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Summary:

In the period between the two World Wars, Turkey played quite an important role in the security system of the Second Republic of Poland, especially after the May Coup in 1926. Poland promoted the establishment of the Central European Bloc, which in some variants would also include Turkey. Furthermore, the state played an important role in the Polish Promethean politics because it had borders with the Caucasus, and in addition there was a wave of Caucasian emigration. As early as in the 1920s Poland initiated intelligence cooperation with Turkey against the USSR, as a result of which Polish intelligence missions operated in the Turkish territory and Turkish intelligence officers underwent specialized training in Poland. The closer the ties between Turkey and the Western countries before the outbreak of World War II, the more this cooperation intensified.

Keywords:

Poland 1918-1939, Turkey, military intelligence (Poland), Prometheism, Caucasus

INTRODUCTION

Shortly after the establishment of the Polish state in November 1918, Józef Piłsudski and Tytus Filipowicz from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs signed the Notification to governments of the existence of the Polish state, which was later forwarded to the Sultan government. However, it did not reach the Bosporus until March of the following year. At that time the Polish perceived Turks as their future allies in the struggle
against the Bolsheviks. The first representative of the re-born Republic of Poland in Turkey was the consul Antoni Świerzbinski who performed his duties in Izmir from May 1920. In October of the same year at the Sublime Port in Istanbul the Delegation of the Republic of Poland headed by Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz began to function, although it was not formally accredited in the diplomatic sense, since, according to information held by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the accreditation of the Polish envoy in Constantinople before the conclusion of peace would be unwelcomed by the coalition. The Delegation was closed in 1923 and there was only the Consular Department functioning until the Legation in Ankara was established in June 1924.

Formal Polish-Turkish relations were established on 23rd July 1923. Then, the Treaty of Friendship between Poland and Turkey was signed in Lausanne. Apart from establishing official relations, the form of diplomatic cooperation between the two countries was also agreed, the consent of both governments to sign the convention on trade and settlement was confirmed, it also included a promise to ratify the Treaty. The Treaty was in force until 1993. On 3rd November of that year, the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Turkey was signed in Warsaw. Not only did the new act not evade this 70-year-old one, but it even alluded to it in its content.

In 1924 Roman Knoll was appointed Polish Envoy in Ankara and took over his duties in June 1924. Prior to his departure, he received instructions from the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Maurycy Zamoyski, who considered the following objectives as the most important ones in the Polish-Turkish relations: 1) extending the resistant front against Russia 2) determining our influences of the access to the - so important for us, both economically and strategically - Black Sea, and 3) acquiring a new, available due to our influences, factor in the play of forces in the Balkans.

Other tasks of the newly appointed envoy included the work to build a bloc of the Black Sea countries, and especially to lead to the rapprochement between Turkey and the Polish ally - Romania. Another important issue was to lead to the rapprochement between Turkey and France, Great Britain and Italy. Measures undertaken to end Ankara’s isolation against the Western powers were to contribute to the relaxation in its relations with Moscow, and in the longer term the development of a joint Polish-Turkish anti-Soviet policy. The Polish Foreign Ministry claimed that the government and Turkish society were in fact hostile to the USSR, and even feared the export of

3 The Treaty of Friendship between Poland and Turkey (approved by the Law of 5th December 1923 – Journal of Laws of 1924, No. 1, item 3.
4 The Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Turkey signed in Warsaw on 3rd November 1993 (Journal of Laws of 18th October 1995).
revolution, while the then rapprochement with the Soviets was primarily of conjunctural nature.

1. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE PROMETHEAN ACTIVITY IN TURKEY

In December 1924, Lt. Col. Tadeusz Schätzel came to Turkey to act as a military attaché. He was, like Roman Knoll, a staunch Promethean activist and with his works significantly supported the Polish envoy in Ankara. According to them, Turkey was one of the important links in the Polish defence system. After a six-month stay in Ankara Lt. Col. Tadeusz Schätzel sent an extensive memorandum to the Head Office of the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw, the document presented the status of the organisation of the Caucasian emigration in Turkey, first of all of the Committee of the Liberation of the Caucasus, also called the All-Caucasian Committee, formed owing to Knoll’s initiative in 1925. The committee consisting of 3 representatives from Azerbaijan, Georgia and it was headed by North Caucasus.

The main objective of the organisation, according to Schätzel, was the liberation of the Caucasus and the creation on its territory the Federation of Caucasian States, which would be in alliance with Turkey and Iran, and under the protection of the Republic of Poland. The Federation was intended to be a secretive organisation and was supposed to maintain contacts only with the Turkish government, the Legation of the Republic of Poland in Ankara, as well as activists in the Caucasus and the Caucasian politicians-in-exile in Paris.

In 1925, another Promethean activist Tadeusz Hołówko came to Turkey. He met the leaders of the Caucasian emigrants who were staying in this country. These talks, however, did not achieve the expected results. During the meetings both Promethean activists, Hołówko and Knoll, agreed that a larger amount of money previously provided by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the emigration Georgian Government should have been allocated to the Committee of the Liberation of the Caucasus. In addition, the Georgian government, in their opinion, should have subordinated to the Committee for the Liberation of Caucasus.

Hołówko continued his mission abroad, this time in Paris, where on his initiative the exile organisation Promethee (Prometheus) was established. Meanwhile, Knoll was still directing the Promethean works in Turkey. They were integrated into a much broader concept of creating by Poland the alliance system extending from Finland, through

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6 Prometheism - a political and intellectual movement implemented by the Polish authorities in the interwar period (1921-1939), directed politically against the USSR, aimed at achieving independence transitions within the country, made by nations which in the years 1918-1921 had been under the imposed force the Soviet system, and consequently, bursting of the USSR into individual countries.

7 The committee consisting of 3 representatives from Azerbaijan, Georgia and North Caucasus which headed this alliance.

Central Europe, the Balkans and Turkey to Tehran. In addition, as Lew Sockow wrote, Knoll took every opportunity to remind the Turks that Poland and Turkey had similar political interests in the Caucasus.

Polish diplomacy was concerned about the signing of the Turkish-Soviet Treaty in 1925. It was not preventable despite the efforts of the Polish diplomacy. It considerably hindered the acting of Turkey as an ally against the Soviets. To a large extent, it was prevented by the article of the Treaty saying that both parties agreed not to participate in any alliance directed against the other party. The Poles made attempts at that time to convince the Turks that it was in their interest to support the existence of the independent Caucasus countries, which would be a buffer separating them from Russia.

