HERMENEUTICS OF HEIDEGGER’S FACTICITY AND ITS RELIGIOUS ASPECTS

Abstract. The concept of facticity that was developed by Heidegger from 1919 to 1923 composes the basis of all his further thought: the conceptions of Dasein and ontological temporality will originate namely from this concept. The article analyzes various expressions of the factitious life (care, Er-eignis, life, Self-Destruction, meaningfulness, death), yet the special consideration is paid to its religious aspects. Really the essence of facticity is treated by Heidegger as a temporality that is essentially correlated with the Christian experience. The influence of Saint Augustine to Heidegger and the Heideggerian concept of methodical atheism are analyzed and this analysis raises the intricate problem of the relation of the Black Forest philosopher to Christian faith and to God.

Keywords: Heidegger, hermeneutics, facticity, religious, care, Er-eignis, life, temporality


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On 9 January, 1919, a 30-year old Martin Heidegger wrote a letter to his friend, the canon Engelbert Krebs, informing him of his withdrawal from the Catholic Church and indicating the main reason for his choice: a scholastic system, where the Church aimed to squeeze Christian beliefs, had become “problematic and unacceptable”\(^1\) to him. He reached this conclusion after a thorough study into the theory of knowledge that highlighted the fundamentality of the nature of *historical* human knowledge. Certainly, the baroque scholastic system, which divided being into immobile eternity and insignificant time planes, had already become a caricature of philosophy for Heidegger and he mocked it scornfully even during public lectures.\(^2\)

What had happened to the young Catholic thinker, whom Freiburg University officials had been grooming since 1913 to become an apologist of Catholic philosophy in protestant Germany?\(^3\) At first glance, whatever happened was nothing extraordinary: young Heidegger had become entwined in the common European intellectual movement, which had already started in the XIX century and which Sloterdijk defined as the “apocalypse of reality.”\(^4\) It was expressed by expulsion of the underworld and eternal being from the centre of the European world as illusory long-lasting images and positioning temporal flow at the centre. To put it differently, from the XIX century onwards, post-Hegelian Europe was set in motion by a radical process: time was emancipated from eternity. Heidegger, who up until that time had been an active Catholic and passionate fighter against modern tendencies,

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\(^1\) This letter was published by Heidegger’s biographer Hugo Ott only in 1988, in his work *Martin Heidegger. Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie*. We got to know it through its French translation: H. Ott, *Martin Heidegger. Eléments pour une biographie*, Payot, Paris 1988, 112–113.


\(^3\) The events of Heidegger’s childhood and youth that had influence on his future life were thoroughly examined by Hugo Ott in an already mentioned work *Martin Heidegger. Eléments pour une biographie*, op. cit., especially 47–127.

dedicated his habilitation thesis, written between 1914 and 1915, to the scholar Duns Scotus. However, in the conclusion of the thesis, written in 1916, we can see a radical change. Inspired by Hegel, young Heidegger pointed to the concept of correlation between eternity and time as the major philosophical concept and task, which meant that from then on all the efforts to understand time philosophically were in vain, if they moved away from the margins of time and historical processes. From a philosophical perspective, eternity is only in time, having left for itself no place whatsoever beyond time. That year such a point of view caused a scandal among Catholic social strata and temporarily disrupted Heidegger’s academic career. After all, this worldview meant that it was not eternity, but time and only time that had to be the field for philosophical investigation. In truth however, this attitude of Heidegger could already be seen on 27 July, 1915, in his habitation paper *The Concept of Time in the Science of History*, prepared with reference to Dilthey’s conception of time.

It could have been possible for the young Martin Heidegger, who directed his thinking towards the “apocalypse of reality”, to remain indistinguishable from thousands of other European intellectuals of his time, if not for one thing. Heidegger brought time into the centre of his philosophy, just like many others did, yet with the help of texts by Husserl and Dilthey, he grasped what no one else could see in the phenomenon of temporality and what would eventually form the great thinker Heidegger as we we know him today. He called the concept that he grasped *Faktizität* – facticity. In spite of important

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7 The word *Faktizität* is translated as *facticity*, based on the tradition of French and English translations (*facticité* and *facticity*, respectively). One should especially avoid translating this concept as factuality and understand it as basic factuality (“plain facts”), respecting the categories of subject/object.
references left by Heidegger himself, especially in *Being and Time*,\(^8\) the meaning of the concept of facticity was generally understood only in the eighties, i.e., when texts written at the beginning of 1920s,\(^9\) consisting mainly of lectures of that time, were published in the edition of his collected works (*Gesamtausgabe*). Particularly, attention should be paid to six lecture cycles *Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungs Problem* (*The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview*) (1919),\(^10\) *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (*The basic problems of phenomenology*) (1919–1920),\(^11\) *Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion* (*Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*) (1920–1921),\(^12\) *Augustinus und Neuplatonismus* (*Augustine and Neoplatonism*) (1921),\(^13\) *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (*Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*) (1921–1922),\(^14\) *Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)* (*Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity*) (1923),\(^15\) as well as synthesis of philosophical investigations that in 1922 Heidegger wrote to Natorp, professor of the University of Marburg; hence the report is widely known as the *Natorp Report*.\(^16\)

\(^8\) “The author points out that in his lectures, starting from 1919–1920 winter semester, he changed his analysis of the surrounding world many times; and more generally ‘factual hermeneutics’ of *Dasein,*’ M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Niemayer, Tübingen 1976, 72.


\(^11\) Ibid., 58.

\(^12\) Ibid., 60.

\(^13\) Ibid.

\(^14\) Ibid., 61.

\(^15\) Ibid., 63.

\(^16\) The original title is *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation).* Published in bilingual German-French edition:
In spite of Heidegger’s withdrawal from Catholicism, the sphere of Christian thought had vital influence on the discovery of facticity. Up until now this fact has not been emphasized and explained enough. Our remarks should serve to bridge that gap.

1. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF FACTICITY
IN HEIDEGGER’S WORK

The concept of facticity was first mentioned by Heidegger in lectures *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview*, which he delivered in the spring of 1919. There Heidegger talked about *hermeneutics of facticity*. In his 1927 letter to Karl Löwith, he would also reveal the prehistory that led to the emergence of the concept of facticity: a habilitation thesis about Duns Scotus prepared in 1915 was “the most probable efforts at the time to comprehend what is facticible, to raise facticity as an issue.”

