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2005 | 2 | 73-111
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PRESENTATIONISM IN THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND REALISM

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PL
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EN
The difficulties with justification of the thesis of realism in the theory of knowledge (scilicet belief that we gain or we are capable of gaining knowledge about objects transcendent to the mind) are well known since long. Those difficulties caused many kinds of realism to exist nowadays - kinds discordant among themselves or even excluding each other. As is well known, since Descartes the main problem of every kind of realism and perhaps even of the whole theory of knowledge became so called 'transcendency problem' or 'the bridge problem'. How to come from perceptions to the things themselves? Or: how to come from 'the knowledge of knowledge' to 'the knowledge of things'? These are some examples of questions being in close relation with the transcendency issue and 'the bridge problem'. Since Descartes, in order to solve the above-mentioned problem, there have been created several standpoints, which tried to justify the thesis of realism in the theory of knowledge in an indirect manner, basing on other theses (for instance the principle of causality or referring to the term of cognitive intermediators). The author claims that defending the realism from the standpoint of representational theory of knowledge is inefficient. Representationism rather assumes the thesis of realism than proves it. It means that representationism can be defended efficiently only from the standpoint of presentational theory of knowledge. In other words, to prove transcendency and ontological objectivity of conceived objects, we need to refer to various kinds of immediate cognition, and to take into consideration the selfpresentation of objects. Whoever neglects that, deprives himself of a good opportunity to justify thesis of realism. The standpoint of Putnam (his internal realism) and the discussion about the realistic character of the semantic theory of knowledge (especially the distinction between weak and strong correspondence) make a good illustration of the difficulties, to which lead the standpoints ignoring the above-mentioned 'principle of all principles'.
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2
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73-111
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ARTICLE
Twórcy
  • J. Debowski, Uniwersytet Warminsko-Mazurski, Wydzial Humanistyczny, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Kurta Obitza 2, 10-725 Olsztyn, Poland
Bibliografia
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
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07PLAAAA03326858
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bwmeta1.element.8ce5f597-162a-39da-b014-fe65a8a29c07
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