THE FEELING OF MORAL SATISFACTION
This paper is an attempt to find an adequate explanation, in terms of ethical theory, of an emotional state that the author defines as 'a feeling of moral satisfaction'. He understands this feeling as an emotional state that stems from the identification by the subject of his or her realisation of moral values with a subjective perception of fulfilling his or her own life rather than mere realisation of an objective sense of human life. The main issue thus concerns the way of such a description of the moral subject that would take account of his or her ability to experience such emotional states. The traditional approaches in rationalist ethics (e.g. Descartes, Kant) rely on the concept of the so-called higher or spiritual emotions; however, this concept is inconsistent. This is why he draws on that of eudaimonia and proposes to understand the 'feeling of moral satisfaction' as a mood the object of which is one's own cognitive-motivational- evaluative construct seen as a process of perfecting reaction to the subject's aims in their entirety..
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