Duns Scotus’ concept of *haecceitas*, the analysis of which led Heidegger to the foundation of *time* and *existence* moments (*existentiam et tempus*, where for the first time we hear *being* and *time*, *Sein und Zeit* connotation’s shades) provide support for the Heideggerian concept of facticity, because it expresses the feeling of *life’s concreteness*: Duns Scotus “more than previous scholars before him (...) was able to find broad and subtle proximity (*haecceitas*) for what a real life is; its plurality and its tension.”

The famous geneticist of Heidegger’s texts, Theodore Kiesel, draws our attention to the fact that in the thesis about Duns Scotus quite a lot of attention is given to the analysis of medieval concepts *simplex apprehensio* and *intellectus principiorum*. The aim of this analysis is to show that reality

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hides reflexive categories within itself; thus that reality is hermeneutic from within and not because of throwing something that comes from human reason over its exterior. To put it differently, as early as 1915, Heidegger had already grasped what, four years later, would crystallize into the concept of becoming of reality’s concreteness (haecceitas, existentiam et tempus), which is characterized by existential structure and which he would call *hermeneutics of facticity* in 1919. Reality in its concreteness and inseparable from that concreteness operation of human reasoning: in 1919 this hermeneutics of facticity were also named by Heidegger as equally important and interchangeable concepts of *factual life* and *factual thought*. Hermeneutics of facticity, factual life and factual thought – these essentially equivalent phrases would crystallize into the concept of Dasein a few years later.

In 1919 lectures, the “experience” of factual thought is explained though an expression *Es gibt*. The investigations of Kiesel show that this expression comes into Heidegger’s texts from Lask’s term *Hingabe*, which means the existence of reasoning categories in any (even “unconscious”) human experience. Having linked this idea of Lask with scholarly *intellectus principiorum* (primordial emergence of meaning in human experience), Heidegger started to reflect upon it independently, calling it *Es gibt*. Primordiality of the emergence of meaning manifests itself through its occurrence before any “deductive” (“conscious”) organisation of experience. Meaning is assigned at the “pre-theoretical” level, which forms a basis for and leads the organisation of the “theoretical” level. The place of *Es gibt* is life itself, which is what Heidegger calls facticity, *Fakticität*. Thus, even pre-theoretical facticity is not irrational: human intelligence works within it from the

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20 Because of this inseparability, Heidegger’s notion of *faktizität* is incompatible with the one of Fichte, who, it seems, was the first one to use it in German.


22 During his lecture in 1919, Heidegger drew a diagram on the board that made a distinction between theoretical and pre-theoretical plane. This diagram is referred to in Theodore Kisiel’s paper *L’indication formelle de la facticité: sa genèse et sa transformation*, op. cit., 218.
very beginning, providing foundations for all the theorizations before any theorization of experience. This activity enables the foreseeing of a certain “science”\textsuperscript{23} of facticity – of life within itself – the formation of which becomes the main objective of Heidegger in 1919–1923.

There arises a question: how can one comprehend something that happens at the “pre-theoretical” level? How can one define the puzzling \textit{es gibt}, a primordial assignment of meaning that happens before any theoretical formulation of that meaning? If we want to apprehend the \textit{es gibt} experience, we have to learn, encourages Heidegger, to withdraw from the “theoretical” level. However, here we have to avoid a misunderstanding: this withdrawal is not some attempt to reason or act irrationally.\textsuperscript{24} The rationality of reasoning has to be maintained, but also radically transformed: it has to be reconciled with whatever is being considered, with “pre-theoretics.” The “objects” of reasoning are no longer theories, notions, abstract figures or concepts, but an absolute dearth of them. How can rational and hence nevertheless theoretical reasoning approach such a dearth? How can one theoretically reason what is “pre-theoretical”\textsuperscript{25}? Heidegger gives such an answer: “The sphere of this subject can be apprehended only when fully giving oneself to it.”\textsuperscript{26} This means that theoretical reasoning (at the “theoretical” level) has to follow that primordial reasoning, which happened from the very beginning and immediately, together with the mobility of an object, and primordially existed in all experienced things (at the“pre-theoretical” level). Here Heidegger uses biblical imagery: theoretical level has to be grafted onto the Tree of Life, growing in the desert, to become part of it, its core. One has to get “pure understanding of life in


\textsuperscript{24} In reality Natorp considered facticity to be synonymous with irrationality; and for the “philosophers of live” this term meant some sort of “mysticism.” However, Heidegger treats facticity in a completely different way. More on his relation with the issue of irrationality at the time in J. Greisch, \textit{L’Arbre de Vie et l’Arbre du savoir}, op. cit., 111–133.


\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 61.
itself and for itself.” This is precisely the aim of Heideggerian “hermeneutics of facticity.”

2. THE ACCOUNT OF FACTICITY

To enter these hermeneutics means to observe various forms of factical life. These forms cannot be perceived as separate features: they cover each other, penetrate each other, they are one another. Theoretical reasoning that analyses them has to be unified as light illuminating itself. Only by maintaining this unity, our “theory” that illuminates features of facticity will avoid becoming vainly abstract and “un-lived,” and will remain faithful to facticity.

3. FACTICITY AS MOVEMENT: CARE

The first feature that catches the eye as soon as one starts to examine factical life is its mobility: everything that exists is penetrated by movement; there is nothing that appears on the human horizon without moving. However, precisely because of its universality, movement is invisible. Heidegger quotes Pascal: “When everything moves in such a way it seems that nothing is moving.” When we want to observe movement in the universe of physical objects, we have to stop. But such a stop would be fatal for philosophy: Having dropped out from the movement of facticity, facticity itself would leave our reason.” The first problem that Heidegger faces is the necessity to find reasoning categories which would enable us to see factical movement while being within it. Husserl’s method of phenomenological seeing enables one to do so; Heidegger would express gratitude to his teacher for this possibility for the rest of his life. A person who is able to look onto reality without any prejudice, without pre-conceived ideas of scientific

27 Ibid., 125.
28 Ent-leben, Ibid., 74.
30 “Husserl gave me sight”, Ibid., 6.
or anyother nature, that are universally accepted and cover our eyes even before we get to open them; a person, who is able to look onto the world in a “completely naive” way can overcome contradictions that confounded Pascal and see unique but fundamental movement of the world’s formation: a primordial assignment of meaning that happens in reality itself. This assignment, the movement of the world’s formation, oddly reminds us of the phenomenon of care: someone who takes care of obtainment of daily bread knows that the whole world and all of its meanings change depending on whether the bread was obtained or not. Thus Heidegger defines facticity as care: “The fundamental meaning of factual movement is care (curare).”

