Koťátko o chrobákovi vo Wittgensteinovej škatuľke

• Autorzy: Tomáš Čana

Warianty tytułu

EN

Koťátko on the beetle in Wittgenstein’s box

• Języki publikacji: SK

Abstrakty

EN

Wittgenstein’s metaphor of the beetle in the box in the Philosophical Investigations has been the object of a robust critique by Petr Koťátko. In the book Interpretace a subjektivita (Interpretation and Subjectivity) he resolutely opposes the view that mental experiences do not figure in our vocabularies of the mental, which he associates with the metaphor in question. The aim of this article is to show that the critique in question is founded on a misunderstanding of the real sense of the metaphor. Its motivation is quite different. In addition, the aim is to show that, in reality, there is agreement between Koťátko’s critical thoughts and the motivation of Wittgenstein’s metaphor of the beetle in the box.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Petr Koťátko; philosophy of psychology; mental experiences; mental vocabularies; feeling; analogy of the beetle in the box; perception; Wittgenstein

• Wydawca: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Rocznik: 2015
• Tom: 63
• Numer: 2
• Strony: 267-278
• Rodzaj publikacji: ARTICLE

Twórcy

autor

Tomáš  Čana

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic