Ograniczanie wyników
Czasopisma help
Autorzy help
Lata help
Preferencje help
Widoczny [Schowaj] Abstrakt
Liczba wyników

Znaleziono wyników: 63

Liczba wyników na stronie
first rewind previous Strona / 4 next fast forward last
Wyniki wyszukiwania
Wyszukiwano:
w słowach kluczowych:  defence
help Sortuj według:

help Ogranicz wyniki do:
first rewind previous Strona / 4 next fast forward last
EN
Following the ‘hybrid form’ of Russian aggression in Ukraine that emerged in 2014, the period after February 24th, 2022 is referred to as the ‘new reality’. Hence, the question that needs to be addressed is how to deter and prevent Russian aggression of this kind. The national legal framework against the aggressor is a part of the deterrence policy and can be construed as defensive lawfare. Focusing on Latvia, the aim of the paper is to analyse defensive lawfare and deterrence in the context of hybrid warfare. The following research question has been identified: What is Latvia’s approach to establishing defensive lawfare in terms of hybrid warfare? For the empirical analysis, the chronological framework has been set from 2014 to 2022. To complete the empirical analysis of the present paper, both qualitative and quantitative research has been implemented comprising document analysis and semi-structured interviews, as well as content analysis, respectively. The improvement of a regulatory base and the development of deterrence, whilst using regulatory acts, is an element of deterrence and a way to act legally. The law can be used as a weapon. Lawfare, a concept with three definitions, has two forms: defensive a nd offensive. Latvia’s legal base includes a regulation to overcome hybrid threats and to implement a broad-spectrum of defence measures. Latvia’s regulatory framework is designed for defence purposes, whilst also being a way of promoting deterrence. Decision makers must be able to manoeuvre with the powers assigned to them.
EN
The article presents the results of research carried out for the purposes of the doctoral dissertation entitled Creating the image of the Polish Armed Forces as a guarantor of defence capabilities. The work draws attention to the importance and essential meaning of military classes in this process. The article presents the history of military classes and the methodological assumptions of the research. A review of research on students of military classes included in the literature on the subject was conducted. The results of the author’s own research on the impact of education in military classes on the perception of the Polish Armed Forces were presented, as well as conclusions and recommendations. The research problem of this article is the question: How do students of military classes perceive the current image of the Polish Armed Forces? The aim of the study was to analyse the currently employed measures shaping the image of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland in the opinion of the students of military classes.
PL
Artykuł zawiera prezentację wyników badań przeprowadzonych na potrzeby rozprawy doktorskiej pt. Kreowanie wizerunku Sił Zbrojnych RP jako gwaranta obronności. W pracy zwrócono uwagę na znaczenie i istotę klas wojskowych w tym procesie. W artykule przedstawiono historię klas wojskowych oraz założenia metodyczne badań. Dokonano przeglądu badań dotyczących uczniów klas wojskowych zawartych w literaturze przedmiotu. Przedstawiono wyniki badań własnych obejmujących wpływ nauki w klasach wojskowych na postrzeganie Sił Zbrojnych RP oraz zaprezentowano wnioski i rekomendacje. Problem badawczy niniejszego artykułu stanowiło pytanie: Jak uczniowie klas wojskowych postrzegają obecny wizerunek Sił Zbrojnych RP? Celem pracy była analiza obecnie stosowanych działań kształtujących wizerunek Sił Zbrojnych RP w opinii uczniów klas wojskowych.
