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2005 | 13 | 1(49) | 15-23
Tytuł artykułu

WHY IS TRUTH (IN)DEFINABLE

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Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
PL
Abstrakty
EN
The aim of this paper is to consider the question about the reasons of the indefinability of truth. We note at the start that a formula with one free variable can function as a truth predicate for a given set of sentences in two different (although related) senses: relative to a model and relative to a theory. By methods due to Alfred Tarski it can be shown that some sets of sentences are too large to admit a truth predicate (in any of the above senses); the limit case being the set of all sentences. The key question considered by us is: what does 'too large' mean, i.e. which exactly sets of sentences don't have a truth predicate. We give a partial answer to this question: a set of sentences 'K' has a truth predicate in an axiomatizable, consistent theory 'T' if for some natural number 'n', all the sentences belonging to 'K' are equivalent (in 'T') to the sum of 'n' sentences. Here the notion of a 'too large' set receives a clear and definite sense. However, the case of a model-theoretic truth predicate seems to be more complicated: this second problem we leave as open, indicating only some possible directions of future research.
Słowa kluczowe
Czasopismo
Rocznik
Tom
13
Numer
Strony
15-23
Opis fizyczny
Rodzaj publikacji
ARTICLE
Twórcy
  • C. Cieslinski, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Instytut Filozofii, Zaklad Logiki, ul. Krakowskie Przedmiescie 3, 00-927 Warszawa, Poland
Bibliografia
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
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CEJSH db identifier
05PLAAAA0037897
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.4c3e5ef7-55e6-3f2e-8392-c85c43d6de9a
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