capabilities that enable understanding and situational awareness by destroying radar installations. On the other hand, Info Ops can have an effect on enhancing situational awareness for decision-makers in the economic domain looking at organised crime. For example,
according to the NATO Military Police CoE, ‘Stability Policing’ is a method that can support the rebuilding of governmental bodies. One area is (re)building forensic capabilities targeting economic crime and forgery. (NATO MP Centre of Excellence, 2016).

**The Relevance for Peacebuilding**

How do the economic instrument of power and the Info Ops tools of embargo and forensics fit into the different Pillars of the 3PF model of peacebuilding? Firstly, they can address conflict root causes. As described in Pillar 2. Conflict causes, these can include economic aspects and may fuel the violence, even if it was not an original source of the conflict (Sandole, 2010, p. 67). As we have previously seen, these causes of conflict must be addressed in building positive peace. ‘Conflict-handling Orientations’ found in Pillar 1, conflict elements, is a description of how the parties manoeuvre towards their objectives. They may be competitive and confrontational or more constructive and cooperative. Parties may also reach a point of compromising and dividing resources in fair shares in more ‘collaborative problem solving’ when they understand that it is not sustainable for either part to split the difference and other solutions are required (Sandole, 2010, pp. 65-66). Looking at the example of third party intervention, where economic embargo is only lifted when parties adhere to peace agreements, we see how the use of Economic Power and PPP can be a tool with goal to influence the will of parties from a negative towards a more positive conflict handling approach.

The work of forensics carries the attributes of an information system by collecting, applying and disseminating information. Information related to organised crime stemming from deep-rooted problems can be addressed by decision-makers in pursuit of peacebuilding. The peacebuilding phase of ‘Conflict Transformation’ in Pillar 3, involves a third party to enhance or rebuild actors’ capabilities and a way to handle future conflicts in a non-violent manner (Sandole, 2010, p. 71). Conducting a type of Military Assistance, like training governmental bodies on forensics, would assist actors’ C2 capabilities on the judicial side and can be part of the comprehensive approach, making a bridge to the civil instrument of power as we will address in the last section.

It can be argued that there are not many Info Ops tools that connect JFCs to the economic instrument of power. Nevertheless, we have witnessed the relevance of military capabilities, supporting a common approach with the International Community, influencing the cognitive will and understanding of the different actors in pursuit of effective peacebuilding.

**Civil Instrument of Power**

**Instrument of Power**

According to the COPD, the civil instrument of power is the use of ‘...judiciary, constabulary, education, public information and civilian administration and support infrastructure...’ (SHAPE, 2013). It also underlines that the instrument is controlled by nations, international and non-governmental organisations (IO and NGO).

**Information Operations**

There is a close connection between the Economic and Civilian Instrument. In the last section, we examined the enhancement of governmental C2 capabilities combating economic crime. This, in turn, has an effect on the parties’ ability to exert judiciary power. ‘Stability Policing’ can be associated with judiciary power and described as constabulary activities directed to build, or rebuild, governments
2.3. NONMILITARY SECURITY

ability to enforce law and order as well as protect human rights (NATO MP Centre of Excellence, 2016). When military units train other actors, the training can be associated with the Info Ops tool of Military Assistance and to a degree, CIMIC. The latter is defined by NATO as: ’The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental and agencies’ (NSA, 2013). In AJP-3.10, Doctrine for Info Ops, CIMIC is mentioned as a tool that contributes to influencing key decision-makers and contributing with information (NATO, 2015). An example is Kosovo Force CIMIC teams working together with United Nations Mission in Kosovo registering destroyed domestic, educational, health care, economic and communicational infrastructure (Kosovo, 2000, p. 120). The registered data provided a baseline for a broad group of decision-makers representing different entities in pursuit of peacebuilding.

The Relevance for Peacebuilding

Having examined how Info Ops provides the JFC access to the civil instrument of power, let us look at how it fits with peacebuilding theory. Chadwick, citing Galtung, explained that there is a mission and role for everybody in the complex effort of achieving both negative and positive peace. Furthermore, there are myriads of actors involved in the work of peacebuilding and the number is increasing. The UN system organises most of these governmental, international and NGO (2007, pp. 534-536). Even though the UN cluster does not encompass all institutions, it is the largest IO and attracts the most NGOs due to funding and legitimacy. Acknowledging the complexity of peacebuilding missions in the frame of the 3PF model and the need for a comprehensive approach, the JFC’s use of CIMIC in conjunction with the UN would be beneficial in restoring civil society.

John Prendergast, in Chadwick (2007, p. 542) argues that humanitarian aid is the most important tool for connecting third party interveners and conflicting actors. As such, it can be a stepping-stone for communication and a facilitator in transferring a narrative in the frame of Info Ops. CIMIC, as an Info Ops tool in the Civil Instrument of Power, can connect military capabilities with other actor’s efforts on rebuilding or establishing new mechanisms supporting local institutional bodies’ ability to govern their own population and master internal disputes. (Sandole, 2010, p. 71).