3
PL
Jednym z bardzo istotnych elementów infrastruktury krytycznej i obronnej Polski, obok sieci lotnisk wojskowych i cywilnych, są drogowe odcinki lotniskowe, których funkcja, znaczenie i przydatność nabrały szczególnego wymiaru w aktualnej sytuacji geopolitycznej, w tym przede wszystkim podczas trwającego konfliktu zbrojnego w Ukrainie. Drogowe odcinki lotniskowe (DOL) to specjalnie przygotowane odcinki dróg publicznych przystosowane do wykonywania operacji lotniczych startu i lądowania wojskowych statków powietrznych (WSP) realizujących zadania operacyjne w czasie kryzysu i wojny oraz zadania wynikające z realizacji procesu szkolenia lotniczego. Szczegółowe informacje dotyczące wymagań stawianym DOL przedstawiono w normie obronnej NO-17-A207:2022 Nawierzchnie lotniskowe – Drogowe odcinki lotniskowe – Wymagania i badania [1]. W ww. dokumencie normatywnym określono minimalne wymagania w zakresie wymiarów geometrycznych, obszarów o ograniczonych przeszkodach oraz układów konstrukcyjnych nawierzchni DOL. Przedstawiono wymagania dla podstawowych parametrów eksploatacyjnych nawierzchni na obiektach użytkowanych przez służby drogowe, które należy stosować przede wszystkim: przy projektowaniu i budowie DOL, modernizowaniu i przebudowie istniejących drogowych odcinków lotniskowych, odbiorze wykonanych robót, ocenie technicznej i eksploatacyjnej. Postanowienia normy są właściwe dla oceny stanu technicznego DOL w całym okresie ich technicznej żywotności, a szczególnie w okresie ich użytkowania przez wojskowe statki powietrzne. Stan techniczny i użytkowy nawierzchni DOL ma bezpośredni wpływ na bezpieczeństwo wykonywania operacji lotniczych. Wymusza to konieczność posiadania aktualnej, pełnej wiedzy o ich stanie technicznym, co będzie pozwalało podejmować odpowiednie decyzje mające na celu zapewnienie ich bezpiecznej eksploatacji. W artykule przedstawiono wyniki badań parametrów eksploatacyjnych nowowybudowanych konstrukcji nawierzchni drogowego odcinka lotniskowego Wielbark w ciągu drogi wojewódzkiej nr 604 oraz wymagania obowiązującej normy obronnej NO-17-A207:2022. Omówiono również możliwe zagrożenia eksploatacyjne dla wykonywania operacji lotniczych przez wojskowe statki powietrzne oraz realizowane prace dla poprawy bezpieczeństwa na DOL, wchodzących w skład elementów infrastruktury krytycznej i obronnej państwa.
EN
One of the essential elements of the Polish critical and defence infrastructure, apart from the network of military and civil airports, are highway landing strips, which function, importance and usefulness have taken on a special dimension in the current geopolitical situation, especially during the ongoing armed conflict in Ukraine. Highway Landing Strips (Polish. DOL) are specially prepared sections of public roads adapted to perform air operations of take-off and landing of military aircraft (Polish. WSP) intended for operational tasks during crisis and war, as well as tasks resulting from the implementation of the flight training process. Detailed information on the requirements for DOL is presented in NO-17-A207:2022 Airfield pavements – Airfield road strips – Requirements and tests [1]. The above normative document outlines the minimum requirements for geometric dimensions, runway obstacle free zones and DOL surface construction systems. Requirements for the basic operating parameters of pavements on facilities used by road services have been presented. In addition, these requirements should be primarily used in designing and constructing DOL, modernizing and reconstructing the existing road sections of airfields, accepting the performed works, and technical and operational assessment. The normative provisions are appropriate for assessing the technical condition of DOLs throughout their entire technical lifetime, especially during their use by military aircraft. The technical and operational condition of the DOL surface has a direct impact on the safety of air operations. This enforces the need for up-to-date, full knowledge about their technical condition, which will help make the appropriate decisions to ensure their safe operation. The article presents the results of testing the operational parameters of the newly built structures of the surface of the Highway Landing Strip of Wielbark airport along provincial road No. 604 and the requirements of the applicable defence standard NO-17-A207:2022. The possible operational hazards for performing air operations by military aircraft and the ongoing works aimed at improving the security of the DOL, which are part of the critical and defence infrastructure of the country, are also discussed.