Care is a phenomenon that gives life a “relational meaning” (Bezugssinn). This means that mobility of life is caused by care; that it is because of the phenomenon of care that life happens as “directed towards” and as giving its own directions (“directives”), arising from within itself: “The sense of relation is self-directing in a way characteristic only of itself. It is a directive that life gives to itself; a directive that life experiences: it is a meaningful message coming from within it. This is the meaning full of intentionality at the primordial level.”

The word “directive” has two meanings: that of movement and that of understanding. That is why Heidegger can explain the phenomenon of care, realized as a sense of relation of factical life, by using the concept of intentionality. We will come back to this “meaningful” dimension of facticity.

A certain movement of care – in the relational sense (Bezugssinn) – manifests itself through three phenomena “propensity” (Neigung), “distance” (Abstand) and “blocking-off” (Abriegelung). Propensity de-

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31 M. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, op. cit., vol. 61, 21. Before calling facticity Sorge, Heidegger referred to it as Bekümmerung, which should be translated as “caring.”

32 Ibid., 98.

33 These phenomena were analysed in greater detail by J. Greisch in his books L’Arbre de Vie et l’Arbre du savoir, op. cit., 265–267, and J. Greisch, Ontologie et Temporalité, PUF, Paris 1994, 33–34.
termines that care shifts in one or the other direction. “In the direction of sense, in that inclination where care is realized, the world inhabited by life has weight, which it always distributes anew in its facticity.”\(^{34}\) Greisch comments as follows: “Any meaningful experience is accompanied by a decision about importance: this is important for me, and this is not, this almost does not interest me, etc.”\(^ {35}\) A more difficult to comprehend phenomenon of “distance” is a behaviour when care seeks to “distance oneself by neutralizing,” to move away from disturbing (potentially threatening) variety of the world’s meanings.\(^ {36}\) Blocking-off is the reaction of care to haziness (Diesigkeit),\(^ {37}\) arising from the fact that life potentially contains an infinity of meanings and therefore is difficult and unbearable. As a result of haziness, care has a sense of constantly being at fault and staying in debt (Schuld). Blocking-off is an escape from this difficulty, a search for ease and carelessness. Care and carelessness, in essence, is the same thing.\(^ {38}\)

4. ER-EIGNIS AND THE FORMATION OF THE LIVING WORLD

As a relational sense of factical life, care is the source of primordial meaningfulness, named Es gibt by Heidegger. The world “comes” from the giving of this primordial meaning. Heidegger says: “Es weltet,” “There is worlding.”\(^ {39}\) Es gibt is an event that unfolds in two dimensions of facticity – movement and meaningfulness. It is the same reality that opens up every moment as a perceived world for the one who lives. There is no reality on one hand and one who perceives it on the other; the world is not an encounter of two self-enclosed substances, during which perceivers would impose their own laws of perception upon reality. “Meaning is already there,” from the very beginning, as primor-

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\(^{34}\) M. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, op. cit., vol. 61, 101.

\(^{35}\) J. Greisch, L’Arbre de Vie et l’Arbre du savoir, op. cit., 265.

\(^{36}\) M. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, op. cit., vol. 61, 104.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 88.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 105–110.

\(^{39}\) As es regnet, “It rains.”
dial mobility, through which the world happens simultaneously, encompassing both reality and the perceiver. Heidegger calls this emergence of the world “Occurrence,” “Er-eignis.”  

Emphasizing its dimension of mobility, he also says: *Es er-eignet sich*, “It is happening.” In the concept of *Er-eignis*, there is no way not to notice a special connection that will dominate Heidegger’s reasoning up until his death: Mutual interdependence of what happens and to whom that happens. Heidegger sometimes says: *Es er-eignet mir* (“It happens to me”).

The concept of *Er-eignis* that was seldom but powerfully used in the lectures of 1919–1923, would resurface in Heidegger’s writings in the 1930s and would become the foundation and the aim of his late thought, just like the concept *Dasein*, which also emerged in the environment of facticity, while writing *Being and Time*. In 1919 *Er-eignis* simply marks primordial mobility of the world that the philosopher has to grasp within itself rather than looking for some transcendental reason behind it. Apprehended in the following way, “the living world” unfolds on three overlapping planes: *Selbstwelt* (self-world), *Mitwelt* (with-world), *Umwelt* (around-world). However, *self-world* occupies a central position as the world is located gravitating towards “me.” This phenomenon, which by no means can be interpreted as some masked subjectivism, manifests itself in critical situations of life, when my own life and its meaning are in mortal danger. We then see that everything, “the entire world” and its future directions in a certain way depend only on me.

The fact, that by introducing the concept of *Er-eignis* Heidegger refuses any reference to transcendence, reveals his principled attitu-

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40 Heidegger emphasizes that the concept of Ereignis is a complete resistance to traditional metaphysics, for which things are only „brutally existing instances that emerge and then immediately stop,” M. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, op. cit., vol. 56–57, 69.

41 When Heidegger will overtake this term in 1930s, he will give it a much broader meaning, making it doubtful if the term can still be translated as “occurrence.” But this is an issue of the later thought of Heidegger.

42 M. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, op. cit., vol. 58, 33; Ibid., vol. 61, 94.

43 See J. Greisch comment in *Ontologie et Temporalité*, op. cit., 38–39.
de towards religion: reality, considered from a philosophical point of view, i.e., nothing other than facticity, can be divided “on this side” and “on the other side.” It might seem that in this sense Heidegger’s reasoning should be decoupled from any religiosity. But actually the philosopher rejected only the perception of reality, which became a classic and which is characterized by the above mentioned model of division of reality, traditionally applied to define the concept of religion. Later, while writing *Being and Time*, a different concept of transcendence would crystallize and it would not be possible to treat this concept in a neutral way, because this thought, in turn, also gave rise to the concept of transcendence that superseded the classic model.\textsuperscript{44}

More interestingly, around 1920, while developing analyses of facticity and placing *Selbstwelt* at their centre as the most fundamental becoming of reality, Heidegger would point to the Christian faith as the one, which would highlight and create conditions for reasoning to apprehend the phenomenon of “one’s own world.” Heidegger referred to the personality of Christ, and “The kingdom of God among us” (Lk 17, 21) that he preached, as historically it created the opportunity to treat *Selbstwelt* as the centre of the world.\textsuperscript{45}

5. FACTICITY AS LIFE

As Heidegger claims, life is a “fundamental phenomenological category, which denotes fundamental phenomenon”\textsuperscript{46} – facticity. We will understand it by only referring to what life itself shows us from within: “Life talks to itself in its own language.”\textsuperscript{47} It is specifically self-


\textsuperscript{46} M. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, op. cit., vol. 61, 80.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., vol. 58, 231.
Caught within itself, life unfolds in various forms; however one can only comprehend all of them through tension between illumination of one’s own self and opacity.

