This paper presents a rocket flight safety analysis using methods from the internationally recognized standard RCC 321-20 with an emphasis on a suborbital launch from the Polish coast. Currently, several entities are launching (or planning to launch) suborbital rockets and land them in the Baltic sea – and such flights are expected to be performed using more and more capable rockets with increasing launch frequency. While the present approach in Poland is to close a predefined air space, monitor or close the maritime zone to any traffic and ensure that the impact point dispersion of all rocket elements will fit within that restricted area, established and proven methods often take advantage of advanced calculations of flight risk to the public, aircraft and vessels. This paper demonstrates this approach and compares relative rocket or missile flight safety from Poland to other locations frequently used for such exercises. The results of this work may also be beneficial when planning safety measures for military exercises involving missiles.
Celem artykułu jest naświetlenie problemów rozwoju europejskiego przemysłu obronnego oraz prób jego reformowania. Prezentowany tekst został opracowany na podstawie dokumentów Europejskiej Służby Działań Zewnętrznych, w strukturach, których funkcjonują między innymi: Sztab Wojskowy UE oraz Europejska Agencja Obrony. W 2017 roku powołano kilka instytucji, które miały na celu modernizację oraz integrację kilkuset rozproszonych europejskich przedsiębiorstw zbrojeniowych i wyposażenie ich w konkurencyjne technologie. Ważną rolę w tej dziedzinie odgrywają Europejski Fundusz Obrony oraz Roczny Skoordynowany Przegląd Obronny (CARD). W 2022 r. procesy integracyjne w dziedzinie obronności zostały przyspieszone z powodu agresji Rosji przeciwko Ukrainie, a także po przyjęciu nowej strategii bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej zwanej „Kompasem Strategicznym”. Europejska Agencja Obrony opublikowała także rezultaty i wnioski CARD 2022.
EN
The aim of the article is to highlight the problems of development of the European defense industry, and the attempts to reform it. The presented text was prepared on the basis of documents of the European External Action Ser-vice, in the structures of which they function, and among others the EU Military Staff and the European Defense Agency. In 2017, several institutions were established to modernize and integrate several hundred dispersed European defense companies and equip them with competitive technologies. The European Defense Fund and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) play an important role in this area. In 2022, integration processes in the field of defense were accelerated due to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, as well as after the adoption of a new European Union security strategy called the Strategic Compass. The European Defense Agency has also published the results and conclusions of CARD 2022.
Wprowadzenie do rozważań na przyjęty w artykule temat stanowiły aspekty związane z rozwojem polskiego systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego. W opinii autorki wywarł on zdecydowany wpływ na kształtowanie się nowej roli i znaczenia urzędu Prezydenta RP w zapewnianiu bezpieczeństwa w państwie. Głównie w aspektach związanych z kierowaniem bezpieczeństwem narodowym. Polska przyjmując w 1997 roku Konstytucję RP rozpoczęła nowy rozdział działalności w obszarze polityki bezpieczeństwa. Główne organy władzy wyposażone zostały w szereg kompetencji mających na celu zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa obywatelom. W artykule dokonano charakterystyki ustrojowych kompetencji Prezydenta oraz tych z zakresu bezpieczeństwa państwa. Na podstawie analizy aktów prawnych oraz literatury ukazana została rola Prezydenta RP w systemie bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski.
Zagrożenie Izraela ostrzałami rakietowymi i moździerzowymi z roku na rok przybiera na sile i skali oddziaływania. Można przyjąć, że ostrzały rakietowe i moździerzowe stały się po zamachach bombowych najgroźniejszą bronią ugrupowań terrorystycznych z Palestyny i Libanu. W tych działaniach prym wiodą dwie największe organizacje terrorystyczne, tj. Hamas i Hezbollah. Wraz z rozwojem tej formy terroryzmu Izrael musiał poprawić skuteczność systemu obronnego, co przełożyło się na skuteczniejszą ochronę ludności cywilnej i obiektów infrastruktury cywilnej i wojskowej przed atakami rakietowymi i moździerzowymi. Zmiany w systemie obronnym wymagały wielu lat pracy, a ich szczególna intensywność przypadła na lata 2006-2012. Dokonane zmiany w systemie bezpieczeństwa przyczyniły się do wykształcenia dwóch form: obrony pasywnej i aktywnej, które są nieustannie modyfikowane i udoskonalane. Celem artykułu było scharakteryzowanie obrony Izraela przed atakami rakietowymi i moździerzowymi wykonywanymi przez ugrupowania terrorystyczne w latach 2001-2012. Przedmiotowo opracowanie ma charakter praktyczny, ponieważ proces badawczy został oparty na faktach i realnych działaniach zrealizowanych przez Izrael, mających ograniczyć wielkość strat wśród ludności cywilnej. Za początek rozważań naukowych przyjęto rok 2001, w którym doszło do pierwszych ostrzałów rakietowych terytorium Izraela.