4
Content available Tasks of the municipalities in the field of defence
EN
As a state directly neighbouring the arena of armed action, Poland was challenged to prepare legal solutions appropriate to the existing threats in the wake of Russia’s armed aggression against sovereign Ukraine. The adoption of the Act of 11 March 2022 on Defence of the Homeland coincided with the armed conflict beyond the eastern border of our country. These circumstances inspired the authors to analyse systemic solutions involving the municipality in the procedures for minimising the impact of security threats related to a potential armed conflict. The paper aims to characterise the tasks of the commune, which is the basic unit of local government in Poland, to ensure national defence.
PL
Zbrojna agresja Rosji na suwerenną Ukrainę spowodowała, że Polska, państwo bezpośrednio sąsiadującym z areną działań zbrojnych, stanęła przed wyzwaniem przygotowania rozwiązań prawnych adekwatnych do występujących zagrożeń. Konflikt zbrojny za wschodnią granicą naszego kraju zbiegł się w czasie z uchwaleniem ustawy z 11 marca 2022 roku o obronie Ojczyzny. Wydarzenia te stały się inspiracją do analizy rozwiązań ustrojowych włączających gminę w procedury minimalizowania skutków zagrożeń bezpieczeństwa związanego z potencjalnym konfliktem zbrojnym. Celem niniejszego opracowania jest charakterystyka zadań gminy jako podstawowej jednostki samorządu terytorialnego w Polsce na rzecz zapewnienia obronności państwa.
PL
Artykuł poświęcony jest jednej z najbardziej złożonych aktywności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa - przygotowaniom obronnym państwa. Przedstawiono je jako całokształt przedsięwzięć rzeczowo finansowych i organizacyjnych realizowanych przez administrację publiczną, a przede wszystkim przedsiębiorców. Nadano im rolę wprost niezbędną do zapewnienia przetrwania i funkcjonowania państwa w sytuacji zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa i w czasie wojny, w tym wsparcia własnych i sojuszniczych sił zbrojnych. Założono, że to właśnie przedsiębiorcy i gospodarka zajmują pozycję kluczowego elementu bezpieczeństwa społecznego, niezależnie od stanu gotowości obronnej, w którym znajduje się kraj. To sfera ekonomiczna, wspierana administracją, ma do odegrania, właśnie w ramach przygotowań obronnych, najważniejszą rolę w ograniczeniu wrażliwości kraju na środki oddziaływania wrogiego otoczenia. W sposób szczególny potraktowano proces planowania operacyjnego, jako integralną część planowania obronnego czyli procesu o kardynalnym znaczeniu dla skutecznej realizacji zadań obronnych. Zdefiniowano go jako ustalanie czynności dotyczących przygotowania i działania organów administracji publicznej oraz przedsiębiorców w warunkach zewnętrznego zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa państwa i w czasie wojny, ujętych w formie zestawów zadań operacyjnych. Następnie przybliżono problematykę realizacji zadań obronnych przez przedsiębiorców o szczególnym znaczeniu gospodarczo-obronnym ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem tych wynikających z Programu Mobilizacji Gospodarki, który są najistotniejsze dla gotowości obronnej państwa. Dokonano przeglądu zadań przedsiębiorców, które muszą udźwignąć w ramach obowiązków na rzecz obronności i narzędzi, które umożliwiają wykonanie tych obowiązków. Założono, iż państwo polskie zadbało o to, żeby obszar ten został zaopatrzony we właściwe rozwiązania prawne i organizacyjne, podjęto próbę ich oceny wybierając niektóre z nich, a następnie poddając je analizie.
