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Control and Cybernetics

Tytuł artykułu

Memoryless equilibrium strategies in multilevel decision processes of discrete-time descriptor systems

Autorzy Xu, H.  Mizukami, K.  Kobara, M. 
Treść / Zawartość
Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji EN
EN Applying a general theorem developed by Basar (1981), providing a set of sufficient conditions for a triple of strategies to be in hierarchical equilibrium, to games in normal (strategic) form, we study three-player Stackelberg games for linear quadratic discrete-time descriptor systems with three levels of hierarchy in decision making. We derive explicitly sufficient conditions for the existence of the memoryless hierarchical equilibrium strategies for the player (called P[sub 1]) at the top of the hierarchy, and for the player (called P[sub 2]) at the second level of the hierarchy. Since the resulting hierarchical equilibrium strategies do not depend on the memory information, P[sub 1]'s original optimal team cost remains the tight (attainable) lower bound for P[sub 1]'s cost function no matter whether the players at the lower levels of hierarchy act or not at the last two (or one) stages. Moreover, the resulting strategies have the advantages of simpler structure and higher credibility. A numerical example is solved to illustrate the validity of the results.
Słowa kluczowe
PL gra dynamiczna  
EN description system   discrete-time system   dynamics games   memoryless equilibrium strategies  
Wydawca Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences
Czasopismo Control and Cybernetics
Rocznik 1998
Tom Vol. 27, no 1
Strony 81--103
Opis fizyczny Bibliogr. 22 poz.,
autor Xu, H.
autor Mizukami, K.
autor Kobara, M.
Kolekcja BazTech
Identyfikator YADDA bwmeta1.element.baztech-article-BAT2-0001-0882