Nevertheless, the Turks were ready to cooperate with Poland. Knoll achieved the approximation of Poland and Turkey. It took the form of, among others, economic exchange. Also military cooperation was initiated, quite limited though. It proved that it was possible to induce the Turks to take a very prudent action to promote Promethean ideas.

The content of the conversation of 1934 between the Polish ambassador in Ankara Jerzy Potocki and the Turkish ambassador in Warsaw Ferit Bey reflected the nature of Polish-Turkish diplomatic relations in the 1930s. During the conversation, the Turkish diplomat stated that the relations between the Republic of Poland and Turkey should have been considered only from the standpoint of the two countries’ attitude to the Soviet Union, which prevented the implementation of anti-Soviet systems that had been proposed by Poland. He also admitted that the 40-million population of Turkish and other related nationalities living in the USSR, which the Turkish state felt responsible for, determined the Turkish policy. He did not rule out, however, that both countries could share the same interests in the future.

2. THE FIRST POLISH INTELLIGENCE POSTS IN TURKEY

The first Polish intelligence post in Turkey was created in 1919 at the diplomatic mission of the Polish Army in Constantinople, then at an attaché was located there. The post was to be terminated in September 1921. From that time until 1924 the Polish military attaché - Leon Bobicki, was to lead intelligence activities against the Soviet Union from the area of Turkey.

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10 Л. Сощков, Неизвестный сепаратизм: На службе СД и Абвера: Из секретных досье разведки, Москва 2003, p. 15.
11 D. Chmielowska, op. cit., p. 235.
13 H. Bartoszewicz, op. cit., p. 238.
14 D. Chmielowska, op. cit., pp. 315-316.
Another Polish intelligence post – Constantinople - was probably set up in October 1924 under a personal agreement between Lt. Col. Ludwik Bociański\(^\text{16}\) and the representative of Georgia in Poland, who at the same time was the contracted General of the Polish Army, Aleksander Zachariadze\(^\text{17}\). The seat of this post was Constantinople. Its head was Gvarjaladze who was trusted by general Zachariadze. He received instructions and money from the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) Division in an indirect way. The post received a one-off amount of USD 1,500 for organisational and installation purposes and the dispositional fund of USD 1,000 for each month of activity. The planned area of its operation was to cover the entire Caucasus together with Rostov-on-Don, and the head of the post had to conduct effective intelligence activities in the Crimea and the Black Sea coast\(^\text{18}\). Another post of the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) Division in Turkey was Georgian headed by A. Assatiani. It functioned from 21\(^{\text{st}}\) March 1925. The date of its liquidation is unknown\(^\text{19}\).

3. THE POST KONSPOL – CAPTAIN JAN KOZIEROWSKI

Another post was Konspol\(^\text{20}\) set up on 1\(^{\text{st}}\) April 1926. It was headed by reserve Capt. Jan Kozierowski, who reported directly to the Headquarters. Its seat was in Istanbul. After arrival, Kozierowski had to contact the field operative Pietruszewski-Bey, who familiarised him with the actual state of the post’s works, opportunities to develop the activity and the use of the source, that is, the French intelligence agency operating under the code name Albatros, towards which he was to be secretive for the first month and was not supposed to come into personal contact with them\(^\text{21}\).

The intelligence benefit of the post’s Head for the first three months was USD 50, and for Pietruszewski-Bey - USD 70\(^\text{22}\). Later Kozierowski’s salary was raised to USD 100\(^\text{23}\). Previously Kozierowski arrived in Turkey several times. In the autumn of 1925 he went on a vacation to Istanbul, where he met Col. Bociański, to whom he reported that he was about to complete the Military Academy and wanted to work on the territory of Turkey. Col. Bociański, who was in a good relationship with him, promised to take this into account and ordered Kozierowski to investigate possible working conditions at the place.

\(^{16}\) The Head of the Intelligence Department of the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) Division of the General Staff.

\(^{17}\) The Central Military Archives in Warsaw (CAW), the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) Division of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (O II), Ekspozytura The Agency No. 2 (E 2), file No. I 303.4.1973, The establishment of the ‘Constantinople’ post - the encrypted telegram to the military attaché in Constantinople of 20\(^{\text{th}}\) October 1924.


\(^{20}\) In some documents of the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) Division other names of the institutions - Istanbul and Konspol also appear.


\(^{22}\) CAW, O II, file No. I 303.4.1991, The ‘Konspol’ post (no date provided).

After returning to Warsaw, Capt. Kozierowski reported his observations to Col. Bociański. At the end of 1925 he received the diploma of the Military Academy and owing to Bociański's support he began working in the 2nd Division. Since the then Chief of General Staff did not approve it, he had to report for military duty in the Military District Headquarters No. X in Przemyśl. However, after arriving in Przemyśl, Kozierowski submitted an application for an unpaid annual leave, and having obtained the approval for this, he set off to Warsaw, where on 5th January 1926 he contacted Col. Bociański. The Head of the Intelligence Department once again offered him a job in the Eastern Department of the 2nd Division; so Kozierowski began to prepare to leave for Turkey. At the end of March 1926 he went to Constantinople, where he contacted the military attaché in Ankara - Col. Tadeusz Schätzel, who, in turn, loyally reported his arrival to the chief of the Turkish police - Ekrem-Bey. Col. Schätzel was also to set a strict limit of Kozierowski's work and interests.

Kozierowski was given the first two months of his stay to establish necessary relationships and contacts. After that, he proceeded to searching for the source of the reports on the Soviet activity from all over the Soviet Union, and especially from the Caucasus. His main task was to conduct intelligence operations covering the area of the Soviet Union using mainly Russian monarchist organisations in Turkey. Any possible intelligence activities were to be first submitted to the Headquarters, without whose approval the related expenses were not covered.

The Headquarters obliged the head of the post to submit monthly reports on its activities. Communication was to be ensured via a military attaché in Ankara and the courier of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs. The usual correspondence was allowed but in compliance with the rules of conspiracy.

Shortly after arriving in Istanbul, Kozierowski received (via the head of the Turkish counterintelligence - Aziz-Bey) the information from the Turkish authorities that he could stay in place and begin his work while keeping necessary discretion. On that occasion, he met Aziz-Bey, who appointed one of his officers - Ismail-Bey for contacts with Kozierowski.