Call and Cousens emphasize the importance of examining and truly understanding individual and societal disputes in Pillar 2 before addressing the elements of conflict in Pillar 1. Otherwise, efforts would not go ‘...beyond fragile, minimalist peacebuilding.’ (Sandole, 2010, p. 69). The example of CIMIC personnel collecting information in Kosovo gives it a role in this context. This, coupled with the civil instrument of power enabling rebuilding of educational institutions in a war-torn society, can be a bedrock for avoiding future outbreaks of violence in pursuit of positive peace by addressing the deep-root causes of the conflict. As such, we can place CIMIC and Info Ops in Pillar 3 of intervention and the peacebuilding phase of ‘conflict transformation’. We have seen Info Ops in the Civil Instrument of Power as a truly comprehensive approach, with UN cluster cooperation, influencing the cognitive will and understanding of the different actors in pursuit of effective peacebuilding.

Conclusion and recommendation

In this paper, we have seen how the tools of Info Ops allow a military commander ac-
cuss to all instruments of power (see figure 4). Info Ops function in the military instrument of power through kinetic or non-kinetic attack on physical C2 installations and PSYOPS having an effect on armed parties of the conflict. The political instrument of power is accessed through the tools of KLE and the organisational body language of presence, posture and profile (PPP) supporting the International Community’s credibility by displaying commitment and intent. PPP, with embargos, can also play a role in the economical instrument of power supporting IC overall efforts. Finally, CIMIC has a key liaison function with the vast amount of entities in the Civil Instrument of Power. All military actions and tools described in these instruments of power have the possibility of influencing parties’ cognitive will, understanding, and C2 capabilities in the information environment. Therefore, Info Ops gives JFCs the possibility to have a comprehensive approach to missions of peacebuilding, which we have witnessed, is crucial in pursuit of positive peace.

The Three-Pillar Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution (3PF) Model encompasses, according to Sandole (2010), the majority of important peacebuilding theories and can be a foundation for planning approaches to peacebuilding. The relevance of Info Ops is displayed with the connection of several parts of the 3PF model as visualised in figure 3. In Pillar 1 (Conflict Elements), it addresses parties, conflict-handling orientations and environment elements. In Pillar 2 (Conflict Causes and Conditions) we have individual and societal elements. In Pillar 3 (Conflict Intervention), we have the different phases of peacebuilding such as conflict management, settlement, resolution and transformation. By merging the doctrine of Info Ops with 3PF in this paper, we see opportunities for JFCs to attain positive effects in peacebuilding missions.

With this background, I encourage military planners and relevant civil servants to take Info Ops, coupled with the 3PF model,
2.3. NONMILITARY SECURITY

into account when planning operations. I recommend that JFCs use Info Ops as a framework for orchestrating military capabilities/tools in pursuit of winning the peace because it supports having a continuous, long-term focus on effects, and continued validity when transitioning between the several phases of peacebuilding. Because they can affect the will, understanding and capabilities of all parties by both kinetic and non-kinetic measures, Info Ops enable a comprehensive approach through all instruments of power, bridging collaboration with actors in those domains by addressing deep-root problems in pursuit of positive peace.

In conclusion, the tools of Info Ops are an essential element for a NATO JFC in pursuit of peacebuilding. This paper has discussed possible paths to move from winning the war to winning the peace in the frame of communication. However, will it enable a bold statement of ‘mission accomplished’ with the end of violence? Call argues that family violence increases in succession of war (Sandole, 2010, p. 81). As Info Ops can be an effective element in peacebuilding, communication is probably a large part in all type of violence between ethinical groups or within a family. With communication, peace can replace violence in all arenas.

Figure 4. Visualisation of tools and their connections to each Instrument of Power as presented in the paper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selection of JFC tools in IO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinetic strike</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-kinetic strike (EW)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLE</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List of abbreviations:
JFC: Joint Force Commander
COPD: Comprehensive Planning Directive
NAC: North Atlantic Council
Info Ops: Information Operations
3PF: Three-Pillar Framework
EW: electronic warfare
CIMIC: civil military cooperation
KLE: key leadership engagement
PPP: presence/posture/profile
PSYOPS: psychological operations
AMCP: Aggressive Manifest Conflict Process
StratCom: Strategic Communication
CoE: Centre of Excellence
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
IO: International Organisations
NGO: Non-Governmental Organisations

References
ACT-SHAPE, 2015, NATO Strategic Communications Handbook. s.l.: NATO.


NATO, 2015, AJP-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations. s.l.: NATO Standardization Office (NSO).

NSA, 2013, AJP-3.4.9 Civil-Military Cooperation. s.l.: NATO Standardization Agency.


Tutins, M., 2016, Introduction to Strategic Communication, M3 Module. Tartu, Baltic Defence College: NATO StratCom CoE.