Warianty tytułu
THE FICTION OF MORALITY. THE PROBLEM OF MOTIVATION IN DAVID HUME`S ETHICS
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
David Hume is considered to be the founding father of metaethical non-cognitivism and his moral philosophy is often taken to be a classical example of motivational internalism. In this paper I discuss Hume’s view on the problem of moral motivation depending on natural and artificial virtues. I also analyze some recent interpretations of his moral philosophy. I conclude that Hume can indeed be treated as a non-cognitivist, but his theory is very different from present-day non-cognitivism. The main difference is that Hume did not consider moral emotions as necessarily motivating.
Czasopismo
Rocznik
Tom
Numer
Strony
65-109
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
autor
- Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński, ul.Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków, Poland, t.zuradzki@uj.edu.pl
Bibliografia
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.cejsh-a37c3238-a0b2-4f36-a9aa-ae9cbecfc8e6