The main attribute of life that Heidegger distinguishes is “the unity of succession and temporalization.”\(^{49}\) We have to treat this primordial unity as a unified experience of the world. Experiences never line up next to one another; they complete one and the same experience: the world is constantly experienced in its unity. It is because of this fatal unity that the world cannot be explained by abstract reasoning and analyses that will always be late and will never catch up with what is given to us to experience anew. Every moment something happens and profoundly changes our state and world, while many other things imperceptibly fall into oblivion and their loss, in turn, replaces rich experienced unity.\(^{50}\) There is no way for us to control this fundamental becoming of

\(^{48}\) Ibid., 41–44.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., vol. 61, 84.

\(^{50}\) “We investigate an integral experience of factical live and highlight particular aspects of it; more precisely, we enable them to be what they are and only observe them more intensively. Therefore we catch quite a concrete unity of life’s experience here and now; unwilling either to frighten it, or to stop it with our glances and only wishing to understand it and to follow it. What we look at is what we experience at this moment. We do not think about the surrounding world, the world of others and our own world – we factically live it. What we experience is not some confusing life experience, \textit{ad hoc} put in order. Let us not be ashamed of triviality! (\textit{Keine Scheu vor Trivialitäten}!).

Having finished my lecture, I leave the university building; I see an acquaintance at the other side of the street; he greets me; I greet him too; I can hear music while passing by Colosseum; then I remember that I am going to a theatre tonight, that I still have to arrange a couple of matters, and that I can’t come back late; in the flow of all the thoughts it strikes me that during my lecture I was not able to form a statement to adequately reflect what I have seen; while going further I examine my matters that I want to tackle before doing anything else; at the same time I can see people and I enter into a cigar shop at a corner of the street; I buy Swiss \textit{Stumpen} and I can hear a gentleman at the bar talk about the last football match; I am interested in what he is telling; as I put my shopping into my bag I can hear that he comes more and more agitated and excited because of the marvellous things that happened at the pitch.

What do I experience here? Trivialities, small everyday things. But we would gain an experience of important things in exactly the same way. This is only to say that my
factual life. Theoretical reasoning is late as “post factum” considera-
tion does not hold here: Constantly renewed unity of experience does
not allow a thought to stop at what has happened, because in that case it
would consider what is no longer there and not what is happening. This
is why, when Heidegger talks about life, he constantly uses the concept
of struggling (Quälenden). Experience accompanies us as something
simultaneously clear and opaque. Life is movement, which gives in,
but by doing so it changes and leaves our consciousness confused. This
is why life will always manifest itself as something unpredictable. The
link between assignment of meaning and opacity turns life into fate,
which we cannot control.\footnote{Ibid., vol. 61, 84.}

Life that is described above as Er-eignis and care is the same as
the movements of “propensity,” “distance,” and “blocking-off.” The
particularity of these movements of life is that they are pure reactions
to themselves. Life gives itself to itself, runs from itself and brings
anxiety to itself. There starts to emerge a phenomenon that lays the
foundations of all of Heidegger’s philosophy – finality.

We are now in a position to define one more attribute of factual life:
the creation of self by self-destruction.

6. FACTICAL LIFE AS SELF-DESTRUCTION

The earlier analyses show that factual life cannot bear its own burden,
and that is why it runs away and hides from itself, trying to fade (Ver-
blassen). Distraction (Zerstreuung) becomes its core. It is precisely by
fading away and being distracted that life becomes what it is, beco-
mes itself and creates itself. Care and carelessness are two sides of the
same coin; they are the same thing and the same movement. Heidegger

experience exists in reality: my acquaintance really greets me; music really plays; I re-
ally think about something; Swiss Stumpen that I really put in my bag really exist; the
man at the bar is really excited; that bloke that really infuriates a dog really behaves as
an uneducated one; hesitant and disappointed with oneself beginner of phenomenol-
ogy whom I cheer up is really hesitant and disappointed with oneself,” Ibid., vol. 58,
103–104.

\footnote{Ibid., vol. 61, 84.}
calls this paradoxical dynamics “Praestruktion” – a word that simultaneously denotes both creation and destruction. By creating life with its provisions, organisations, considerations and choices, “propensity” coincides with distraction as care immediately faces its inability to encompass the totality of its own life. This is also where the movement of “distance” arises; although it is characterised by the “objective” evaluation of reality, it is only a runaway from one’s own self, i.e., an attempt to neutralise and control that fatal distance, which separates life from itself. The phenomenon of “blocking-off,” of course, expresses “the meaning of facticity and its mobility” in the best way, developing as “‘Von-sich-weg’ im ‘Aus-sich-hinaus,” as a runaway “away from oneself, while being parted from oneself within one’s own self,” i.e., as a runaway from oneself, because within oneself there is no capacity to anticipate the whole of oneself and this is unbearable.

Unable to bear itself, life unfolds as a constant ruining (Ruinanz) of itself. Factual life is a “downfall.” However, by falling down it creates itself. Destruction is a fundamental element of construction, and that is why Heidegger talks about “Nothingness of factual life,” which nevertheless is not nothing. We are woven into stunning dynamics: a life running away from itself is the same phenomenon (there is no life on one hand and another life running from it on the other), the unity of which consists in taking care to avoid the downfall. Wishing to clarify this complexity of factual life, Heidegger introduces the concept Be-
sorgnis ("concern," ",worry"),\textsuperscript{56} in the dynamics of care expressing the movement which tries to avoid the downfall of life, even though this downfall is caused by life as a reaction to itself and life as such! Concern (Besorgnis) creates a certain care (Sorge) of the “second order”, which still creates unbreakable unity with the phenomenon of care in a more general sense.

