UPTAKE AND CONVENTIONALITY IN ILLOCUTION
The aim of this paper is to put forward a new way of conceiving of the conventionality of illocutionary acts, grounded in a new look at Austin's original ideas. While the indispensability of uptake has correctly been deemed to be a hallmark of illocution, it has also been taken as evidence of the intention-based nature of illocutionary acts as opposed to their alleged conventionality. After discussing the readings of the 'securing of uptake' offered by Strawson and Searle and commenting on the consequently established divide between 'communicative' and conventional speech acts, the authoress claims that illocutionary acts are conventional, first of all, because they have conventional effects. She shows that Austin took such effects to be essential to illocution and argue that the bringing about of conventional effects is bound up with the indispensability of uptake.
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