EXPLANATIONS IN SCIENCE AND ETHICS REVISITED
The paper is a reply to the polemic with authoress' article 'The Structure of Scientific Theories and Systems of Values', which presented a number of analogies between methodological and metaethical problems. Those analogies can be seen when we acknowledge the information surplus of evaluative statements in comparison to normative statements (similarly in science theories are stronger than observational statements), which is indicated by the examples of actual moral questions. The basis for the polemic is the fact that its authors deny the existence of this surplus, claiming that evaluations are equivalent with norms, not stronger than them. Moreover, if they reduce metaethics to the issues of meaning, and methodology to the issues of justification, it is understandable that they deny the possibility of those two domains meeting on the grounds of similar problems. The paper also illustrates the reasons for a modification of the meaning of certain philosophical terms appearing in authoress' article.
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