Social-insurance pension systems as public goods

• Autorzy: Meszaros J.
• Języki publikacji: HU

Abstrakty

EN

The study shows how the present social-security pension systems, assuming methodological individualism and employing the apparatus of repeated games, are in a multiple prisoner's dilemma situation. The study analyses this by formulating and proving three propositions: the dilemmas of demography, contribution payments, and the political class. These are confirmed using the so-called Selten thesis of repeated-game theory.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

GAME THEORY; PENSION SYSTEMS; SOCIAL SECURITY

• Wydawca: Committee for Economic Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Kozgazdasagi Szemle (Economic Review)
• Rocznik: 2005
• Tom: 52
• Numer: 3
• Strony: 275-288
• Rodzaj publikacji: ARTICLE

Twórcy

autor

Meszaros J.

• J. Meszaros, no address given, contact the journal editor

Identyfikatory

CEJSH db identifier

07HUAAAA02956016