EN
The threat to Israel from rocket and mortar attacks has been increasing in terms of strength and impact year after year. It can be assumed that rocket and mortar attacks have become the most dangerous weapons used by terrorist groups from Palestine and Lebanon, following suicide bombings. The two largest terrorist organizations, namely Hamas and Hezbollah, play a leading role in these actions. As this form of terrorism evolved, Israel had to improve the effectiveness of its defense system, resulting in a more efficient protection of civilian population and civil and military infrastructure against rocket and mortar attacks. The changes in the defense system required years of work, with a particular intensity during the years 2006-2012. The implemented changes in the security system led to the development of two forms of defense: passive and active, which are constantly modified and improved. The aim of this article was to characterize Israel’s defense against rocket and mortar attacks carried out by terrorist groups in the years 2001-2012. The research conducted for this purpose has a practical nature, as it is based on facts and real actions implemented by Israel to minimize civilian casualties. The analysis begins in 2001 when the first rocket attacks on Israeli territory took place.
W artykule autor analizuje już widoczne najważniejsze konsekwencje polityczno-militarne wojny rosyjsko-ukraińskiej, do których możemy zaliczyć: uruchomienie Europejskiego Instrumentu na rzecz Pokoju, aby wyposażyć Ukrainę w broń; zwiększenie wydatków na obronę praktycznie wszystkich państw NATO; rozszerzenie NATO o Finlandię i Szwecję; przyjęcie przez USA ustawy Lend-Lease. Celem artykułu jest analiza wybranych konsekwencji polityczno-militarnych, chyba najważniejszych z punktu widzenia Polski i jej sojuszników. W związku z tym, że na dzień dzisiejszy nie ma jeszcze badań naukowych poświęconych danej problematyce, w artykule zostały wykorzystane prasowe materiały analityczne oraz różnego rodzaju raporty. Główna hipoteza: w związku z tym, że nie wiadomo, kiedy skończy się ta wojna, jej konsekwencje mogą szybko przerodzić się w globalny kryzys.
EN
In the article, the author analyzes most important political and military consequences of the RussianUkrainian war, which include: launching the European Peace Facility to equip Ukraine with weapons; increasing defense spending of almost all NATO countries; NATO expansion to include Finland and Sweden; US adoption of the Lend-Lease Act. The aim of the article is to analyze selected political and military consequences, which are the most important from Poland’s point of view and its allies. Due to the fact that as of today, there is no scientific research devoted to a given issue, the article uses analytical press materials and various reports. Main hypothesis: as it is not known when this war will end its consequences could quickly turn into a global crisis.
