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2007 | 54 | 7/8 | 628-643
Tytuł artykułu

Designing optimal pension rules: new results

Treść / Zawartość
Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
HU
Abstrakty
EN
This paper follows earlier ones by the same authors in applying mechanism design to finding an optimal non-linear pension-benefit rule for flexible retirement. It is assumed that individuals have private information about their expected life spans. The government's goal is to design a pension system (a payroll tax and a function that relates benefits to length of employment) that maximizes a social-welfare function and satisfies a social budget constraint (without satisfying the individual ones) redistribution. Since individuals with different life expectancies optimize their employment lengths conditionally on the benefit function, the government must also take into account incentive constraints. The authors' former studies reduced the inflexibility of the optimum and the excess in redistribution by rendering the social-welfare function concave. The new findings in this paper are: (1) some redistribution is inevitable in any reasonable pension system, and (2) second-best solutions may be local indeterminate, while (3) returning to utilitarianism, the minimization of redistribution is considered.
Rocznik
Tom
54
Numer
7/8
Strony
628-643
Opis fizyczny
Rodzaj publikacji
ARTICLE
Twórcy
autor
  • Andras Simonovits, no address given, contact the journal editor
Bibliografia
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
CEJSH db identifier
10HUAAAA07852
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.221a0a5e-98d0-36ae-80eb-3303ada44b14
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