7. MEANINGFULNESS OF FACTICAL LIFE OR THE HERMENEUTIC DIMENSION OF FACTICITY

We have already talked about the “haziness” of life (Diesigkeit),\textsuperscript{57} which emerges because of the potential infinity of meanings found in the world. Inability to see through the totality of meanings makes life restless and dark; however, meaning as such is always related to comprehension; that is why the ability to see just a few meanings also makes life “clear” and bright. The concept of “haziness” connects both of these dimensions of factical life, expressing their true unity: life is neither completely dark, nor completely clear; it is hazy. Because of its haziness life is simultaneously self-comprehensive and constantly late in self-comprehension; and that is what determines the particulars of its movement.

Haziness is a particular “translucency”; and its factical life is in a relationship with itself. This translucency is primordial comprehension\textsuperscript{58} that happens as a rotation (Umweigigkeit) of life itself: when dark, life is not familiar, but as consisting of meanings, it becomes comprehensible. This constant self-rotation is care and this means that care is the location of primordial comprehension. That is why Heidegger understands care as hermeneutic from the very beginning, i.e., as inexorably interpreting itself by itself, by its own movement.\textsuperscript{59} We have to remember that this movement is “relational meaning,” ",directive,"

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 136.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 88.
\textsuperscript{58} “(...) ein Fonds von Verständlichkeiten und Zugänglichkeiten,” Ibid., vol. 58, 38.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., vol. 61, 86–87.
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a particular “instruction” that guides life; thus the movement of care in itself naturally contains the category of comprehension. Heidegger describes the movement of care as “relucence” (Reluzenz), happening hand in hand with the phenomenon of “Praestruktion” as the guide of the latter, as its inner and self-aware “engine.”

Hence hermeneutics is the “inner” dimension of facticity. This is why reality itself is primordially meaningful. No “subject” or “soul” imposes any lateral meaning or order upon a rough reality. Care itself, constructing reality, can give rise to such theoretical structures as the “soul” or “subject” only at a later stage. Primordial interpretation is not reflexive thinking according to common realisation: it is not abstractions, theories, or concepts... However, primordial comprehension is a location that provides an opportunity for any type of reflection. Reasoning can only develop in the hazy light of the hermeneutics of care.

Primordial comprehension of care makes separation of subject/object into philosophically unacceptable: Primordial emergence of meaning is the reality itself. Of course, if one is to explain the neglect of this separation more thoroughly, one has to understand what is means. As of 1922, Heidegger would concentrate all his efforts on resolving this issue, and his analysis of factual life should be viewed as the preparation for that. However, as soon as Heidegger started analysing facticity, he considered the issue of subject/object separation to already be resolved: If factual life is the location of primordial comprehension, any attempt to indicate a source of meaning (subjective mind, for instance) other than reality itself is empty; any evaluation of reality as consisting of comprehension categories without factual thought is

60 Ibid., 98.

61 Ibid., vol. 63, 15. In 1923 lectures Ontologie. Hermeneutik der Faktizität, where Heidegger starts to talk about “Dasein ontology,” hermeneutics will be treated as “a form of Dasein being.”

62 “Heidegger aims to neutralize metaphysics of subject-object relation simply in order to reveal pure direction-towards movement of intentionality,” Th. Kiesel, L’indication formelle de la facticité: sa genèse et sa transformation, op. cit., 207. This “pure movement of intentionality” is factual life, care.
 unacceptable. In this way Heidegger exceeded classical metaphysics, divided into the schools of idealists and realists.\textsuperscript{63}

8. FACTICITY AS TEMPORALITY

In his 1921–1922 autumn semester lectures, \textit{Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research}, Heidegger defined factical life as \textit{temporalization}; as „unity temporalizing the worlds of life.”\textsuperscript{64} This unity does not form any stable support, as it might seem for ordinary imagination; on the contrary, it is precisely this unity that is the engine of life’s mobility. He talks about a particular form of unity, which is characterised by a particular and permanent process of expanding its boundaries (\textit{Erstreckung}).\textsuperscript{65} Care that hermeneutically forms the world of life is characterised by the structure of unifying expansion. Heidegger specified the agent of this unity: It is time, but in a sense of \textit{kronos} rather than \textit{kairos}. We are at the most important point of Heidegger’s philosophy: The search for the essence of facticity has brought us to the issue of time in its kairological dimension. From then on, and until the time of the thinker’s death, time would be the most profound mystery that encourages reasoning. We cannot forget that the kairological aspect of time is in essence related to Christian teaching. But we will come back to this point and continue considering the analysis of factical life as kairological time that Heidegger conducted in his 1921–1922 lectures.

Factual life is not perceived by interpreting its movement as a sequence of separate and equivalent moments: the model of time as \textit{kronos} is completely unsuitable for trying to understand its essence. We will comprehend the essence of factical life only if we grasp the moment of care, the opportunity for the “moment of capacity” (\textit{kairon dunamis}),


\textsuperscript{64} M. Heidegger, \textit{Gesamtausgabe}, op. cit., vol. 61, 84–85.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid. 85.
when care sees that it has to “cling onto life,” not to let go of opportunities, and to undertake one or another matter immediately (jezt). Thus, we will comprehend the time of care only in the concept of kairos. Of course, the meaning of kairos in factical life has nothing in common with evangelical kairos. Factical kairos is not some “favourable opportunity” to receive the message of salvation; on the contrary, it creates an opportunity to start the destruction of factical life. During kairos the essence of factical life unfolds as care: one receives an opportunity to care about one thing or another. Factical life becomes the “being of a moment” (Seiende des Augenblicks), the door to the “outside” opens for it and it gets a chance to run away from itself.\footnote{M. Haar, \textit{Le moment (kairos), l’instant (Augenblick) et le temps-du-monde (Weltzeit) [1920–1927]}, in: Heidegger 1919–1929 : de l’herméneutique de la facticité à la métaphysique du Dasein, op. cit., 68–69.} This is the moment that provides the opportunity to be overwhelmed by worries, to be beset by them and to feel distressed about taking them out: This destruction of life usually manifests itself as “a paradoxical wish to destroy time, coming to light through such sayings as “I don’t have time” etc.”\footnote{J. Greisch, \textit{L’Arbre de Vie et l’Arbre du savoir}, op. cit., 271.} Furthermore, this moment is also characterised as an affective state, where a simultaneously expanding, unified, hermeneutic nature of care, that is running from itself, appears.