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Państwowe dokumenty strategiczne powstają w rezultacie określonych procesów, czyli zamierzonego ciągu czynności, zaprojektowanego w celu osiągnięcia sprecyzowanego wyniku. Chcąc, aby powstał jakikolwiek dokument musi pojawić się podmiot, który podejmie decyzję o jego stworzeniu. Nieodłącznym zjawiskiem związanym ze sformalizowaną, stałą i hierarchiczną strukturą organów i instytucji państwa jest też, odzwierciedlająca ten stan rzeczy, hierarchiczna struktura dokumentów państwowych. Tworzenie dokumentów strategicznych jest wyrazem zdolności najwyższych organów kierowniczych danej organizacji do formułowania koncepcji i ich gotowości do podejmowania stosownych działań w dziedzinach ważnych dla istoty jej funkcjonowania. Działania tego rodzaju, ujmowane w skali ogólnych celów, odnoszą się do sposobu wykorzystania wszystkich środków, będących w dyspozycji w dużym horyzoncie czasowym i przestrzennym. Strategie są elementarnym narzędziem do uzyskania zakładanego poziomu rozwoju państwa we wszystkich gałęziach jego funkcjonowania. Przyjęte w strategiach cele stanowią podstawę do uruchomienia procesów planistycznych i określenia możliwości ich osiągnięcia w zakładanym czasie. W państwie działanie strategiczne jest domeną osób wchodzących w skład najwyższych władz lub decydentów mających uprawnienia do działania w określonej dziedzinie jego aktywności. W opracowanym artykule zostanie podjęty wysiłek opisania złożonej materii narodowych dokumentów strategiczno-planistycznych, ściśle powiązanych lub wprost wynikających ze strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Poddane analizie dokumenty, wyznaczają ramy i kierunki rozwoju bezpieczeństwa narodowego, a także ich dokumenty wykonawcze. Do dokumentów wykonawczych autor zaliczył Polityczno-Strategiczną Dyrektywę Obronną Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Plan Reagowania Obronnego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz plany niższych szczebli. Zapoznanie się z krótką analizą omawianych dokumentów pozwoli na pozyskanie podstawowej wiedzę i zrozumieniu procesów związanych z rozwojem, planowaniem i reagowaniem, a także zobrazuje znaczący wpływ na przeciwdziałanie zagrożeniom militarnym i niemilitarnym.
EN
State strategic documents are produced as a result of specific processes, an intended sequence of activities, designed to achieve a specific result. In order for any document to be created, there must be an entity that will make the decision to create it. An inherent phenomenon related to the formalized, permanent and hierarchical structure of state organs and institutions is also the hierarchical structure of state documents that reflects this state of affairs. The creation of strategic documents is an expression of the ability of the highest management bodies of a given organization to formulate concepts and their readiness to take appropriate actions in areas important for the essence of its operation. Actions of this type, when captured in the scale of general goals, relate to the way of using all resources at the disposal in a large time and spatial horizon. Strategies are an essential tool to achieve the assumed level of the state’s development in all branches of its functioning. The aims adopted in the strategies constitute the basis for launching planning proccesses and determining the possibility achieving them within the assumed time. In a state, strategic action is the domain of the highest authorities or decision-makers authorized to act in a specific area of its activity. In the article, an effort will be made to describe the complex matter of national strategic and planning documents, closely related or directly resulting from the national security strategy. The analyzed documents set the framework and directions for the development of national security, as well as their executive documents. The executive documents include the Political and Strategic Defense Directive of the Republic of Poland and the Defense Response Plan of the Republic of Poland, as well as lower-level plans. Getting acquainted with a short analysis of the discussed documents will allow you to acquire basic knowledge and understanding of the processes related to development, planning and response, as well as illustrate a significant impact on counteracting military and non-military threats.
This study proposes an alternative (i.e., air-assisted) system for launching payloads (micro-satellites) into space using rockets fired from Su-22 or MiG-29 combat aircraft . This paper verifies and evaluates such an air-assisted rocket system used for launching payloads to low Earth orbit (LEO) in many aspects. Mission profile and rocket drop maneuver concepts have been developed. From the adopted model of calculations and simulation results, it follows that in the considered configuration, the aforementioned aircraft will be capable of accomplishing a mission in which a payload of at least 10 kg is launched into low Earth orbit. The analyses were complemented by simulations and wind tunnel tests verifying the impact that space rockets may exert on the aerodynamic and mechanical properties of the carrier aircraft . Results of numerical simulations and wind tunnel tests to which models of the air-assisted rocket launching system were subjected indicate the rocket’s impact on the aerodynamic characteristics of the aircraft and its in-flight properties is negligible. Similarly, load and strength tests to which the airframe’s load-bearing structures have been subjected also failed to show any significant changes or deformations caused by the space rockets attached. The kits proposed may be deemed as the so-called Responsive Space Assets for the Polish Armed Forces. Implementation of such a system not only offers independence from countries or commercial companies providing space services but also allows us to master new capabilities in the context of deploying satellite systems for safety and defense purposes.
