How facts become norms

• Autorzy: Marek Káčer
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

I argue that it is possible to derive norms from facts. In this second part of my enterprise I suggest that permanent human behaviour as a matter of fact produces norms as a matter of ought. I proceed to defend this suggestion in two steps. Firstly, I use Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance applied in the particular context of judicial decision-making to demonstrate how our behaviour changes our normative attitudes. Subsequently, I try to prove that normative attitudes which stem from settled inferential practice can be understood as “the genuine ought”. The objectivity of normativity is thus not a matter of reference, but a matter of inference and the meaning of our ought-terms is nothing else but the sum of practical conclusions they usually lead to.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

cognitive dissonance; frege-geach problem; inferentialism; one right answer thesis

• Wydawca: Institute of State and Law, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic
• Czasopismo: The Lawyer Quarterly
• Rocznik: 2017
• Tom: 7
• Numer: 1
• Strony: 1-11
• Rodzaj publikacji: ARTICLE

Twórcy

autor

Marek Káčer

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