EN
The article is dedicated to one of the most complex activities of the Republic of Poland in the field of security - state’s defence preparations. They are presented as all material, financial and organizational projects carried out by the public administration and, above all, by company owners. They were given the role that was directly necessary to ensure the survival and functioning of the state in a situation of security threats and in times of war, including support for their own and allied armed forces. It was assumed that merely the company owners and the economy are in a position of a key element of social security, regardless of conditions of defence readiness represented by the country. It is the economic sphere, supported by the administration, that has the most important role just in preparations of defence, and in limiting the country's sensitivity to the hostile environment. The process of operational planning was treated in a special way as an integral part of defence planning, i.e. a process of fundamental importance for the effective implementation of defence tasks. It was defined as the establishing of activities related to the preparation and operation of public administration bodies and company owners in conditions of external threats to state security and during the war, which are represented in the form of sets of operational tasks. Then, the issues related to the implementation of defence tasks by companies of special economic-defensive meaning were presented together with questions resulting from the Economy Mobilization Program and being the most important for the state's defence readiness. The tasks that companies have to fulfil under their defence obligations and the tools that enable them to do so have been reviewed. It was assumed that the Polish state made sure that this area was provided with appropriate legal and organizational solutions, and an attempt was made to evaluate and analyse some of them.
EN
Objectives: The deliberation issues of this article are focusing on the satellite constellations as the governmental and military technological requirements responding to the current space communication trends. Methods: For the purposes of this research, the following theoretical research methods were applied: analysis, synthesis, abstraction, generalisation and inference. Results: Paper reveals a brief description of the satcom evolution, as well as, the market analysis of current and emerging trends which clearly indicate that the small satellites and their constellations are presumed to remain the largest and the fastest growing segment both for the structured institutions of European Members in the governmental and military area. This institution performs the solution for innovative R&D projects and in more independent perspective acts with the business domain or administrative diplomatic efforts to create the balanced synergy in undertaken projects for worldwide security factor. A short, non-technical description of a set of general requirements of civ-mil users for the satcom is also presented in this paper. Conclusions: The research results presented in the analysed studies are useful for providing the worldwide standards of security and order in spite of developing technologies and competitiveness in faster data processing of outer space technology requirements. There shall be taken into consideration the solution of bilateral cooperation of EU institutions and non- structured EU entities under the common agenda of European investment in the space technologies and science as the resilient structure to strengthen European Continent as the global actor and expert in the government and military requirements of the current satcom trends.
7
Content available remote Willingness to defend one's own country and to resist in the Baltic states
EN
This article addresses the question of willingness to defend one’s own country and a similar notion of resistance, should Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia be attacked. The study principally relies on quantitative data from a dedicated nationally representative survey across all three countries. The data acquired thereof reaffirm findings from previous studies concluding that the highest level of willingness to defend one’s own country is in Estonia, while it is lower in Latvia and in Lithuania. Asked if and how respondents would resist in case of an attack, more willingness to resist either non-violently or violently was expressed by respondents in Lithuania, ahead of the number of willing to do so in Estonia and more so in Latvia. Demographic background of the respondents visualized and discussed in the article provides further nuances of both research questions. While situation with the willingness to defend Estonia is relatively comfortable, this should not be treated as a reason for complacency. There is still room for progress within some groups of the society. Meanwhile, valuable lessons could be drawn for policies of Latvia and more so of Lithuania to avert some of the less flattery trends identifed in this study.
EN
The goal of this study is to identify whether PESCO can be one of the tools for future projects in medicine and whether it can be used to strengthen the military medicine of the EU and, simultaneously, be in synergy with the civilian sector by providing support to the civilian field, and, finally, can EU member states increase their prestige through PESCO. The study, which is based on qualitative research methods, shows that based on Latvia’s case, strengthening the medical field by participating in PESCO can lead to countries promoting their prestige on the international stage, as well as strengthening civil-military cooperation to build much stronger policies within the EU member states. Firstly, the findings showed that from all 47 PESCO projects, only two are related to the field of medicine. Secondly, with the whole world being affected by COVID-19, PESCO can be used for new projects related to the field of medicine. Thirdly, different types of projects can be initiated under PESCO, for example, a new kind of transport for evacuation, new types of medical devices, the creation of new regional laboratories and research centres, development of new analytical and biotechnological equipment, improvement of logistic chains, the establishment of unique and specific training institutions for civilian and military medics, and the development and use of robotic technologies or drones. Finally, countries that engage in epidemiological security measures during COVID 19 are clearly enhancing their prestige by not only demonstrating their readiness to react to the current situation, but also by taking practical action.