This paper deals with military mobility, which in recent years has become one of the strategic priorities for both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). The authors argue that the ability to quickly transport soldiers and military equipment over long distances across member states’ territories is a prerequisite for an effective and rapid military response by the allies. An analysis of the achievements to date shows that the European Union is one of the key actors in identifying and eliminating existing barriers and initiating necessary infrastructure construction. Simultaneously, close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in this area allows the parties involved to achieve synergies. This paper analyzes the results achieved in the light of the assumed objectives. Simultaneously, elements that hinder military mobility and perspectives of the development of the studied issue are indicated.
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Z historycznego doświadczenia konfliktów zbrojnych wynika że jednym z podstawowych elementów skutecznej obrony przed atakiem przeciwnika jest stworzenie warunków uniemożliwiających mu uzyskanie zaskoczenia. Wojna na Ukrainie oraz to że Polska odgrywa główną role na wschodniej flance Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego, unaoczniają, jak ważne znaczenie z punktu widzenia bezpieczeństwa państwa ma osłona strategiczna. W artykule podjęto próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie, jak postrzegać osłonę strategiczną we współczesnej obronie Polski i obronie wspólnej NATO.
EN
Historical experience of all armed conflicts shows that one of the key elements for an effective defense against enemy attack is to create conditions that prevent him from getting surprised. The war in Ukraine and the fact the Republic of Poland plays a key role on the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance show how important from the point of view of state security is strategic cover. The article also attempts to tackle the question of how to perceive the strategic cover in the contemporary defense of Poland and the common defense of NATO.
On August 15, Mariusz Błaszczak, Minister of National Defense, and Michael Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State, signed an agreement to strengthen the permanent presence of U.S. troops in Poland. The agreement was signed in the presence of the President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda. The agreement sets the legal framework for the presence of U.S. troops in Poland. The adopted principles are based to a large extent on regulations common to all NATO members, i.e. the NATO SOFA agreement of 1951, which Poland adopted with its membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. The agreement, which replaces the existing agreement from 2009, has been concluded for an indefinite period, and both parties can terminate it after informing the partner. This article details the provisions of the new international agreement, comparing its provisions with the existing legal regulations in the field of Polish-American cooperation.
PL
Mariusz Błaszczak, minister obrony narodowej, i Michael Pompeo, sekretarz stanu, 15 sierpnia 2020 roku podpisali umowę o wzmocnieniu trwałej obecności wojsk Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki w Polsce. Umowa została podpisana w obecności Prezydenta RP Andrzeja Dudy. Umowa ustala uregulowania prawne obecności amerykańskich wojsk w Polsce. Przyjęte zasady opierają się w dużym stopniu na regulacjach wspólnych dla wszystkich członków NATO, czyli umowy NATO SOFA z 1951 roku, którą Polska przyjęła wraz z członkostwem w Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckim. Umowa, zastępująca dotychczas obowiązujące porozumienie z 2009 roku, została zawarta na czas nieokreślony, a obie strony mogą ją rozwiązać po poinformowaniu partnera. Autorzy artykułu szczegółowo omawiają postanowienia nowej umowy międzynarodowej, porównują jej postanowienia z dotychczasowymi regulacjami prawnymi dotyczącymi współpracy polsko-amerykańskiej.
This article contains a summary of the research conducted in the Military University of Aviation concerning the problems of warfare use of unmanned aerial vehicles. It indicates the operational needs of the air force at the modern and future battlefield and the resulting requirements for unmanned aerial vehicles. The present paper outlines the areas of the potential applications and types of unmanned platforms useful for these tasks. It presents the technical and operational requirements and indicates the directions of future research necessary to expand the combat capabilities of these machines. It defines the potential groups of combat and support tasks that may be performed by unmanned aerial vehicles in the future. Conceptual solutions for the use of unmanned platforms at the battlefield and the problems of introducing new means of destruction and extending the autonomy and viability of the platforms are also presented in the present article.
