How to win in combat : an ideal model applied in a scenario
Treść / Zawartość
Are our tactics effective compared to our opponent or not? Since tactics are about how to use time, units and resources in the best possible way to win or gain advantages in battle, it becomes important to be able to evaluate and measure the outcome. The purpose of this paper is to give an example of how a designed scenario in a specific military tactical situation can work as a frame for an ideal model of win or lose in combat. From the theories about how and why we are winning and losing in battles, an ideal model of the most important criteria has been compiled. The ideal model is not a “law” or the ultimate truth but more of an empirical path of knowledge and to be used as a hypothesis. A specific military combat scenario is used in visualising and to measure the quality of the tactician’s plan and action. The tactical scenario is operationalised in the narrative based on conventional warfare in future high-intensity and high-tech level conflicts. It is thus essential for the tactician to be proficient in knowing his/her units, resources and capabilities, regarding how their mobility and firepower can be optimised at different times and in different sequences. Tactical criteria can be tested in various scenarios but need to be measured more thoroughly by using wargames.
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