THE CRITIQUE OF COMMUNICATIVE REASON. COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AND PERSONAL IDENTITY (A kommunikativ esz kritikaja. Kommunikativ cselekves es szemelyes identitas)
The following essay is aimed at confining the scope of The Theory of Communicative Action apropos of the problem of personal identity. For Habermas the notion of personal identity may be derived directly from the conclusions of his social theory: it is the specific part of the lifeworld (the meanings connected to the self) reproduced via communicative action. As communicative action is the mechanism of social integration as well, it is impossible to describe theoretically a personal identity that is distinct from the social in the Habermasian approach. This problem is solved in the paper with the help of Foucault's ideas on social power and subjectivation. Foucault introduces a constitutive dimension of power: he originates the modem subject from the individualization of power relations. By examining the subject in its opposition to social power, he offers an opportunity to describe a personal identity that is distinct from the social. In the author's opinion, by approaching to the concept of communicative action from a Foucaultian perspective, certain elements of power in the series of speech acts (that is certain dogmatic language uses) may be introduced as the expressions of the opposition against the logic of action coordination referring to the contours of personal identity. These dogmatic language uses may be specified based on the Kohlbergian-Habermasian ideas on moral development. In these cases the dogmatic language use does not require emancipation as it refers to personal identity, in this sense it reveals the limits of the scope of communicative rationality. In the final part of the paper the recognition-theoretical presuppositions of personal identity are introduced.
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