This article presents the results of research that set out to identify and diagnose the trends found in the development of Russia's precision-guided weapons. The research process mainly employed the critical assessment of the literature and comparative analyses. As a result of the research, it was established that Russian thought on the strategic use of precision destruction weapons was historically determined and changed with technological progress, economic opportunities and changes in foreign policy objectives. Today, precision-guided weapons are complex strike systems capable of shaping the battlespace. Its high effectiveness makes it a real threat to objects that determine the opposing side's defense capability and can be considered strategic. The new generation of precision-guided weapons and hypersonic weapons will be crucial in achieving victories in armed struggle in the near future. Precision weapons will also be an effective tool of pressure and blackmail used to achieve the goals of international competition without the need for direct military confrontation.
The Polish armed forces have used the S-200 Vega surface-to-air missile (SAM) system since the middle of the 1980s. In the early 21st century, it was upgraded to a digital version and adapted to the reality of air combat at the time. After almost twenty years of service since its upgrade, it remains the only long-range SAM in the armament of the Polish Air Force. Today, this SAM system is undergoing a major modification, again, to maintain its long-range anti-air attack potential and the required combat functionalities. The objective of this paper is to identify the technical and tactical functioning conditions of the S-200 family of SAM system on the modern battlefield. In order to achieve this goal, the authors used theoretical methods of research. As a result of the conducted analyzes, this paper presents the operational experience gained so far and a justification for the continued service of the Vega SAM system.
This article discusses the role of artillery in fire systems as a part of Joint Fire Support (JFS). The purpose of this article is to outline the functions, place and role of artillery as a component of JFS during operation and indicate important elements of JFS planning in the context of artillery. The article is mainly based on an analysis of the artillery of NATO and the USA. The author used theoretical research methods such as analysis and synthesis of information comprised in literature and source materials and the inference method to develop this article. The article described the main tasks and function of artillery in FS, the role and place of JFS in operation and selected elements of JFS planning. Artillery will executed fire support to create conditions that provide the supported commander freedom of action. Planning, coordinating and employment of all allocated JFS assets are essential parts of JFS. This is crucial to execute deconflict and avoid fratricide.
Over the last two decades, China and Russia have been developing Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) systems Mainly based on long range Air Defense, ballistic and cruise missiles, supported by Electronic Warfare and cyberattack capabilities. Initially, these systems were used for defense purposes, but over time it was recognized they could be also applied for imposing military situation in the specific regions and create effective response to NATO countries and their concept of conducting military operations. The main aim of the article is to asses and present the impact of Chinese and Russian Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) systems on changes in global political relations and balance of military power. In the course of this study, the author used numerous analyzes, synthesis, comparisons and case studies methods mainly concentrated on presently operating A2/AD systems. This article undertakes the analysis of the Chinese bases located in the South China Sea and Djibouti, Russian A2/AD systems within Russia's borders with particular emphasis on Kaliningrad Oblast, and A2/AD systems in Crimea and Syria created as part of Russian military operations. This research allowed us to conclude that some of the A2/AD systems serve to defend borders, while the rest are created to influence the geopolitical and military situation or to gain an advantage in the area of military operations. It can be also evaluate that the use of these systems allow dominate future conflicts because they enable to establish a full control zones which are completely closed for opponents forces operations.
As strategic research plays an important role in shaping and implementing the state's security and defense policy there is a need for institutionalized capability in this field. Institutes of strategic studies serve as primary institutions providing states’ authorities with expertise related to strategic problems. The article discusses the mission, organization and activities of the Institute for Strategic Research of the Military School (Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'École Militaire – IRSEM). The article attempts to assess the role of the institute for France’s security and defense policy. The research has been based on critical qualitative analysis of publicly available sources on IRSEM mission, organization and activities. The analysis was reinforced by a short term internship of the author to the Institute in 2020. The results of research suggest that the scope of the Institute’s activities is broader than research activities. IRSEM importance for French security and defense policy stems also from its support to professional military education, outreach activities and so called “strategic succession”.
The main purpose of this article is to present the decisive contribution that Brigadier General Ion Bungescu had to the development of anti-aircraft artillery in Romania. To achieve this objective we describe in the paper the evolution of the anti-aircraft gun director computer he invented, as well as its modus operandi.The adopted methods include quantitative and qualitative analyses of documents, manuals and albums published during the considered period, and some published by Brigadier General Ion Bungescu.The results of the article are presented in the context of the accelerated development of military aviation between the two world wars. This development put terrible pressure on the development of anti-aircraft artillery that started with land guns adapted for anti-aircraft firing in 1916 and reached anti-aircraft guns controlled by Gun Director Computer in 1945. We can compare the development of military aviation during that time with the development of information technology over the last 30 years, from connecting computers in the network to the use of artificial intelligence.