EN
Objectives: The goal of this study is to explore the components of defence strategies faced by society in its information environment, and how these strategies are inter-related. Methods: This qualitative in-depth case study applied past research and empirical evidence to identify the components of defence strategies in a society’s information environment. The collected data were analysed using the Grounded Theory approach and a conceptual framework with the components of defence strategies and the relationships between these components being developed using the Grounded Theory. Results: This study shows that the goal of politically and militarily hostile actors is to weaken society’s information environment, and that their operations are coordinated and carried out over a long time period. The data validate past studies and reveal relationships between the components of defence strategies. These relationships increase the confidence in the validity of these components and their relationships, and expand the emerging theory. Conclusions: First, the data and findings showed 16 inter-connected components of defence strategies. Second, they showed that the political, military, societal, power, and personal goals of the hostile actors carrying out cyber operations and cyber attacks are to weaken society’s information environment. Third, they revealed that cyber operations and cyber attacks against networks, information and infrastructures are coordinated operations, carried out over a long time period. Finally, it was revealed that the actors defending society’s information environment must rapidly change their own components of defence strategies and use the newest tools and methods for these components in networks, infrastructures and social media.
EN
During periodic inspections, the technical condition and assessment of the suitability of the building object serving the state’s defence for further safe use by means of: • identification of symptoms of technical wear of the facility; • estimation of the impact of this consumption on the functional properties and technical efficiency of the building. The paper proposes an assessment of the technical condition of buildings for defence purposes based on a four-valued logic.
PL
Podczas okresowych kontroli dokonuje się sprawdzenia stanu technicznego i oceny przydatności obiektu budowlanego służącego obronności państwa do dalszego bezpiecznego użytkowania poprzez: • zidentyfikowanie symptomów zużycia technicznego obiektu; • oszacowanie wpływu tego zużycia na właściwości użytkowe i sprawność techniczną obiektu budowlanego. W referacie zaproponowano ocenę stanu technicznego obiektów budowlanych bazującą na logice czterowartościowej.
EN
The tools of exerting soft power constitute an effective instrument of information warfare conducted by intelligence services of many countries. The Russian disinformation machine, as well as other methods it uses in information warfare, seem to be effective in destabilising other countries' security and defence systems. Purpose: The purpose of this article is to bring to the attention the social engineering attack on the President of the Republic of Poland that took place either immediately after or at the final stage of the election in Poland. Method: The article was designed using the problem-based method with elements of comparative analysis. The research part was carried out using the method of critical analysis of academic literature on the topic of using soft power for achieving political goals. Results: The article presents an analysis of a recent attack by Russian pranksters on the President of Poland. It has been shown that this incident should be viewed as a dangerous manifestation of the information game played by Russia. Information about the attack was provided by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The analysis of the content of the President's conversation with the pranksters posted on Russian portals prove the existence of a real information warfare against the security of the Polish state, aimed at destabilisation of the defence system of our country. The call made by the Russian pranksters fits into the Russian strategy of exerting soft power. Conclusions: The action taken by the Russian pranksters can certainly be regarded as an example of information warfare aimed at weakening the state security system and its defence capabilities. The provocative conversation between the Russian pranksters and the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, was criticised by mass media, which accused the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the President's Chancellery of neglect in terms of ensuring the safety of the Polish head of state. Such accusations against those responsible for the president's safety seem to be justified.