But Heidegger draws our attention to another expression of factical life, which is equally related to temporality. When being beset by worries becomes unbearable, care performs something of a reverse turn of its state and starts to “enjoy time” and “gives itself plenty of time.” It is in these rare circumstances that time as such, the core essence of time, appears. “To remain seated still, to be able to wait, i.e., ‘give time’ to the world and its history. Factical life has its own time, familiar time, which can ‘belong’ to it in various ways; by withholding it in waiting or reserving. ‘How I have time.’ Time does not limit me: this is artificial. Not to have time, but to let time in.”\footnote{M. Heidegger, \textit{Gesamtausgabe}, op. cit., vol. 61, 139.}
emergence of the world as such. In his 1924 paper about the *Concept of Time*, Heidegger would present this experience of the essence of time as *Jemeinigkeit* and in *Being and Time* this concept would name the manner of authentic being. “The phenomenon of facticity itself became clearly visible; that is ‘temporality.’” Time appears as the source of factical life in its fullness that care aims to suppress, because of the richness of its expression, falling into its own destruction, and turning time into time for resolving nagging worries. Heidegger describes downfall, the inability to hold out in the richness of meaning, as the need for care to feel safe, as the need for leading one’s own movement rather than letting time – primordial attribution of meaning – lead. Heidegger says this behaviour of care is completely mad (*tolltöricht*).

9. FACTICAL LIFE AND DEATH

The text written in 1922 and dedicated to the professor of Marburg Paul Natorp (thus known as the *Natorp report* (*Natorp Bericht* in Heidegger’s historiography) is where the topic of death that determines the further thinking of Heidegger appears. Death is immanent in care and forms the fundamental agent of all factical movement. Here one could repeat the whole analysis of factical life, pointing out the relationship that each of its forms has with death as its driving force. In 1922 Heidegger used the term “to have death” for the first time and treated this phenomenon of having-of-death-in-itself as a fundamental support and in leaning on it “there has to be explanatory temporality characteristic of care.” To consider time, having resisted the care for

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71 Ibid., vol. 61, 140.

72 M. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)*, op. cit. In 1922 Heidegger applied for a teaching position at Marburg University and this “rapport,” which synthesized the essence of his philosophical searching, was written for that purpose.

death’s immanence, would become the new direction in Heidegger’s thought.

In the *Natorp Report*, the experience of death’s immanence is discussed as a “constitutive element”\(^74\) of factical life. Constitutive is meant not only in the sense of revealing the phenomenon of time through “having death” but also in a sense of manifestation of the *ontological* dimension of factical life during this revelation. It is in this text that the word “being” resurfaces in Heidegger’s writing. “The being of life, as such, seen in facticity, as such” manifests itself in the light to the care for death’s immanence.”\(^75\) Having revealed the ontological dimension of factical life, life reveals itself as “a being for which [care] of his own being through temporality is being itself.”\(^76\) From then on mortality would complete the horizon of links between time and being; and it is impossible to overestimate the importance of this fact to the subsequent thinking of Heidegger.

### 10. CHRISTIAN FACTICITY

The factical life is most thoroughly revealed in the Christian experience: “That strange gravitational centre process of factical life and world’s life, happening in its own world, which is the world of inner experience; the deepest historical paradigm of this process reveals itself to us while performing genesis of Christianity.”\(^77\) The essence of facticity as such manifests itself in Christian facticity, which Heidegger finds above all in the letters of St. Paul that reflect the primordial state of Christian consciousness. The aim of St. Paul’s teachings is not some dogmatic “objective” truth but *lived experience itself*: “What strikes one is that St. Paul almost does not think about things from theoretical-dogmatic perspective; even in the letter to the Romans. His situation does not require theoretical demonstrations. Dogma, understood as

\(^74\) Ibid.
\(^75\) Ibid., 26.
\(^76\) Ibid., 25.
\(^77\) Ibid., vol. 58, 61.
doctrinal content that is remote and isolated in its cognitive objectivity, never had to be the guide of Christian religiosity. On the contrary, dogma can be understood in its genesis only through the fulfilment of Christian life experience.”78 According to Heidegger, St. Paul regards this “fulfilment,” i.e., the living of Christian experience, as a struggle.79 The particulars of Christian existence lie in the necessity of self-realisation and self-interpretation “in struggle and through struggle.”80 Interpreting oneself in struggle and through struggle; we will not find a better definition of factical life, and the dynamics that appear there develop as hermeneutic energy, as “dynamics of meaning” (Sinndynamik). Here the world that is formed coincides with the process of formulation itself, thus with a lived experience, with the state of fulfilment. “To understand the teaching means not only to analyse its thematic contents but, first and foremost, being interested in the modalities of its fulfilment.”81

In the lectures, Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion, that Heidegger gave in 1920–1921, he explained all the forms of factical life in the Christian register, claiming that it was this experience in particular that provided the most favourable conditions for the explanation: “In spite of its primordiality, the facticity of early Christianity does not hold in itself some features characteristic only of itself. In spite of the transformation of absolute fulfilment that it holds, everything there is the way it is in the world’s facticity.”82 However, Christian facticity interests philosophy, because there care manifests itself in its essence, i.e., as temporality: “Christian religiosity lives temporality as such”83, “Christian experience lives time as such.”84 Christian facticity

78 Ibid., vol. 60, 112.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., 128.
81 J. Greisch, La facticité chrétienne: „Heidegger, lecteur de saint Paul”, Transversalités 60(1996), 91.
82 M. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, op. cit., vol. 60, 117.
83 Ibid, 80.
84 Ibid, 82.
is important to philosophers as the tendency to “go against the flow” is highlighted there, encouraging care to oppose its downfall and to experience its primordiality directly, rather than running away from it. Therefore, completely corresponding to the fundamental structure of factical life, Christian facticity reveals some of its major phenomena, such as “experience time as such,” meaning to get the experience of primordiality of all things through “body and blood.”

How exactly is an experience lived? According to Heidegger, St. Paul reveals primordial temporality by urging us to “wait” for the second coming of Christ (parousia) while writing to Thessalonians. This eschatological kairos is not “momentary” kairos, during which care takes on various activities and unending organisational tasks or sinks in daily concerns, “filling in the emptiness” and running away from itself. Such activities are “life” in its most vulgar, everyday sense. Meanwhile St. Paul offers a different way of life, determined by waiting for the Day of the Lord. This day will come unexpectedly, it “is going to come like a thief in the night” (1 Tes 5, 2). As it can come at any moment, Christians already experience eschatological kairos by keeping a vigil and waiting. At each moment in time, that time unfolds for them in its essence, because waiting for the coming of Christ forces them to turn their back on everyday concerns, to objectively calculated and dated events, even if such events would be metaphysical-theoretical considerations, and to stand in the presence of God while keeping a vigil, coram Deo. Heidegger explains this Christian act as the standing of factical life in the presence of its own essence that is looking at its own primordial origins, to its own primordial becoming and is actively approaching that becoming: “Their becoming-being is actual being.”

