The influence of risk fuzziness on strategies of drawing up contracts

• Autorzy: Piech H. , Ptak A. , Machura M.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

A contract usually consists in weighing risk and motivation [21]. Most contracts are constructed in such a way that both players share of risk. Only one party taking the risk reduces the motivation of the players. When making decisions the players have a range of knowledge on the acts of "Nature", i.e. they are aware that a random factor can influence their payments. One uses, as a rule, the usefulness function in contracts. It is also possible to use functions determining the connection between sums of money and usefulness (e.g. v(x) is the usefulness of receiving the x currency units). One includes the risk concept in considerations in the form of so-called reluctance to risk. If somebody is reluctant to risk this means that he prefers to receive a definite sum of money than to hope for the best which can give either a bigger or a smaller payment. In the present considerations [24], random parameters as well as estimated and non-measurable parameters are subjected to fuzziness. The influence of fuzzy information and any forms of uncertain knowledge is extremely essential in the strategic games and to a high degree decides on the final results of the game.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

contracts; strategies; drawing up contracts; risk

PL

umowy; strategie; przygotowanie umowy; ryzyko

• Wydawca: Wydawnictwo Politechniki Częstochowskiej
• Czasopismo: Prace Naukowe Instytutu Matematyki i Informatyki Politechniki Częstochowskiej
• Rocznik: 2005
• Tom: Vol. 4, nr 1
• Strony: 211--219
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 31 poz., rys., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Piech H.

• Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Czestochowa University of Technology

autor

Ptak A.

• Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Czestochowa University of Technology

autor

Machura M.

• Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Czestochowa University of Technology

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