After some time Aziz-Bey asked Kozierowski for information about the Red Army. Col. Schätzel allowed Kozierowski to forward the dislocation of the Soviet army (the information had been sent from Warsaw) to the Turks, in exchange for which the head of

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24 It could be Gen. Stanisław Haller, who was the Chief of the General Staff until 16th December 1925, or Gen. Edmund Kessler – the Chief from 16th December 1925.
30 He was Azerbaijani from Baku. In Capt. Kozierowski’s documents he acted as a source under the pseudonym Iskander.
the intelligence post was promised to receive materials necessary for him, and the assurance of the care of the Turkish chief of counterintelligence he could count on in his work. However, the Turkish chief of counterintelligence had more and more questions to the Poles on the Soviet army\textsuperscript{31}, and also Greek and Italian ones, as well as military and political relations between them. What is more, the Turks took a great interest in the intelligence training in Poland\textsuperscript{32}.

Therefore, in early September 1926 Kozierowski went to Warsaw in order to obtain new materials, and probably also Col. Bociański’s acceptance for his new plans of intelligence work.

According to Kozierowski’s concept, the intelligence work in Turkey would bring many greater results if he obtained direct contacts with the Turkish General Staff. In addition, he planned to move most of the work to the Caucasian-Turkish frontier and engage emigrants from the area of the Caucasus for this purpose, including Ismail-Bey.

In September 1926 Kozierowski sent proposals concerning activities of his post to the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Division. He proposed to establish direct contacts with the key representatives of the Turkish army: first of all he mentioned the Chief of the General Staff - Fevzi Paşa\textsuperscript{33} as well as the Head of the Army Inspection - Ali-Sait-Paşa. He claimed that through the relationships the Polish party could reciprocally obtain information from the Turkish intelligence on the Soviet Union. In order to expand cooperation with the Turkish General Staff, he suggested that the Chief of the Intelligence Department of the Division II came to Istanbul, and notwithstanding the above, Aziz-Bey came to Warsaw.

Moreover, Kozierowski informed on the so-called Union of Active Struggle created on the initiative of Aziz-Bey which had anti-Soviet character. According to Capt. Kozierowski, the Union, among others, was to be a form of the Turkish authorities’ control over the emigrant circles from the territory of the USSR and intelligence groups functioning there. Among others, members of the group Albatros and Pietruszewski (Bey) belonged to the Union. Its members included representatives of various organisations operating in Istanbul. The Chairman of the Union was Ismail-Bey maintaining close contacts with Emin Resulzade - the leader of the Azerbaijani Musavat Party which enjoyed the strong support of the Turkish authorities. He considered contacts with both the Musavat Party and the Union of Active Struggle as very important, because it would provide some impact on the Caucasian policy from the area of Turkey, the state support for actions taken by the Polish party as well as the orientation in what was happening within various political groups in Istanbul and the Turkish police with which, by the way, he had good relations, because of the special nature of his work.

In his report of September 1926 Capt. Kozierowski described the special attitude of the Turkish authorities to various intelligence groups operating in Istanbul at that time. As


\textsuperscript{33} Fevzi-Paşa – originally Mustafa Fevzi Çakmak (1876-1950), a marshal, a military and a politician. The long-time Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish army in the years 1921-1944.
he observed, the Turkish police and military counterintelligence allowed them to work in Turkey, on condition that the groups shared information they had gained with them. In the case when a group did not provide the Turks with information for some time, the Turkish police carried out searches and arrests among its members. Most of the arrested were released after a period of time. These activities were to force those groups to cooperate more intensively with the Turks. This way of acquiring intelligence information by the Turks was also one of the reasons for which the head of the Polish post strived for closer contacts with the Turkish police, and especially with the Turkish General Staff. He hoped that the information obtained in this way would be transmitted to him.

Capt. Kozierowski also found the contacts with the Polish envoy in Turkey Karol Bader significant, as he could inform him about many important issues occurring in Turkey. This contact would be clandestine – through a trusted employee of the Polish Consulate.

Col. Schätzel was against Kozierowski’s direct contacts with the Turkish General Staff, which he expressed in the face-to-face dialogue with him. In his letter of May 1926, addressed most likely to Col. Bociarński, he asked to firmly bring it to Kozierowski’s attention that he had no right to show even the slightest interest in any form in the Turkish army. He reported to the Headquarters that in May, the Head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry submitted a complaint against me to the Polish envoy in Ankara that I had intervened in the Turkish office in work directed against a fellow state. This comment was to be conveyed in a very friendly manner, ensuring that the Turks knew about Col. Schätzel’s good intentions towards their country, but the conversation was carried out by the Polish attaché at the office, where after each conversation led by an official foreign representative a note was prepared and sent to the Head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. According to Col. Schätzel, the Turks primarily wanted to gain advantage over a possible Soviet intervention which the Poles were carrying out any anti-Soviet activity together with them. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, given the good relations with the USSR, did not want to be associated with such activity. He also claimed that Kozierowski might have unmasked himself to the courier of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Markowski, by informing him that he had been working for the Intelligence Bureau and should not have attracted anybody’s attention.

What is more, Kozierowski received a letter on this matter, in which the Headquarters ordered him to consult Col. Schätzel on intelligence cooperation with groups belonging


35 In addition, Kozierowski received information from Aziz-Bey that Bobicki was included in the Turkish police files, which evidenced that he had been acting to the detriment of Turkey and Poland CAW, O II, file No. I 303.4.1991, The Project of the organization of the post in Istanbul (no date provided).

36 That is, the USSR.

to the Federation of Caucasus, prohibited *stealing* his contacts and taking any interest in the Turkish army, they also obliged him to keep a strict conspiracy.38

Meanwhile, the head of the ‘Konspol’ post explained that his interest in Turkey had only to do with the Caucasian affairs. His situation became complicated when on 1st October 1926 Col. Schätzel was dismissed from the office in Ankara and appointed as Head of the 2nd Division. Thus, he became Capt. Kozierowski’s superior. Cavalry Capt. Mateusz Iżycki39 was appointed the head of the intelligence post, and Kozierowski his deputy. Initially Kozierowski even wanted to resign. He even discussed the issue with the new head of the 2nd Division, however, as a result of these talks he decided to stay in Turkey. Iżycki came to Turkey and took up the post before the end of 1926; he was familiarised with the post’s ongoing issues by Capt. Kozierowski.