PL
Zatwierdzenie w maju 2020 roku nowej strategii bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej nakazywało zwrócić uwagę na aspekty terminologiczne pojęć używanych w tym dokumencie, a także na kwestie prawne wiążące się z problemem, czy ten akt, formalnie rzecz biorąc, ma być kontrasygnowany czy też nie. Równie ważną sprawą było zwrócenie uwagi na to, że w systemie prawnym Polski opracowywane są w praktyce dwie strategie – jedną zatwierdza Prezydent RP (ostatnia postanowieniem z 12 maja 2020 r.), druga zaś ma formę uchwały Rady Ministrów (ostatnia z 9 kwietnia 2013 r.). Obecnie obowiązująca strategia została poprzedzona wcześniejszymi strategiami oraz „Białą księgą bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej”. Strategia z 12 maja 2020 roku jest obszernym dokumentem, w którym analizowane są wszystkie elementy bezpieczeństwa narodowego. W jej treści odniesiono się do takich zjawisk, jak: hybrydowość, działanie w cyberprzestrzeni, potrzeba nowych technologii oraz problem sztucznych inteligencji.
EN
With the May 2020 approval of the new national security strategy of the Republic of Poland, it was necessary to look at the terminological aspects of the terms used in this document, as well as to consider the legal issues associated primarily with whether or not it would be formally countersigned. Also, it was equally important to note that in practice there were two strategies prepared in the Polish legal system – one to be approved by the President of the Republic of Poland, the last one being adopted under the Decision of 12 May 2020, and the other under the Resolution of the Council of Ministers, last adopted on 9 April 2013. The currently applicable strategy was preceded by other strategies and the White Book on the National Security of the Republic of Poland. The strategy of 12 May 2020 is an extensive document exploring all the aspects of national security. It addresses such phenomena as hybridity, cyberspace activities, the need for new technologies and the issue of artificial intelligence.
EN
The European Union is focusing on military capabilities and the fight against terrorism, but to a lesser extent on employment opportunities for immigrant integration, human rights and peace-building and the sustainability of countries and societies in Europe and around it. The European Union has always been proud of its soft power and will continue to do so in the area of security and defence. On the other hand, the idea of Europe as an extremely “civilian power” does not correspond to the changing reality. In this regard, the EU will need to deepen its transatlantic relationship and its partnership with NATO.
EN
The study is focused on state defence management, in particular its political, strategic and legal-comparative aspects. The issue of managing the defence of the State has been presented from a systemic perspective as a separate system, being a part of a higher system and at the same time containing subordinate elements. Appropriate government documents of a conceptual nature and provisions in the common law on defence management were chosen as the subject for political-strategic and legislative legal analysis. The result of the analysis is a presentation of the key gaps and flaws in the legal solutions that may affect the functioning of the State defence management system in wartime1, in particular those related to the decision-making process of system components. In addition, an attempt was made to assess the implementation of security concepts adopted in Poland over the years, mainly in the field of managing national security and defence.
15
Content available remote Lithuania in European Union common security and defence policy context
EN
Objectives:EU Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that encompasses 29 nations is gaining momentum. The aim of this study is to acknowledge ongoing developments in EU CSDP and define their impact for Lithuanian defence and security policy. Methods: Comparative scientific literature and document analysis method was used throughout this study. Article firstly reviews a path of EU CSDP developments, outlines roles and responsibilities of EU structures and examines current activities in CSDP framework with the focus to Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Second part is devoted to consider Lithuanian’s role in current EU CSDP context, to outline decisions that Lithuanian authorities made to implement new PESCO initiative. Results: Study reveals that: CSDP remains adaptive framework for EU; established procedures ensure CSDP is in compromise with all of nations; PESCO initiative signals positive outcomes while reinforcing idea of “EU Strategic autonomy”. Furthermore it was indentified that: approved National Security Strategy backs current EU initiatives; PESCO could provide flexible response options without duplicating NATO’s efforts; national participation in PESCO initiatives will enable improvements in cyber security and will enable rapid access for possible EU and NATO troops deployments; participation in PESCO negotiation phase reached given political aims to seek more extensive projects and position nation within core members of EU. Conclusions: Lithuanian policies’ shift for deeper engagement in CSDP is likely shaped by recognition that strategic trans-Atlantic partnership is not certain anymore, as well as UK role at post-Brexit period as 3rd party.