This article presents the results of research that set out to identify and characterize the challenges and threats to international security posed by the use of hypersonic weapons. The research process mainly employed the critical assessment of the literature, systemic and comparative analyses and generalization. As a result of the research, it was established that hypersonic weapons are an indispensable tool in the conducting of international competition by the Russian Federation and can be treated on par with nuclear weapons. Due to its attributes, it meets the criteria of an offensive weapon and poses certain uncertainties and real threats to the international security environment mainly because, so far, the capabilities to intercept and destroy it in the active phase of flight to the target has not been acquired. The Russian Federation considers hypersonic weapons as an excellent tool for applying pressure and aggression, allowing it to conduct international competition in the gray zone and achieve foreign policy objectives without the need for direct military confrontation. Due to its ability to cause almost immediate operational and strategic effects, it accelerates the dynamics of conflict escalation and rapidly affects the transition from a state of stability to international instability. It cannot be ruled out that in the third decade of the 21st century hypersonic weapons may be the key element determining the Russian Federation's achievement of global dominance.
The aim of this study is to identify a drone swarm’s capabilities and the key factors influencing its employment in military operations. The research takes the quantitative analysis of scientific literature related to the technical and operational utilization of drones. The use of drones for military purposes in contemporary world is widespread. They conduct dull, dirty, dangerous and deep military operations replacing manned aviation in many areas. Progressive technological development including artificial intelligence and machine learning allows for the use of military drones in the form of a swarm. It is a quite new technology at the beginning of development. The study indicates that the capabilities of a drone swarm based on communication within the group and autonomy differentiate it from the typical use of unmanned aircraft. Size, diversity, self-configurability and self-perfection amongst the others indicated in literature are attributes of a drone swarm which may give advantage in military operation comparing to the classic use of unmanned aircraft. Emergent coordination as a command and control model of a drone swarm is a future way of utilizing that technology in military operations. In the future, a drone swarm will be a cheaper equivalent of advanced and much more expensive weapon systems conducting combat operations.
The Territorial Defence Forces (TDF, Polish abbrev. WOT) are to participate in combat counter-subversive operations, alone or in cooperation with other security actors. Using both offensive and protective-defensive forms and methods, they will create freedom of action for operational troops. Precise reconnaissance of the area, infrastructure knowledge in permanent areas of responsibility (Polish abbrev. SRO), cooperation with the non-military system (Polish abbrev. UPM), and cooperation with the local population in combination with the training of the TDF commanders and soldiers equipped with modern weaponry, reconnaissance and object monitoring systems will ensure good quality of protection while reducing the number of human resources involved. All forms and methods of conducting combat counter-subversive activities presented in the article are a compilation of the content contained in the literature on the subject and the practical conduct of training classes with cadets and officers at the Military University of Land Forces.
PL
Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej (WOT) będą uczestniczyć w bojowych działaniach przeciwdywersyjnych, samodzielnie lub we współdziałaniu z innymi podmiotami odpowiedzialnymi za bezpieczeństwo. Stosując formy i sposoby, zarówno zaczepne i ochronno-obronne, stworzą swobodę działania wojskom operacyjnym. Dokładne rozpoznanie terenu, znajomość infrastruktury SRO, współdziałanie z układem pozamilitarnym (UPM), współpraca z miejscową ludnością w połączeniu z wyszkoleniem dowódców i żołnierzy WOT, wyposażonych w nowoczesne uzbrojenie, systemy rozpoznania i monitoringu obiektów, zapewni dobrą jakość ochrony, ograniczając przy tym ilość zaangażowanych zasobów ludzkich. Wszystkie formy i metody prowadzenia bojowych działań przeciwdywersyjnych, przedstawionych w artykule są kompilacją treści zawartych w literaturze przedmiotu oraz praktycznego prowadzenia zajęć z podchorążymi i oficerami w Akademii Wojsk Lądowych.
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