Prior to his subsequent leave for the Bosphorus, Kozierowski received new instructions, according to which he was to sustain contacts with Aziz-Bey, and even make new ones - with the head of the Turkish General Staff - Fevzi-Paşa. For this purpose, he engaged the then resident in Turkey Tadeusz Gasztowtt40, who had known the Turkish commander since the Tripolitanian War of 1911. Fevzi-Paşa agreed to establish contacts with the officers of the Polish intelligence, exchange materials on the Soviet Union and provide the Poles with assistance in their work on the Caucasian border. He set out the condition, however, that any contact with him was to be unofficial, with the utmost discretion, and the Polish Legation in Turkey could not be involved in this in any way.41

Obviously, Cavalry Capt. Iżycki as the head of the post received instructions as well. There were four main tasks specified for the post. The first task was to continue secretive contacts with the Turkish intelligence via Aziz-Bey, with the exchange of intelligence documents taken into account.42

The following task was to keep intelligence contacts with the Albatros group, from which documents were bought. It was also ordered to seek their own intelligence sources, although they were banned from using Caucasian organisations which were associated with the Polish party through the Promethean work. After finding a new source, it was required to notify the Headquarters each time stating working conditions and intelligence capabilities in order to obtain approval.

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40 Tadeusz Gasztowtt (1881-1936) - a journalist, an activist for the rapprochement between Poland and Turkey.
42 As it was assessed in one of the later documents of the 2nd Division, both parties (Poland and Turkey) primarily exchanged worthless documents. At a later date, the Polish-Turkish cooperation was based on the study of [Soviet] deserters, assistance in compiling studies, etc. (CAW, O II, file No. I 303.4.2078, The Trzaska post analysis and assessment).
The final task for the post staff was to prepare the intelligence should there be war and mobilisation. At this point, all the projects had to be agreed with the Headquarters which recognised materials related to mobilisation plans, preparations for war, as well as supplies and armament of the Red Army as the most important issues. Desirable materials were also those concerning the Soviet war industry, its organisation, production capacity in times of peace and in times of war and their distribution, as well as their breakdown by the type of production located in some Soviet military districts. Among the ongoing cases the most crucial were original orders of higher Headquarters, reports and protocols of various special committees, regulations of authorities of military administration and special services in these districts.43

In February 1927 Kozierowski received the extension of the contract for work in the post for the following 12 months, but without including this year in the period of his military service. This was most likely caused by Col. Schätzel’s aversion to him. At the same time his closest collaborators - Pietruszewski and Ismail-Bey were arrested, which greatly weakened the activity of ‘Konspol’.

In April 1927 Fevzi-Paşa came to Constantinople. Cavalry Capt. Iżycki met him due to the Gasztowtt’s intermediation. After the meeting, at the end of April, the head of the post went to Warsaw, probably for further instructions on cooperation with the Turkish General Staff. At the same time, also Gasztowtt was planning to spend his vacation in the capital of Poland, where, by the way, he was to meet with Marshal Piłsudski and talk, among others, about the Polish-Turkish cooperation. And then something a bit strange happened, because Cavalry Capt. Iżycki urged Gasztowtt to leave a week after his departure. As it turned out this delay was likely to prevent him from meeting with Marshal. And this is how it happened. Gasztowtt did not manage to meet him, despite a two-and-a-half-month stay in Warsaw and intervention in this matter by the then Foreign Minister - August Zalewski.44

4. THE KONSPOL POST – CAVALRY CAPTAIN MATEUSZ IŻYCKI

After a three-and-a-half-month stay in Warsaw and Cavalry Capt. Iżycki’s return, the work at the post changed significantly. The Head of the ‘Konspol’ post brought the dismissal from service for Capt. Kozierowski45, the nomination of the attaché in Turkey came for himself, signed by the Deputy Head of the Foreign Ministry - Roman Knoll, while Gasztowtt became subordinated to Cavalry Capt. Iżycki and engaged in the Legation of the Republic of Poland as a press referee. With the departure of Col. Schätz-

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43 CAW, O II, file No. I 303.4.1991, Instructions for the ‘Konspol’ post (no date provided – probably 1926)

44 Later Gasztowtt tried to pass his letter written to Józef Piłsudski through Capt. Kozierowski. It is not known whether it reached the addressee.

45 He was dismissed on 1st September 1927. He got to know about this just a few days before.

46 With the departure of Col. Schätzel the position of a military attaché at the Polish Legation in Ankara no longer existed. Cavalry Capt. Iżycki was an unofficial military attaché holding the position of the official attaché at the Legation. (CAW, O II, file No. I 303.4.2078, The Trzaska post /analysis and assessment).
zel the position of a military attaché at the Polish Legation in Ankara no longer existed. Cavalry Capt. Iżycki was an unofficial military attaché holding the position of the official attaché at the Legation.

Kozierowski felt bitter after his dismissal. The more so that the period of his work at the intelligence post in Turkey in 1926 was not included in the period of his military service. He believed that he had achieved success in his intelligence work in which the establishment of contacts with the Head of the Turkish General Staff was the most important success. After 15th September 1927 Cavalry Capt. Iżycki went to Warsaw 47.

Cavalry Capt. Iżycki was appointed attaché at the Polish Legation in Turkey in July 1927. Then his salary was of USD 275. In his letter to the head of the 2nd Division in August 1928, he considered that sum insufficient and asked to raise it by USD 100, he also wanted the one-off installation benefit and the reimbursement for the costs of his wife’s travel to Turkey in the amount of USD 500. His request was motivated by the fact that equivalent salaries for officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were much higher. As an example he gave the salary of the Secretary of the Legation, which together with the representational allowance was of USD 415, and what is more, he used the official housing and servants employed there. He suggested, therefore, that because of his work for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it should bear some costs, i.e. a part of his salary - USD 100.

In addition, the head of ‘Konspol’ drew attention to the additional costs that he incurred while working for the 2nd Division. First of all, he had to rent an apartment because of a great number of visitors he received, including Turkish officers, who hesitated to come to the Legation and who valued a reception at the diplomat’s house more than, e.g. an invitation to a restaurant. This fact, as well as expanding the post’s activity and representational costs, resulted in expenses which, as he wrote, exceeded his financial capacity 48.