EN
In this article, the author analyses types of Europeanisation: top-down, bottom-up, horizontal, circular, and looks at Latvian involvement in the EU CSDP capability project - EU Battlegroups. Additionally, the author analyses the EU CSDP strategies in 2003 and 2016 with emphasis on key threats and key directions of action for the security of the EU. If it is necessary, EU Battlegroups can become involved to secure the EU. In the article, the author examines Latvian involvement in EU Battlegroups and changes in political planning documents and legal acts regarding EU Battlegroups. The author shows that for the future, it is necessary to involve an EU Battlegroup in real action in the area of operations, and that it is necessary to initiate discussions on a possible review and evaluation of the format of the EU Battlegroup.
EN
The article is the second part of the intended series of articles on the technical and legal problems of the operation of construction works. it presents basic information on the issue of operation of construction works, including the explanation of the operational concept of the construction process, its structure and the stages of this process.
EN
the article is the second part of a planned series of articles devoted to the problems of technical and legal operation of buildings for defence and state security. It presents basic information about building objects being subjects of construction processes. this information includes the definitions of construction works, their classification and general characteristics of generic diversity of building objects, emphasising the issues of building objects that are of key importance for the security of the state.
PL
artykuł jest drugą częścią planowanej serii artykułów poświęconych problemom technicznej i prawnej eksploatacji budynków dla obrony i bezpieczeństwa państwa. przedstawia podstawowe informacje o obiektach budowlanych, będących przedmiotem procesów budowlanych. Informacje te obejmują definicje robót budowlanych, ich klasyfikację i ogólną charakterystykę różnorodności obiektów budowlanych, podkreślając kwestie obiektów budowlanych, które mają kluczowe znaczenie dla bezpieczeństwa państwa.
19
Content available remote Potrzeby obronne jako czynnik rozwoju infrastruktury transportowej w Polsce
PL
Zgodnie z zapisami strategicznych dokumentów doktrynalnych budowa nowoczesnego systemu transportowego, połączona z wprowadzaniem nowoczesnych środków transportu stanowi jedną z kluczowych dziedzin w systemie przygotowań obronnych oraz reagowania kryzysowego państwa. Z perspektywy współczesnych uwarunkowań rozbudowa sieci transportowych jest niezbędna dla zapewnienia wymaganych warunków przemieszczania się osób oraz przewozu uzbrojenia i sprzętu wojskowego, zaspokojenia potrzeb bytowych ludności i możliwości jej ewakuacji, wparcia Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz wojsk sojuszniczych, w przypadku kryzysu lub wojny. W artykule, na podstawie przeprowadzonych badań zidentyfikowano istotę i znaczenie potrzeb obronnych dla procesu rozwoju infrastruktury transportowej w Polsce.
EN
One of the key elements of the critical infrastructure of the state is the transport system. Its development is determined by a number of various factors, among which the priority role falls to defence issues. In accordance with the provisions of strategic doctrinal documents, the construction of a modern transport system, combined with the introduction of modern means of transport is one of the key areas in the system of defence preparations and state emergency response. From the perspective of contemporary conditions, the development of transport networks is necessary to ensure the required conditions of movement of people and the transport of armaments and military equipment, to meet the living needs of the population and the possibility of evacuation, support of the Polish Armed Forces and allied forces in the crisis or war time. The article, based on performed researches has identified the essence and importance of defence needs for the development of transport infrastructure in Poland.
EN
Two independent assets are analysed, being subject to special and general protection and attack, supplementing earlier research on individual and overarching protection and attack. Sixteen analytical solutions are developed to examine how a defender and attacker choose either two special efforts, one general effort, or one special effort and one general effort. The latter occurs when the special unit effort cost for one asset is lower than that of the other asset and the general unit effort cost. The article provides a tool for each player to realise which of these three options it should choose when facing an opponent who also chooses between these three options. The solutions are explained and illustrated with examples. The article focuses on specialization versus generalization of effort which is of paramount importance.
first rewind previous Strona / 4 next fast forward last
JavaScript jest wyłączony w Twojej przeglądarce internetowej. Włącz go, a następnie odśwież stronę, aby móc w pełni z niej korzystać.