Christian distress (Bekümmerung) is the experience of primordiality, of time as such that is fulfilled through waiting for the end of time. Construction of the Christian world of life (Er-eignis) happens not by the means of downfall, but by the way of experience of temporality within itself. That means that “the existence of parousia in my life fulfils life

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85 Ibid., 94.
86 Ibid., 98.
as such”87 or “in the experience of factual life there lies the experience of religiosity and, truly speaking, the same is experience”88. Of course, we are talking about an ideally experienced situation of a Christian, which hides what is probably the most well hidden element of factual life: Primordial temporality; and together we see the emergence of the most essential elements of human flow that will gain an authentic/in-authentic form in *Being and Time*.

Having shown how the primordial temporality phenomenon that surpasses chronological time appears in Christian facticity, Heidegger declares that this phenomenon enables the reconsideration of the problem of eternity once again. Knowing what kind of hostile attitude towards the concept of eternity Heidegger demonstrated as early as 1918,89 this sort of declaration surprises. However, the fact that Heidegger would never take on the task of “reconsidering the issue of eternity”, brings coherence back to his thought. Nevertheless the issue of the relation between time and eternity in Heidegger’s philosophy, considering the whole of it, is not thoroughly resolved.90 This is caused by Heidegger’s particularly problematic relationship with Christianity, concerning not only his reasoning but also his personality. If, in the 1920s, Heidegger overtly admitted his benevolence towards and even belonging to the Christian tradition in its Protestant form,91 a few years later he would firmly deny any links between his philosophy and Christianity. However, the mature works of Heidegger claimed that the issue of his relationship with Christianity was never resolved: his biographer Hugo Ott would call this problem “a wound bleeding for the

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87 Ibid., 104.
88 Ibid., 131.
91 Ph. Capelle, op. cit.
entire life," while Heidegger himself would refer to it in his letter to Jaspers that he wrote on the 1st July, 1935 as “a thorn in the flesh,” referring to the saying of St. Paul (2 Kor 12, 7).

11. ST. AUGUSTINE’S INFLUENCE ON HERMENEUTICS OF FACTICITY AND THE ISSUE OF GOD

When looking at the analyses of factual life conducted by Heidegger, it is impossible to overlook their links with the thoughts of St. Augustine. Heidegger himself described the philosophy of St. Augustine as “the first big ‘hermeneutics’” and he admitted on more than one occasion that this Christian thinker created authentic “hermeneutics of facticity.” The basic concepts that Heidegger developed in 1919–1923 are taken from the works of St. Augustine, especially Confessions, as demonstrated by the lecture cycle Augustinus und Neoplatonismus. Care, relationship with death, opacity of life, downfall, temptation to sink into the everyday, to be scattered, to suffer, to run from oneself and to destroy oneself – Heideggerian descriptions of the movement of factual life seemingly mirror St. Augustine’s considerations about the turns of human soul. Heidegger finds the basis for such mirroring in the

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92 H. Ott, op. cit., 126.
95 Thorough investigations of Heidegger’s and St. Augustine’s hermeneutics, revealing their interrelations, we can find in M.B. Martins, L’herméneutique originaire d’Augustin en relation avec une ré-appropriation heideggérienne, Mediaevalia, Porto 1998.
96 M. Heidegger, Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus, in: M. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, op. cit., vol. 60. In spite of the name, the relationship between St. Augustine and Neoplatonism is not analysed in these lectures, read in Freiburg in 1921.
97 Detailed analysis of the parallels between Heidegger’s considerations of facticity and St. Augustine’s meditations on human soul can be found in J. Greisch, L’Arbre de Vie et l’Arbre du savoir, op. cit., 232–251; J. Greisch, Le Buisson ardent et les lumières de la raison, vol. 3, op. cit., 553–565.
famous saying of St. Augustine *crede ut intelligas* that he translates as “Live alive your own self” (*Lebe lebendig dein Selbst*)\(^{98}\) and explains: “Before being able to know, I-myself has to actualize in the fullness of life.”\(^ {99}\)

Heidegger starts and finishes his considerations about the account of Augustinian soul movements citing a saying *quaestio mihi factus sum* (“I became a question to myself”).\(^ {100}\) Pronounced in such a way, self-haziness, containing both the dimension of life’s opacity and its hermeneutic meaning, makes up the essence of factual life – a certain self-heaviness, weight, self-pressure, due to which all the mentioned movements of the Augustinian soul/Heideggerian factual life arise: *onere mihi sum*, “I am my own burden.”\(^ {101}\) However, St. Augustine sees the tensions of the soul as the most compelling reason for these dynamics; tension that arises because it lives in itself with the other rather than on its own – with God, its creator. It is precisely this strange theological transcendence in immanence that is the engine of the natural anxiety of the soul for St. Augustine – *quaestio mihi factus sum*. Due to this, the search for one’s own self coincides with the search for God, and also with the acknowledgement that this search will never end in some finite knowledge. The life of a soul is structured around the fact that the search conducted by it has to take place not only within it but also “above it” (*in Te supra me*). Meanwhile for Heidegger, factual life on its own does not have any theological dimension. The issue of the existence of God is “parenthesized” as required by phenomenological method. Asked about what is the meaning of “search” in the texts of St. Augustine, i.e., an action that always means “search for God” in those texts, Heidegger responds: phenomenological intentionality.\(^ {102}\) According to him, what St. Augustine refers to as God, can be fully expressed by his other saying, completely corresponding to the

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\(^{99}\) Ibid., 205.

\(^{100}\) Ibid., vol. 60, 178, 246.

\(^{101}\) Ibid., 205.