Furthermore, Kozierowski’s leave coincided with the arrest of Pietruszewski 49 and Ismail. Iżycki as the head of the post found himself in a difficult situation. During the first 6 months of his work, he took several unsuccessful attempts to find new agents and intermediaries. He managed to recruit only two co-workers coming from the area of the Soviet Union whom he described as beaters. However, he formed a rather negative opinion on them. One of them was named Arshenievsky (agent No. 2818) - a Russian, a former tsarist officer. In Turkey he dealt with smuggling spirits and petty wine trading. He reported smuggling competitive with him. Iżycki described him as a person without morals. He was well acquainted with ports and had numerous relationships in the dark spheres, but also had connections with the Soviet Embassy and representatives of the Soviet merchant fleet. Iżycki claimed that he would get rid of him right away if he had someone else on hand. His opinion on the second beater was not positive either;

49 After the arrest, Pietruszewski was dismissed from the post.
Artymov (agent No. 2819) was also a former tsarist officer of Russian-Armenian origin, coming from Odessa. He ended up singing in choirs. He had similar contacts as Arshenievsky. According to Iżycki both were constant informers of rumours and worthless news. However, some information from them he described as useful, for example on the movements of the Soviet fleet, on the Soviet Consulate, trade associations, and especially on the activities of the Turkish Department of GPU. Both beaters received a fixed salary of USD 20 a month.

In March 1928, Iżycki had a meeting with the Turkish Deputy Chief of the General Staff - Kazım-Paşa. After this conversation he had the impression that the Turks would like to arrange, even semi-official, cooperation between the General Staffs of the two countries. In addition, the head of the ‘Konspol’ post, in accordance with the received instructions, raised the issue of assigning a Turkish military attaché in Warsaw. He received a reply that the Turkish army had no appropriately trained staff officers and the matter would be resolved successfully in the summer of that year. On the other hand, according to Iżycki, the Turks were afraid of a working meeting with the Polish General Staff officers, due to the scarcity of their own information. He also complained that the heads of Polish Legation in Turkey – Józef Wierusz-Kowalski and Kazimierz Papée had exposed him to the Turks.

Complicated internal relations in Turkey, quite important from the standpoint of the Polish - Turkish military relationship, were described in the report of the ‘Konspol’ post of 11th September 1928. The report, above all, concerned the diversity of views and contradictions in the activities relating to matters of the Caucasian emigration and relations with the Soviet Union and between the Turkish General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Turkish military authorities still perceived the Soviet Union as its natural enemy, and were willing to support all actions aimed at weakening the country, thereby strengthening Turkey. The Chief of the General Staff - Fevzi-Paşa expressed such views. In contrast, the Turkish Foreign Ministry, who was linked with the USSR by the Treaty, tried to be loyal to it, and even made staggering concessions requested by the Soviets, having failed to take any account of the views of the General Staff. The Ministry of Interior supported the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its activities. In addition, the then Turkish Prime Minister İsmet Paşa, despite the fact that he was not regarded as a friend of the USSR, considered Great Britain as the most important enemy and thus he often fa-

50 CAW, O II, file No. I 303.4.1991,
52 İsmet-Paşa – originally Mustafa İsmet İnönü (1884-1973) – a Turkish military (General) and a politician. In the years 1922-1924 – the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and then in the years 1922-1923, 1924-1937 and 1961-1965 – the Prime Minister, and the President - (1938-1950).
voured the Soviets. In addition to this, there were also some personal conflicts, as İsmet-Paşa tried to sidestep Fevzi-Paşa.\(^{53}\)

An example of such contradictions in the Turkish policy was the arrest of the leaders of Georgian emigrants in Turkey and the former Georgian envoy to the Turkish government - Simeon Mdivani. This Georgian politician based his plans for regaining independence by Georgia, among others, on Turkey. The last time he met with Fevzi-Paşa was three days before his arrest. Then, he was expelled from the territory of Turkey.

The event was supposed to be some kind of indication and a warning for Cavalry Capt. Iżycki as to the direction of his activity. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior could have paralysed his work among Caucasian organisations with the support of the Turkish General Staff. Therefore, he decided to base his work on Azerbaijani organisations enjoying the favour of various Turkish political authorities.\(^{54}\)

In his report of September 1928 Cavalry Capt. Iżycki described his contacts among emigrants from Azerbaijan. He divided them into two main groups. One of them was under the moral leadership of Sadık-Bey (Ahumzade). It was a group of loyalists to the state and the Turkish authorities. It included students of Turkish universities and young officers of the Turkish Army of Azeri origin. According to Cavalry Capt. Iżycki, they did not completely abandon the thoughts of independent Azerbaijan, but any action taken by them in this direction would first be consulted with the Turkish authorities. They had confidence in this respect in the Turkish state and enjoyed the confidence of the Turkish authorities which viewed them as a loyal element. They could especially count on the support of the Turkish military authorities. Moreover, the Turks thought that all the actions of activists coming from the Caucasus and residing in their area should be based solely on Turkey.

The second group described by Cavalry Capt. Iżycki included the Azeri independence Musavat Party under the leadership of Mehmet Emin Resulzade, who was also the editor of the journal ‘Yeni Qafqasıya’ (‘Young Caucasus’) and a number of leaflets promoting the idea of the independence of Azerbaijan. At that time both the Musavat Party and other Caucasian independence organisations were in crisis in relations with the Turkish authorities, who accused them of having caused problems in relations with the Soviet Union.

In the middle of 1928 Rasulzade was staying in Paris for 3 months in order to enhance cooperation with the local Caucasian activists. Turkish authorities suspected that he also contacted the French authorities and, which is even worse, the British ones.\(^{55}\) Besides, Rasulzade used his relations with all the enemies of the Soviet Union, who could in any way assist in regaining Azerbaijan’s independence.

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\(^{55}\) Cavalry Capt. Iżycki was sure that these suspicions were not unfounded and Resulzade held such meetings.
During his yearlong stay Cavalry Capt. Iżycki found contacts with Sadık-Bey and his group more profitable for himself. What is more, he had friendly relations with Sadık-Bey. He met him dozens of times. Owing to him, in the summer of 1928 they succeeded in creating two permanent groups of agents including the most ideological people on the Turkish - Soviet border, whose main aim was to fight against the Soviets, and who claimed it was their main occupation.

The first of these groups had its Headquarters in Kars. Its head was a former officer of Azerbaijani cavalry, who had served in the Turkish army for six years. He was at the age of approximately 3556. In order to keep up appearances he was professionally involved in trade. His group consisted of 18 organised people, 5 of whom were directly used for intelligence activities. They were experienced agents, who had been crossing the Soviet border for several years. The Turkish authorities possessed information about the activities of this group, which could even count on their favour in return for provided information.

