This article provides an assessment of the defense efforts undertaken by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania since 2014. This analysis is focused on national efforts in the field of military defense and societal resilience. The assessment of defense efforts undertaken by the Baltic states has been based on their pragmatic perception of threats, development of military capabilities, and preparations in the field of civil resilience. The research references publicly available governmental documents of the Baltic states, such as security and defense strategies and concepts, defense plans, and budgets. It discusses recent research and analytical works in the field of and defense of the Baltic states. The research suggests that despite national modalities, all of the Baltic states are implementing core elements of the comprehensive defense. Although there is solid progress in implementing comprehensive defense in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, there are still many challenges ahead.
The article offers a discussion of the origins, current state, and the future of air defence for the Baltic states. It relates developments in the field of air defense to changes in the security environment and the defence policies of the Baltic states. The article starts with a retrospective on the origins and development of air defence in the Baltic states before they joined NATO. Then, it focuses on the early years of integration with NATO Integrated Air Defense System and implications for air defence related to changes in the security of the Euro-Atlantic region stemming from aggressive Russian actions. An assessment of the current posture of air defence in the Baltic states serves as a starting point for a discussion on requirements for future developments and predicting possible outcomes. The research uses unclassified, publicly available documents and analytical reports to provide background information for a discussion on the future of air defense for the Baltic states. The Baltic states are aware of the limitations of their air defense and try to develop this capability within available resources. Changes to security environment after 2014 gave a new impetus to develop the air defense of the Baltic states, both through efforts undertaken by NATO and for national capability development.
Three Northern European countries over the last century have had similar political experiences, in 1990–1991 they have re-established independence and developed an individual political and administrative system. From 2004, when all Baltic countries became members of the European Union, the land use and spatial planning systems were developed with many similarities, as well as differences. The topic of this study is a survey of the national land policies and spatial planning systems in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in the context of sustainable development, needs of society and depopulation. The aim of the article is to examine the problems, needs of society and tendencies in land usage, as well as systemic features of spatial planning in the Baltic countries. It is very important to analyse how countries realize the implementation of sustainable development strategies In land use planning and in the context of depopulation. It was found that the Baltic countries are facing similar problems in land use and spatial planning documents but there are also differences regarding planning procedures of documents, their hierarchy and types of planned measures. The study has shown that people in these countries want more natura environment and eco-industrial development. Also, it was approved as necessary to createan index (engineering method) of sustainability in spatial planning.
The main aim of the article is to analyze the security environment of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The author presents the security dilemmas of the Baltic States before their accession to NATO in 2004 (based on the example of the Republic of Estonia). Subsequently, the author shows the changes that have occurred in the security systems of the Baltic states since the beginning of the hybrid war in Ukraine in 2014. The author also draws attention to key security problems and points to Polish experiences that could be successfully adopted by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
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The main aim of the article is to considers whether China may poses non-military threat to Balitc states in terms of Belt and Road Initiative. In the face of growing presence of China in Europe, special services have recently noted that huge array of investment, being a part of Belt and Road Initiatve may leverage on national security of Baltic states.
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Historia szlaku kolejowego, który połączy Berlin i Warszawę z państwami bałtyckimi i pośrednio z Helsinkami sięga 2005 r., kiedy rozpoczęły się prace nad studium wykonalności. Budowa rozpoczęła się w 2010 r., a pierwszy odcinek oddano do użytku na Litwie w 2015 r.
The following article treats about the problem of renewable energy sources in Baltic states in the context of Russian Federation European interests. To be more precise, it raises the topic of energy domination policy, which is an integral part of Russian geostrategy. Author makes an attempt to take a look at the influence of renewable energy sources on the Russian-Baltic affairs, whereas Baltic states are importers of widely understood energy – electricity, natural gas, petroleum etc. This article has its theoretical basis on the complex interdependence theory by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. Main hypothesis to verify states that the intensification of renewable energy exploitation brings a positive impact on the Baltic states position in negotiations with Russia. The interdependence model of those countries to Kremlin should move from “vulnerability” towards “sensitivity”, which is relative better. Main point of this article is denying the geopolitical determinism and a simplified, static view on international affairs, which is actually popular in Polish public debate. Poles have great faith in the theses of classic realists, just like Hans Morgenthau or Kenneth Waltz, leading to the conclusion that the negotiating position of the state is given once for all, and is inseparably connected to geography. This point of view did not defend itself from criticism in modern times. In author’s opinion, todays geopolitical reality should be studied from many perspectives, never excluding economy. Polish public debate needs revision of many popular theses and myths, especially about the absolute superpower of Russian empire in every single aspect, resulting from its military power.
The article discusses the issues of employee financial participation in Baltic states which differs and depends on political, legal and economic preconditions. The aim of the research is to analyse employee financial participation as an instrument for collaboration in companies and a new social cooperation model in the Baltic states. The qualitative research was conducted by telephone and e-mail in 2016. The interviews were carried out with the experts (academics, civil servants, lawyers and human resource consultants working in a relevant field) as well some trade union and company representatives. In general, the new policy for supporting employee financial participation has been renewed in Latvia and Lithuania. It started recently with the revision of the legislative framework that was initially established during the privatisation period. The revision of the Law of Companies was driven by the business interest (to have a new effective human resource management tool or to transfer employee share plans from parent companies in Western countries to subsidiaries in the Baltic states) to introduce (or revise, in the case of Lithuania) new employee share ownership (ESO) plans. The research has also proven that there are common similarities in the use of employee financial participation plans despite the existing differences which are based on national features, such as tax and legal regimes, historical development patterns, or economic and structural factors.
The so called Suwalki Gap has been lately among important regional security related topics and it has been linked with its geostrategic location and geographical complexity of the terrain for conducting military operations. The threat toward Baltic states cause it to be discussed widely by civilian and military authorities, especially in the context of destabilising Ukraine and annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and possible assertive actions. The paper proposes an approach to the Suwalki Gap issue based on its geostrategic location and operational importance. It includes also its geographical characteristic connected with conducting military operations in that specific terrain. It furthers the discussion of tactical aspects of defensive and offensive operations there. The outcome of the NATO Warsaw Summit is also discussed in the context of Suwalki Gap as a land bridge linking Baltic states with the NATO allies.