\(^{102}\) Ibid., 190.
facticity of life, but not necessarily bearing theological meaning: “Life that carries any other life” (vita vitae). Someone who searches for God in the Augustinian sense, according to Heidegger, actually “does not perform his search somewhere else or is not the one in which a search simply occurs; however, the fulfilment of search is something coming from itself,” from the searching one.\textsuperscript{103} There cannot be any special eidetic “God’s institution”\textsuperscript{104} in phenomenology, and the Augustinian search for God in \textit{Te supra me} phenomenologically has to be explained as a phenomenon of listening, obeying the connection between a call and a response. The Augustinically raised question of God becomes simply a “consideration about the conditions of experience of God; consideration, the culmination of which coincides with a question of who is my own self” in the hermeneutics of facticity.\textsuperscript{105}

Yet the most evident influence of St. Augustine on Heidegger can be seen while comparing their notions of time.\textsuperscript{106} This, however, is also where their views diverge. Time is the basis for and the source of facticity; however, where does time come from? As pointed out by Giorgio Agamben, the meaning of the Heideggerian notion \textit{Fakticität} should be sought out in St. Augustine’s saying \textit{facticia est anima}, “soul is created, made by God during every moment.”\textsuperscript{107} St. Augustine contrasts two processes of emergence: \textit{facticius} and \textit{natives}. \textit{Nativus} means natural birth, for which the conditions were created in advance; these are the common laws of nature. \textit{Facticius}, on the contrary, means direct interference of God into the process of the soul’s emergence; in other words, the soul emerges from God without any preceding rules. According to St. Augustine, a human being is not only born, \textit{nativus}, but also created every moment, made by God from absolutely nothing, \textit{facticius}, together with time. However, as we have seen, by analysing

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 192.
\item \textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 203.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 204.
\item \textsuperscript{106} P. Aleksandravičius, \textit{Temps et éternité chez saint Thomas d’Aquin et Martin Heidegger}, op. cit., 254–266.
\item \textsuperscript{107} G. Agamben, op. cit., 63–84.
\end{itemize}
factual life phenomenologically, Heidegger cuts off the temporal process of constant emergence from any association with Augustinian transcendence or the divine institution. Facticity, according to Heidegger, is the temporal energy that is constantly renewed and never stops, arising from itself, in itself, free from any external conditions or rules that may be imposed upon it, especially from some divine institution traditionally realised metaphysically. This is where we can see how a particularly important element for Heidegger’s entire philosophy manifests itself: the process of emergence, dissociated from any concept of theological creation.

12. METHODOLOGICAL ATHEISM AND THE MYSTERY OF LIFE’S FACTICITY

Methodical and phenomenological access to factual life means a certain “methodical atheism”: “Explaining fundamental movements of life (...) is fundamentally atheist.” Because Heidegger treats philosophy itself only as the hermeneutics of facticity, “philosophy itself, as such, is atheist.” Nonetheless, this atheism cannot be treated as the atheism of doctrine. One only has to remember that in the course of the same year Heidegger called himself a “Christian theologian” and considered himself a follower of Protestantism. His philosophical-methodical atheism has an exact meaning: having accepted protestant theolog-

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110 From 19 August, 1921 letter to Karl Löwith, cited by J. Greisch, *Ontologie et Temporalité*, op. cit., 35.

gist Karl Barth’s principle of strict separation between philosophy and theology, which enabled him to completely free himself in order to accommodate philosophy to theological authority and to gain absolute autonomy of philosophical thinking, Heidegger did not neglect God, but rather pushed the question onto a purely theological plane.\textsuperscript{112} “Any philosophy that realises what it is as factical modality explaining life has to know, especially if it still holds some kind of “sense” of God, that this separation by which philosophy leads life into itself is a way, to use religious terminology, to turn against God. This way, and only this way, it remains loyal to God.”\textsuperscript{113}

Heidegger would closely follow this atheist methodical attitude while writing \textit{Being and Time}.\textsuperscript{114} The next question is if, and to what extent, this satisfied Heidegger as time went by. It seems that the investigation of factical life, constantly leading into its more profound depths, remains more as a secret rather than a clear, even if methodical, neglecting of God. Augustinian \textit{vita vitæ} later considered the foundations of time, while the foundations of being and the foundations of foundations remained an unsolved and even more acute problem. If the traditional concept of transcendence contrasting the world over here and God’s world over there, according to a traditional spatial model, seemed unacceptable to Heidegger, the concept of transcendence that he himself had developed, over the long decades after he suspended writing \textit{Being and Time}, as the horizon of being that opened up in the depths of \textit{Dasein}, forced him again and again to raise the question of the Difference that resisted all conceptual formulation, while resting in the identity of \textit{Dasein} and \textit{Sein}.\textsuperscript{115} The movement of facticity remained

\textsuperscript{112} More on the relation between philosophy and theology in a fundamental work Ph. Capelle, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{113} M. Heidegger, \textit{Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)}, op. cit., 53.

\textsuperscript{114} The relation of this work with religious topics is thoroughly analysed in J. Greisch, \textit{Le Buisson ardent et les lumières de la raison}, vol. 3, op. cit., 565–610.

a mystery, as the search for its primordiality led us to the Difference that Heidegger remained unable to name.116 These dynamic, however fruitless efforts would break out as an extreme but blissful tension – the state of Gelassenheit; as hopeful but desperate explorations of the East; as Hölderlin’s madness, as the cry of gods and the only possible state of a thinking being at the time – waiting for gods. However, who can deny that the life-long search for the origins of facticity, as if unwillingly from crisis to crisis, led Heidegger to the same Christian God that he’d known in his childhood and that the philosopher of Black Woods had fought against so fiercely his entire life? “Who could deny that all the route followed until now has been speechlessly accompanied by my dispute with Christianity, dispute that was not and is not some accidental ‘problem’ but preservation of my most intimate origins – preservation of my native home, my homeland and my youth – and at the same time a painful separation from everything? Only someone who was equally deeply rooted in a really experienced Catholic world, would be able to assume some things about these needs that so far had an influence on the route of my questionings in a way tremors do”117; “Without these theological origins I would never start to reason. Origins always remain a future for someone who goes forward.”118

116 J. Greisch, Identité et différence dans la pensée de Martin Heidegger. Le chemin de l’Ereignis, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 57(1973), 71–111. When in mid-1930s Heidegger will start to use the concept of Ereignis once again; it will become the basis for some Christian philosophers to draw parallels between his notion of being and, for instance, Thomas Aquinas actus actuum doctrine. A typical example of such parallels can be found in J. B. Lotz, Martin Heidegger und Thomas von Aquin, Neske, Pfullingen 1975.


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