This group was to conduct intelligence activities on the 3rd Caucasian Regular Division (particularly its 7th and 8th infantry regiments) and the Armenian Mixed Division in Yerevan. Its reports were sent to Iżycki within 10-12 days. The first of them arrived in November 1928.

The second intelligence group known as Tabriz57 had its post in the village of Chumarly in the Gorodamskij Region. It consisted of 11 people. According to Iżycki, it was headed by the former commander of the Karabakh uprising58. He was a 40-year-old man, a rich Azeri in the past, a typical warlike highlander. He received No. 2835. He dealt with road transport.

Conducting operations encountered some difficulties there since the region of Persia was penetrated by the Soviets. However, the positive side of this area was the support that the group received from the local population. This group carried out activities aimed at the acquisition of information about the GPU frontier, the dislocation of the Soviet units within the Caucasus, appointing Soviet soldiers for training in the area, gaining Soviet military booklets and gas masks. It took 25 days for a letter sent by the group leader to reach the ‘Konspol’ post.

Contacts with the two groups were maintained by Sadık-Bey (No. 2810) once a week via Azeri merchants travelling by ships. Sadık-Bey received USD 25-50 a month from Cavalry Capt. Iżycki for editing the journal. On the other hand, both intelligence groups were to receive USD 100 in September 1928. However, the head of the ‘Konspol’ post believed, that the total sum of USD 500 would be required for their maintenance and additional costs, such as visitations of these posts.

Another contact of the ‘Konspol’ post on the Caucasian border was Jansupov (No. 2855) - the former captain of the Russian artillery, born in Rivne. He came from a fami-

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56 The name has not been identified. Cavalry Capt. Iżycki gave him No. 2820.
57 Iżycki provided the wrong name – Tawrız / Tavriz.
58 He may have been one of the commanders of the insurgent troops.
ly of Kazan Tatars. His attitude towards Poland was positive. After the revolution he fought against the Bolsheviks in the Azerbaijani army and then went on to serve in the Turkish army, and after a few years he moved to the reserve and worked at a managerial position in the ammunition factory in Erzurum. He had contacts with the Albatros group. He was regarded as an outstanding specialist in the production of ammunition and enjoyed high credibility of the Turkish authorities. He also conducted business in Poland. Cavalry Capt. Iżycki helped him complete the formalities when he needed to go to Poland. He also received a mission from the Turkish authorities associated with the possibility of purchasing goods in Poland for the Turkish defence industry. Contacting him was hindered, because he was afraid to send written information. He provided information about the Turkish orders in the USSR.

The head of the post also intended to engage chauffeurs – Russians driving from Trabzon to Erzurum. They previously worked for the Albatros group and were supporters of the return of the monarchy in Russia. Cavalry Capt. Iżycki believed that they could be engaged as paid informants.

The Crimean Tatars formed an intelligence agency for Odessa and southern Russia. The ‘Konspol’s head defined the group as reliable, ideological and hostile towards the political system in the Soviet Union. Cafer Saidamet (No. 2806), who had worked with Col. Schätzel during his stay in Turkey, was one of them. Saidamet’s collaborator was Osman-Bey (No. 2805), who was to be placed on one of the Turkish ships traveling between Istanbul and the Soviet Black Sea ports. Osman-Bey, as an ideologist, refused a fixed salary. Cavalry Capt. Iżycki had to cover only some of the expenses related to his intelligence work. He found a number of young people among local Tatars who were willing to work against the USSR, but he considered them insufficiently sophisticated, so he decided to postpone their employment. Even more so because after the execution of Veli Ibrahimov and after Ibrahim Ibrahimov’s escape from the Soviet Legation, the USSR authorities started repressions against the Tatar population and they became suspected elements investigated by the GPU.

In October 1928 Selim Bey (No. 2860) went to Odessa as the Consul. He was Raif-Paşa’s son and also a friend of Aziz-Bey’s through whom he committed to intelligence cooperation for Poles. Cavalry Capt. Iżycki did not risk a personal meeting with him for conspiratorial reasons. Selim-Bey was not a soldier, but he had a solid civilian education. He grew up in Germany. He spoke French and German. He was associated with

59 Veli Ibrahimov was the Chairman of the Crimean Central Executive Committee. He was accused by the authorities of the USSR of anti-Soviet activity and nationalism. In 1927 he was arrested and a year later executed. The case of Ibrahimov launched a series of persecution of the Tatar population.
60 Mustafa Ibrahim Ibrahimov was the representative of the Soviet trade office in Istanbul. He deserted from the office to Paris.
61 Köse Mehmed Raif Paşa (1836-1911) was a trusted person of Sultan Abdülhamit’s high-level official in the last period of the Ottoman Sultanate. Among other things, he held the positions of the Ambassador to Rhodes, Cyprus, Beirut, the Minister of Trade and Agriculture as well as the Speaker of Parliament.
social spheres which played an important role in the political life of "old" Turkey, that is the Sultanate period, they were also hostile to Russia. The fact that a contact to Selim Bey was made available resulted from the fact that Iżycki made it clear for Aziz-Bey, according to the instructions he had received, that the 2nd Division was not satisfied with the cooperation with him and had little benefit from it.62

Selim-Bey’s intermediary for contacts with Iżycki was Aziz - Bey. His work for the Poles was to be kept secret from the Turkish Foreign Ministry. During his stay in Odessa, the communication was carried out by means of Turkish vessels in the Black Sea going between Turkish and Soviet ports. The head of the ‘Konspol’ post had more extensive plans for Selim-Bey. He even hoped to create with time a Polish intelligence centre63 in the Turkish Consulate in Odessa, as in case of mobilisation it would be of great importance and would be the fulfilment of basic tasks of the post. He also hoped that Selim-Bey would purchase documents (including orders for appointment to territorial exercise) for the received money. Contacts with Selim-Bey took place every 7-10 days.

The above mentioned beaters64 gained a lot of information from the Soviet seamen for money, which was a common practice used by all the intelligence agencies operating within the territory of Turkey. The head of ‘Konspol’ claimed that he did not fear inspiration from them, since they are convinced that we are well informed and this is why they are afraid. These actions, however, did not bring any meaningful information.

Cavalry Capt. Iżycki maintained contacts with other countries’ attachés deployed in Turkey as well; the closest ones were most likely with Col. Sarou, the attaché of the allied France. He received valuable information from him, especially concerning the Soviet-Turkish relations and the internal affairs of Turkey. On one occasion he also mentioned the head of the French intelligence post - Josse, who was known for taking every inspiration.65

The Head of ‘Konspol’ exchanged some local information from the field of counterintelligence with the attaché of the second state allied to Poland, i.e. Romania. However, he found him not intelligent enough and therefore treated him with certain caution.

Cavalry Capt. Iżycki did not start closer cooperation with the Italian maritime attaché Maroni66 and the British attaché because of unfavourable relations between these countries and Turkey. This could harm his relations with the Turkish authorities. However, he mentioned that they conducted intelligence activity towards the Soviet Union, they had a lot of money at their disposal and a vast network of agents and officers,

62 Most probably Aziz-Bey received such instructions from his superiors.
63 Cavalry Capt. Iżycki had plans to create a data repository there.
64 It concerns Artymov and Arshenievsky.
65 Namely, purposeful misinformation.
66 The assessments of intelligence work issued by Cavalry Capt. Iżycki for the Italian attaché and the Italian intelligence apparatus cooperating with him were discrepant since in the same document he claimed that Maroni happened to have good information and also wrote that both the Italians and the British were not well informed, because they do not have information from the same area as us.
they bought as much as possible and ran up prices. The Japanese did the same. The assessments of intelligence work issued by Cavalry Capt. Iżycki for the Italian attaché and the Italian intelligence apparatus cooperating with him were discrepant, since in the same document he claimed that Maroni happened to have good information and also wrote that both the Italians and the British were not well informed, because they did not have information from the same area as us.

There were also 2 Poles among his informants. One of them was Madej (No. 2845), Cavalry Capt. Iżycki’s colleague, the owner of the local wineries with commercial interests in Odessa and the Crimea. He had the ability to ensure the post’s communication with this area. He was described as a thoroughly reliable man. The other one - Łepkowski (2850) – a local Pole, a son of an emigrant and a great patriot who worked for Turkish trade and had extensive relations.

Cavalry Capt. Iżycki had two informers in Ankara at his disposal, and also Sadık-Bey, who was paid by him, had his person in the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Besides he had a whole series of contacts with Turkish officers, which, however, were of casual nature. The head of ‘Konspol’ drew attention to a very wide range of the post activity and the value of contacts. Establishing a network along with his official duties in the Legation took him so much time, that once again he requested the Headquarters to send him a helper67.

The evaluation of materials sent by the post to the 2nd Division was not satisfactory. In February 1928 most information was received from Turkish sources. The value of data relating to the personnel of the Red Army was compared to those found in the official Soviet press. The information about Soviet factories producing war gases was considered unlikely. Furthermore, reports on the organisation of the Soviet chemical troops were defined as worthless, chaotic and misleading. However, the Headquarters found the information on the transformation of the sugar refinery into a poison gas factory in the event of war interesting. On the other hand, there were doubts on its veracity. What is more, the dislocation of the Red Army proved to be outdated and worthless.

Materials from other sources were not rated high. The minutes of meetings (sent by agents bordering the Caucasus) held by the commander of the Soviet Border Guard did not contain the number of the unit, or any data interesting for offensive intelligence. Alternatively, other information could be of interest to counterintelligence, but it was more widely known. Materials on the organisation of the Soviet infantry regiment from the agency in Odessa were even more severely criticised68.

At the beginning of March 1928, the then Chief of the Department Russia – Lt. Col. Czesław Pawłowicz evaluated the materials sent by ‘Konspol’ as uninteresting. He advised to check the value of individual agents and the sources of the post69.

68 Literally speaking the assessment was as follows: just amazing hoax. Either he is completely ignorant on military matters or made everything up shamelessly.
5. THE L.3 POST

Probably in autumn 1928 the ‘Konspol’ post was renamed L.3. Thus, the current scope of its work changed on 1\textsuperscript{st} December of that year. According to the Headquarters’ guidelines the head of the post was to immediately proceed to abandon the ongoing information work, establish closer contacts with the Turkish General Staff and to mount a network of residencies. The department operating in peacetime became clearly separated from the department of work in the event of war.

The peaceful work of the post was to consist in maintaining contacts with the Turkish General Staff, and especially with the Turkish intelligence. The aim was to exchange information about the Soviet Union. For this purpose, L.3 received special intelligence elaborations to facilitate the cooperation. There were plans to convene a Polish-Turkish conference at the highest level of Headquarters in the future. Quite an important matter for the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Division was the observation of transit through the Turkish Straits, which was to be continued and even intensified. It was ordered to abandon the previous practice of establishing contacts with the help of the Promethean national organisations or individuals belonging to them. Along with the instructions, political issues relating to the Caucasian emigration were left for Kazimierz Pappé\textsuperscript{70} and Zygmunt Vetulani\textsuperscript{71}.

By contrast, in the event of war the task would be to set up residencies or data repositories on the Soviet Black Sea coast\textsuperscript{72}. As usual they were told to be careful when choosing residents so as not to select people who could be called to the Red Army or displaced from places where the residencies were located during the war. It was therefore recommended to take women or elderly people into account.

The priority task for the head of the post was the organisation of double communication with residencies, constant – from the post to the residency, and occasional – from the residency to the post. The rule was that each residency had separate communication networks and a predetermined way of communicating with posts\textsuperscript{73}. Communication with residencies was tested in a practical way and repeated once a quarter or once every six months by sending money – the resident’s salary, which in peaceful conditions was USD 15-25 per month\textsuperscript{74}. The head of the post was obliged to design methods of communication between the post and residencies and submit them to the Headquarters for approval.

It was reminded that residencies designed for work during the war could not be used in peacetime due to the threat of premature unmasking. They could start operating

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{70} The then chargé d’affaires in Turkey.
  \item \textsuperscript{71} The trade counsellor in Istanbul.
  \item \textsuperscript{72} The following cities were mentioned there: Odessa, Batumi, Novorossiysk and Sevastopol. The primary task was to establish residencies in Odessa and Novorossiysk.
  \item \textsuperscript{73} These methods were to be the simplest ways to encrypt information, invisible ink, passwords, etc.
  \item \textsuperscript{74} Resident’s salary was dependent on the validity of particular residencies and local conditions.
\end{itemize}
only upon the announcement of mobilisation or when strong tension preceding the outbreak of the war would occur.

The Headquarters also specified the formalities associated with the acceptance of residents into service. First of all, residents were required to complete a special declaration, sign it with their real name, surname and a pseudonym and attach a photo. Another important thing was the receipt for the salary for the first three months or half a year, which they had to sign with their real names and surnames. The subsequent receipts could be signed with pseudonyms. Declarations with photos and receipts were to be sent as soon as possible by courier to the Department B1 and they had to be addressed to its chief.  

At the beginning of November 1928 the assessment of the L-3 post was poor. Information from the agent No.2818 about Soviet bacteriological battalions as well as ordre de bataille of the Soviet Navy were considered a distasteful fraud. According to the Headquarters, the agent No.2818 undoubtedly belonged to the GPU.  

Military information from the Caucasus obtained from the agent No. 2831 was evaluated as muddled. On its basis it was found that military matters are completely unfamiliar to either the agent or a person receiving the information from him. Moreover, the data on the dislocation of the Red Army were false, misleading and of inspirational nature.  

Information about personnel changes from the agent No.2819 was published in the Soviet press, but, as it was found out later, the Head of the post did not read newspapers, though he had been ordered to do so. Aziz-Bey’s reports on the Soviet Air Forces showed that the Turkish General Staff did not know anything about the aviation and the comments of the head of the post on these materials proved that he was not familiar with the organisation of the Soviet army at all, and that while in Warsaw he had not learnt anything.  

The material was considered a note from an unknown source on the new organisation of military authorities of the Red Army, the information from Tatar merchants about the manoeuvres in Kiev, as well as the material from informers from the northern Caucasus about ethnic units in the Caucasus were regarded false, inaccurate and worthless.  

On the other hand, information about the Junkers factory in Caesarea, the special control of the traffic through the Straits, the index of Soviet merchant ships as well as information obtained during the conversation with the Soviet attaché in Angora were considered as valuable and useful.  

However, the overall assessment of the post’s materials was negative. The explanatory memorandum stated that the materials submitted by the post were not serious. It was written, that it can be seen quite clearly that the head of the post is cheated in a vulgar manner from all sides, and that he is not well versed in the Soviet army.

At the end of that same year, 1928, the Chief of Department B1 went to Istanbul. The purpose of his trip was to check the working conditions of the L.3 post, the possibility of its extension and prospects for carrying out special work aimed at mounting an intelligence network in the event of war with the Soviets. This was related to the general plan of intelligence work, and also resulted from the fact that the intelligence operations conducted by the post in peacetime had been found impracticable.

The Chief of the Department B1 conducted the inspection within 10 days. He stated that the L.3 post had all favourable conditions to carry out the assigned tasks. For instance he pointed out the friendly attitude from the Turkish military circles for performing activities by the Polish intelligence on their territory and the convenient location of Istanbul providing quick and easy sea transport to the agency on the Soviet southern coast of the Black Sea.

The chief of Department B1 attributed friendly relations with the Turkish General Staff primarily to the then head of the 2nd Division - Col. Schätzel. They resulted from his work while he was a military attaché in Turkey and later they went by force of habit. He stated further that they should have been strengthened by the head of the post through the exchange of intelligence documents about the Soviet Union and also through the establishment of social and personal relationships with the individual links with the decision making elements of the Turkish Staff.

The assessment of the head of the post was decisively negative. According to the Chief of Department B1, he was not able to cope with the tasks assigned to him. The family relations of the head were here of great significance - as the chief of B1 wrote - they took him a lot of time and sharpened his attention in the wrong direction. In addition, in budgetary terms the L.3 post showed the flagrant exaggeration of expenditures disproportionate to the results of previous activity and tasks, which had been assigned for the future. The existing head’s salary in the amount of USD 375 per month was deemed too high. In the opinion of the chief of Department B1, taking into account the cost of living in Istanbul, which was to be roughly comparable to the Soviet conditions, a sum of USD 200-225 a month would be quite sufficient.

Summarising his report the chief of the department B1 wrote that during his stay in the post on several occasions he discussed with its head new tasks trying to extract from him at least an alleged plan which might be used to execute such tasks, but unfortunately, he could not give me any concrete answers. In his reasoning aiming at resolving this issue, he often put forward ideas which in another place and time, he excluded with completely contradictory statements. In all this I sensed the chaos of thought, inability to continue simple reasoning, which seems to come from the lack of sense or in-

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77 In addition to this, the head of the post received extra funds for maintaining contacts with the Turkish General Staff in the amount of USD 100 per month, as well as the right to the officer emolument for serving in the country.

78 For comparison, the then Polish Consular Secretary in Istanbul received the equivalent of USD 175, I Legation Secretary - less than USD 250, and the two officers of the 2nd Division staying at the posts in the USSR - only USD 145 per month.
intelligence. Even if we assume that the head of the post will cope with the development of the existing contact with the Turkish Staff, in no event will he manage with the second part of the task - preparing communication with the Soviet area in the event of war. In addition, the chief of Department B1 emphasised too high aspirations of the head of the post, previous poor results of the post and poor intelligence of the current head. Therefore, the chief of Department B1 recommended a personnel change at the position of the head and proposed Maj. Tadeusz Śniechowski as a candidate with a salary of USD 200. Śniechowski was the head of the post from April 1929 to December 1930.

CONCLUSIONS

In the 1920s, Turkey played quite an important role in the Polish political agendas and intelligence plans. Numerous political emigrants from the Caucasian countries occupied by the Soviet Union led to a situation in which Poles conducted very dynamic Promethean activity there. However, because of Soviet pressures at the turn of the twenties and thirties the Turkish authorities severely restricted the anti-Soviet political activity of Caucasian emigrants.

The possibility of conducting the intelligence operation from the Turkish territory into the Soviet Caucasus and the northern Black Sea coast belonging to the Soviet Union was of significant importance for the Polish military intelligence. The Turkish side was also interested in gaining intelligence information about Soviets. Turks, however, did not want any conflicts with the powerful northern neighbour, to whom they owed so much in the formative years and during the initial period of the existence of the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, they decided on quite extensive intelligence cooperation with Poles and gave an unofficial consent to install Polish intelligence posts in Turkey.

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79 He requested the chief of Department B1 to influence his promotion from an attaché to the Secretary of the Legation. According to the chief of Department B1, this request was not motivated by the expediency or necessity of work. In addition, he constantly complained about the inadequate salary. He lived beyond his means, an example of which would be hiring a too large apartment consisting of 6 rooms, which meant spending USD100 on a monthly rent. He also maintained too extensive and strenuous relations in the diplomatic corps, which was also associated with additional high costs.


81 A. Pełoński, op. cit., p. 178.
3. The Central Military Archives in Warsaw (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe w Warszawie).

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